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Understanding and addressing climate change requires the collection of a significant 
amount of environmental data. Although satellites can best collect much of this data, 
it is not possible for one nation to collect all relevant climate data on its own, and 
there are currently gaps in relevant satellite data collection. Further, much of the data 
that is collected is not shared freely, but instead has barriers to access that limit its use 
for both scientific research and operational purposes. This research examined the 
development of data sharing policies to identify the barriers and incentives to 
international sharing of climate data collected by satellites. Quantitative analysis of 
satellite data-sharing policies for Earth observation data as well as case studies of 
domestic agencies in the U.S., Europe, and Japan, showed that limitations in data 
sharing are due to 1) a belief that data can efficiently be treated as a commodity, a 
viewpoint which conflicts with experience for nearly all climate data; 2) the lack of 
recognition of the normative justification for sharing climate data, though this norm 
  
exists for weather data; and 3) insufficient agreement that international cooperation 
and data sharing are required to adequately monitor climate change. These limitations 
exist due to uncertainties about the nature of the market for climate data, the 
inadequate understanding of climate impacts and the ability to mitigate them, and an 
inadequate understanding of the requirements of climate science and operational 
activities. To address this situation, countries should adopt free and open policies, 
recognizing that social benefit is maximized when data is treated as a public good and 
freely shared, and that cost recovery and commercialization of scientific satellite data 
are not viable. Countries should also share climate data internationally because it has 
the potential to save lives and property, creating a moral requirement for sharing. 
Finally, countries should agree on a minimal set of climate data that must be shared to 
adequately monitor climate. This agreement should be institutionalized by World 
Meteorological Organization (WMO) resolution framework, similar to WMO 
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I came to the topic of climate monitoring using satellites based on my previous 
experience in space policy and aerospace engineering. At the University of Maryland, 
I began working with the Center for International Security Studies. Individuals within 
this organization were focused primarily on traditional space security issues, such as 
dealing with space debris, but they were also interested in the security implications of 
climate change. I wasn’t aware of much research being done in the area of satellites 
and climate change, so I began investigating the topic. In my initial background 
research, I found a significant amount of literature about the importance of satellite 
data sharing and efforts to encourage sharing, and I also found information about data 
not being shared. However, I discovered that there was a lack of information 
explaining how or why nations determine their data sharing policies, so I decided to 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Climate change is an important and complex phenomenon, and understanding and 
addressing it requires a great deal of data, including data related to many different 
variables collected over long time periods and large geographic areas. Satellites are 
particularly well suited to climate data collection because of their comprehensive 
global coverage and consistent methodology. International organizations have defined 
a set of essential climate variables that are largely dependent on satellites. However, a 
significant portion of this data is not being collected by any nation, and in many 
cases, even the data that is collected is restricted rather than freely shared, further 
diminishing the global capability to understand and address climate change. These 
limitations on data sharing exist despite the benefits of sharing data and the efforts of 
a number of international organizations over the past 30 years or more. In order to 
understand why this is the case, it’s necessary to understand the most important 
incentives for and barriers to data sharing, i.e. which issues are most important to 
policy-makers developing data sharing policies?  
 
To begin to answer this question, it is necessary to have an understanding of climate 
science and how satellites contribute to this field, as well as a clear understanding of 
the current state of climate-relevant satellite data collection and sharing. A detailed 
examination of existing theories and academic literature related to data sharing is 
used to define the breadth of potential data sharing policy determinants. Next, 
quantitative and qualitative analyses are brought to bear in providing insight into 




development. Finally, this analysis reveals that there are three primary determinants 
of data sharing policy: economic arguments, particularly whether data is seen as a 
public good or a commodity; normative arguments about the role of the government; 
and institutional arguments about the global nature of climate change and climate 
monitoring. However, uncertainty and lack of information about the economic, 
normative, and scientific costs and benefits of sharing climate-relevant data have 
made it difficult for nations to determine which policies are in their national interest, 
and have led to differing policies over time. Though experience has provided more 
information about these issues, leading many nations to increase data sharing, 
uncertainties in these three areas remain the largest barriers to data sharing. 
 
The Need for Climate Data Collected by Satellites 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), a body formed under UN 
auspices to provide an integrated, consensus-based view of climate change, stated in 
its 2007 Assessment Report, “warming of the climate system is unequivocal.”1 It 
based this statement on direct observations, including increases in global temperature 
in the air and ocean, increasing snow and ice melt, and rising sea levels. However, 
there is much that is still uncertain. For example, in the same report, the IPCC notes 
that fully determining the cause of climate change is complicated by short time scales 
and limited spatial coverage of current studies.2 The National Aeronautics and Space 
                                                
1	  IPCC	  Fourth	  Assessment	  Report:	  Climate	  Change	  2007:	  Synthesis	  Report	  Summary	  for	  
Policymakers.	  Rep.	  Intergovernmental	  Panel	  on	  Climate	  Change	  (IPCC),	  2007.	  Web.	  19	  Mar.	  2013.	  
<http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/syr/en/spms1.html>.	  
2	  IPCC	  Fourth	  Assessment	  Report:	  Climate	  Change	  2007:	  Synthesis	  Report	  Summary	  for	  





Administration (NASA) also identified a number of unresolved questions within 
climate science that require additional data and information. For example, the sun 
goes through an 11-year cycle, but data on this cycle has only been directly observed 
for about 30 years, and longer timescales are necessary to fully understand long-term 
changes. Similarly, aerosols, tiny particles in the atmosphere, have the potential to 
produce both warming and cooling effects on the climate system, depending on a 
number of specific characteristics of the particles and their location. More accurate 
observations of this phenomenon over time are important for fully understanding its 
role in climate change.3  
 
Current understanding of the characteristics and dynamics of the climate system, as 
well as focused research on particular determinants of climate change, rely on a wide 
variety of observational data. Climate models are developed to take into account 
atmospheric, oceanic, and land-based aspects of the climate system, as well as 
interactions among these systems. These models are essential for providing insight 
into the causes of changes in the climate as well projecting future climate change, and 
they require a large number of long-duration, accurate measurements. Climate change 
has the potential to cause significant loss of life and property due to effects such as 
rising sea levels and increased floods, droughts, and severe weather. Building on 
studies of the climate system and model projections, other research and programs 
focus on identifying these climate impacts and developing mitigation and adaptation 
plans. These researchers also require high quality observational data.  
                                                
3	  "Uncertainties:	  Unresolved	  Questions	  about	  Earth's	  Climate."	  Global	  Climate	  Change.	  NASA,	  n.d.	  





Increasing the understanding of climate change processes, as well as the ability to 
forecast, mitigate, and adapt to future changes in climate, depend on a robust set of 
data. In response to a request from the IPCC, the Global Climate Observing System 
(GCOS) program defined a set of fifty “essential climate variables” that are required 
to support the work of the IPCC. This list of variables includes each aspect of the 
climate system, including the land, earth, and oceans.4 In addition to collecting a large 
number of different variables, observations must also be made as comprehensively as 
possible on a global level with a degree of accuracy adequate to distinguish long-term 
climatic changes from short-term variability. Continuity of these measurements over 
long timescales of decades or more is also necessary in order to adequately address 
climate change.  
 
Recognizing the growing importance of satellites in climate monitoring, GCOS 
released a supplemental report listing approximately twenty-five essential climate 
variables largely dependent on satellites.5 Satellites provide the only way to directly 
measure solar irradiation, which is critical to understanding the Earth’s energy 
balance, a fundamental area of climate science. Satellites’ global coverage and unique 
vantage point allows them to collect data over the oceans, Arctic and Antarctic areas, 
and sparsely populated zones more comprehensively than can be achieved with any 
                                                
4	  The	  Second	  Report	  on	  the	  Adequacy	  of	  the	  Global	  Climate	  Observing	  Systems	  for	  Climate	  in	  
Support	  of	  the	  UNFCCC.	  Rep.	  no.	  GCOS-­‐82.	  Global	  Climate	  Observing	  System,	  Apr.	  2003.	  Web.	  19	  
Mar.	  2013.	  <http://www.wmo.int/pages/prog/gcos/Publications/gcos-­‐82_2AR.pdf>.	  
5	  Systematic	  Observation	  Requirements	  for	  Satellite-­‐based	  Products	  for	  Climate	  Supplemental	  
Details	  to	  the	  Satellite-­‐based	  Component	  of	  the	  Implementation	  Plan	  for	  the	  Global	  Observing	  
System	  for	  Climate	  in	  Support	  of	  the	  UNFCCC.	  Rep.	  no.	  GCOS-­‐107.	  Global	  Climate	  Observing	  System,	  





other method. In addition, satellites use a consistent method of monitoring over both 
space and time, which provides consistency difficult to ensure with other types of 
measurements. Maintaining this consistency over decades or more, however, often 
requires an overlap period between new and old satellite operations adequate to allow 
inter-calibration. Given the importance of consistency, it is also prudent to maintain 
redundant systems or back-up systems for essential climate variables. 
  
Lack of Data Sharing 
Many countries operate satellites collecting climate-relevant data, often through the 
efforts of their meteorological or space agencies. Generally, meteorological 
organizations collect data using operational weather satellites that are replaced on a 
regular basis, updating technologies and capabilities and that generally collect the 
same types of measurements over time. Space agencies tend to operate research 
satellites, which have much greater variability and focus on providing input to 
specific scientific questions rather than on providing continuous monitoring of the 
same variables over long time periods. 
 
There are 35 nations or regional organizations involved in satellite Earth 
observations. Within this group, there are a small number of large contributors. The 
five countries with the largest Earth observation programs operate nearly 75 percent 
of the instruments; the top ten countries operate nearly 90%. However, many 
countries, including Chile, Malaysia, Morocco, and other non-traditional space 





Despite this high level of involvement and significant activity, the climate monitoring 
system is inadequate. Less than half of the measurements needed to support the 
essential climate variables have been robustly collected during this time period, and 
22 percent were not collected at all. Only about 40 percent of the instruments in the 
database are covered by policies that make data available without costs or restrictions, 
so the data availability situation is actually worse when data sharing policies are taken 
into account. Robust data is only available for about 36 percent of measurements 
needed, and no data is readily available for nearly a third of the relevant 
measurements. Restrictions on data sharing mean that not only is the international 
climate monitoring system inadequate, it is also suboptimal: some of the data that is 
collected is not fully contributing to understanding and addressing climate change.     
 
Data sharing is necessary to ensure that data from all essential climate variables is 
available to the global community and for the work of groups like the IPCC. Because 
of the large number of variables to be collected and the high costs of building and 
operating satellite systems, it is not practical for any one country to attempt to collect 
all essential climate variables on its own. Even in the United States, which has the 
largest budget for Earth observations and operates significantly more Earth 
observation satellites than any other country, only about a third of relevant 
measurements are collected robustly. Another third of the measurements are not 





Sharing data also increases the efficiency of the global climate monitoring system as 
well as the efficiency of global climate research and operations. It allows countries to 
avoid redundant collection of data and to invest funds most efficiently to ensure all 
data is collected. Making the data widely available, through adequate sharing 
technology and open data sharing policies, also means it can be accessed by the 
greatest possible number of scientists, researchers, and other potential data users. This 
maximizes the quantity of climate-related research and operations undertaken and 
increases the speed with which climate-related advancements can be made. This 
increased understanding of climate processes as well as improved models and 
methods for forecasting, mitigating, and adapting to climate can provide global 
benefits. Furthermore, it seems particularly inefficient for governments to pay the 
millions to billions of dollars it takes to build and operate satellite systems, but then 
hold back on the relatively inexpensive step of maximizing use of the data through 
distribution systems and open data policies – the step in which returns on the 
investment on the system are actually realized.6  
 
It is difficult to determine the exact benefits that would be generated due to marginal 
increases in data sharing, and there is a lack of consensus on prioritization of data 
collection and sharing beyond the definition of the essential climate variables. 
However, there are many anecdotes that illustrate the challenges of existing 
restrictions on data sharing. 
 
                                                




Climate modelers face some of the largest challenges within the climate community. 
This is because climate models require many different types of data, often from many 
different sources. When one or more of these sources requires detailed applications 
for initial or continuing data access, this can slow the process of building or 
improving the model. If data cannot be accessed at all, this will likely make the 
model, and its results, less accurate than they could otherwise be. Restrictions on data 
re-distribution make it difficult for modelers to share their model or model results 
with others. In 2011, Jonathan Overpeck noted that about half of international 
environmental modeling groups were restricted from sharing digital climate model 
data beyond the research community because of intellectual property rights imposed 
by the government.7 The same challenges that face the modeler also make it difficult 
for others to replicate and verify model results. Because they often work with fewer 
data sources at a time, these problems are generally less of a barrier for other, more 
focused research, though they certainly still play a role in slowing scientific progress 
overall. For example, high data costs or restrictions can lead researchers to abandon a 
particular research question or to carry out research using other, less expensive or less 
restrictive data that is less well suited for their purposes.8  
 
There are multiple examples of individual researchers and organizations being unable 
to access data due to high costs or restrictions. For example, when prices were raised 
on European and Canadian climate-relevant data, the United States no longer 
                                                
7 Overpeck, Jonathan T., Gerald A. Meehl, Sandrine Bony, and David R. Easterling. "Climate Data 
Challenges in the 21st Century." Science 331.6018 (2011): 700-02. Web. 19 Mar. 2013. 
<http://www.sciencemag.org/content/331/6018/700.short>. 




regularly accessed and used this data. Even within one government, high prices can 
prohibit use. When operation of the U.S. government-built Landsat satellite was 
turned over to a private company, data prices increased dramatically, and the National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) restricted its own use. Even the 
lower prices charged for Landsat data when it had been returned to U.S. government 
control proved too high for use by the Department of Agriculture, which turned to 
less expensive Indian satellite data to fill the resulting gap in information. Though it 
minimized costs for the Department of Agriculture, this meant that the U.S. 
government as a whole was paying both for the Landsat system (and its data) as well 
as for similar Indian data.9  
 
Many data sharing policies are written in such a way that data is provided for free for 
research use, but fees are charged when data is used for operational or commercial 
purposes. Though this may sound like a reasonable policy, it causes a number of 
challenges. For example, a group of countries collaborated in the development of a 
forest carbon tracking system, a tool that could be very useful for climate-related 
monitoring. Many space and meteorological organizations provided free satellite data 
to support research and development related to this system. The system was 
successfully developed and its usefulness was shown through a number of 
demonstration projects. With its usefulness proven, efforts were undertaken to 
maintain the forest carbon tracking system on an operational basis. However, this 
switch to an operational system, rather than a research program, meant that different 
data restrictions would apply. After the change, much of the data previously provided 
                                                




for free would require relatively high prices be paid for access, putting the entire 
program in jeopardy. To many of those involved in this international endeavor, it 
seems that current policies penalize exactly those projects that turn out to be most 
successful.10  
 
Similar challenges related to data-sharing restrictions are seen in the closely related 
area of natural disasters. There is significant international agreement that satellite data 
should be shared freely in the case of natural disasters; however, there are limitations 
on how this agreement is implemented. Some organizations, for example, will 
provide data for free, but maintain restrictions on redistribution of that data. In these 
cases, aid workers in the field may not be allowed to share images and other data 
products with colleagues from other organizations, and instead must direct colleagues 
to the original source of the data for access. This can be particularly challenging if 
information products are developed from multiple data sources.11  
 
In addition, some data is only made freely available for a limited period of time after 
a natural disaster. After that period, the data or information must be returned or 
destroyed. This can result in a lack of available data for long-term recovery and 
rehabilitation, a period in the natural disaster cycle that often sees more death and 
difficulty than the initial disaster. Furthermore, no agreement exists to provide data in 
advance of a natural disaster, such as a hurricane, that has been forecasted. Some aid 
                                                
10	  Personal	  interview.	  




workers cynically note that policies only ensure data is freely available while the 
disaster is still on the news.12 
  
These anecdotes represent only a few examples of a widely recognized issue, and a 
number of international organizations have focused on the need to improve 
international data sharing. The World Meteorological Organization (WMO) was 
formed in 1950 with the goal of free and open international sharing of weather data, 
and satellite data was incorporated into system shortly after the technology was 
developed.13 The Committee on Earth Observing Satellites (CEOS) was created in 
1980 to promote international cooperation and data sharing with respect to Earth 
observing satellites, particularly research-oriented satellites.14 The Global Climate 
Observing System (GCOS) program was initiated by the WMO in 1992 to identify 
needs and promote data sharing particularly related to climate.15 In 2005, an 
intergovernmental agreement formed the Group on Earth Observations (GEO), a 
ministerial-level organization that included free and open data sharing as one of its 
founding principles.16 
 
Despite the benefits of sharing data and the efforts of a number of international 
organizations over the past 30 years or more, some countries and agencies still restrict 
                                                
12	  Personal	  interview.	  
13 "World Meteorological Organization Homepage." World Meteorological Organization (WMO). 
N.p., n.d. Web. 19 Mar. 2013. <http://www.wmo.int/pages/index_en.html>. 
14 "CEOS Home." Committee on Earth Observation Satellites. N.p., n.d. Web. 19 Mar. 2013. 
<http://www.ceos.org/>. 
15 "GCOS: Index." Global Climate Observing System. N.p., n.d. Web. 19 Mar. 2013. 
<http://www.wmo.int/pages/prog/gcos/>. 





access to data. In order to understand why this is the case, it’s necessary to understand 
the incentives and barriers of data sharing, and which issues are most important to 
policy-makers choosing data sharing policies. What arguments, information, or 
concerns drive the development of data sharing policies?  
 
To begin to answer this question, it is necessary to develop a more detailed 
understanding of the current state of climate-relevant satellite data collection and 
sharing. To do so, I created a dataset that includes all unclassified government 
satellites that operated at any time between 2000 and 2012. The database contains 186 
satellites carrying a total of 483 instruments. As mentioned previously, this database 
reveals that less than half of the measurements needed to support the essential climate 
variables have been robustly collected between 2000 and 2012, and 22 percent were 
not collected at all. Taking into account restrictive data sharing policies, robust data is 
only available for about 36 percent of measurements needed, and no data is readily 
available for nearly a third of the relevant measurements.  
 
Potential Incentives and Barriers to Data Sharing 
There is a significant amount of literature related to data sharing, particularly with 
regard to geospatial data, which is often collected by the government. Authors in this 
area provide a wide range of arguments for and against climate change. Current 
thinking on the incentives and barriers to data sharing can generally be categorized 
into six theoretical areas: economic, normative, institutional, organizational, security, 





Those that focus on economic arguments debate the feasibility and relative efficiency 
of free data provision by the government compared to more market-based methods of 
data distribution. Harris recognizes the desire of countries to ensure a good return on 
their investment in Earth observation satellites, and notes that cost recovery can 
contribute to achieving this goal. Policies that include data sales can also help to 
stimulate a commercial Earth observation data market, though he notes that high 
prices could deter research users, in particular.17 Uhlrich and Schröder argue that 
because data has increasing returns to use, economic and overall social benefits may 
be exponentially larger when data is made freely available.18 Shaffer and Backlund 
also maintain that attempts at commercialization and cost recovery inhibit the 
distribution of data and potential economic growth and further contend that these 
restrictive policies are not feasible, providing evidence from U.S. satellite programs 
for which efforts at cost recovery and commercialization failed.19  
 
For some, the normative aspects of data sharing are most salient. These debates often 
revolve around the ethical responsibilities of the government, particularly with regard 
to public safety and equity. In particular, it is widely recognized that the government 
has a responsibility to provide information in the event of severe weather or natural 
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disasters, because this data can save lives and property.20 With respect to equity, a 
common argument, made by Shaffer and others, is that citizens have already paid for 
the data through general taxation, and thus should not be excluded for data access by 
additional fees or restrictions.21 Others, such as Onrud and Holland, argue that 
providing data for free to all users, including commercial entities, could be seen as an 
unfair subsidy to these groups at the expense of taxpayers, and that it is more 
equitable for those who use the data should to pay more than those who do not.22 
 
Institutional arguments focus on the international aspects of data sharing, including 
the potential for mutual benefits among nations and the difficulties of collective 
action.23 Organizational concerns focus on the dynamics within and among 
organizations that can affect decision-making, such as the views of upper-level 
managers or the professional culture.24 Remote-sensing data can be used for both civil 
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and security purposes, so those focused on security issues attempt to detail the 
potential dangers of sharing remote sensing data and determine whether the benefits 
of sharing outweigh these concerns.25 Some authors focus on the role of high-level 
policy-makers and the importance of the visibility of benefits of data distribution, 
arguing that benefits that are easier to measure, such as revenues, can be more 
convincing to policy-makers than less tangible benefits, such as research 
advancements.26 Across these various debates, scholars provide a wide variety of 
potential arguments for and against data sharing, but they do not attempt to identify 
which of these arguments are most important in actual decision-making. Are policy-
makers restricting data access due to economic goals, because of security concerns, or 
both equally? Do normative or organizational concerns have any effect on the policy-
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Contribution of This Dissertation 
There are many countries that operate climate-relevant satellites. However, the data 
collected by these satellites is shared in some cases and not others. Existing literature 
demonstrates that there are many potential factors that may affect a government 
agency’s decision regarding whether or not to share their data. I posit that only a sub-
set of the potential incentives and barriers to data sharing are actually meaningful 
determinants of data sharing policies. To understand which arguments are most 
important, I carry out both quantitative and case study analysis, building on the 
arguments posited in the existing literature. 
 
Quantitative Model of Data Sharing 
Using the database constructed to illuminate the current data sharing situation and the 
potential incentives and barriers to data sharing identified in the literature review, I 
carry out a quantitative analysis to determine the relationship between existing data 
sharing policies for each instrument and other observable characteristics related to the 
instrument, including technical or political characteristics. This is done using a probit 
regression model with proxies representing potential determinants of data sharing 
policies identified in the literature. This model shows that a number of specific 
arguments within the normative, institutional, organizational, and security areas are 
each correlated with data sharing policies, with statistically significant results all in 
the direction suggested by literature. These results provide some indication that the 
incentives and barriers suggested by the literature do play a role in determining data 




arguments discussed in the literature, and each proxy could potentially pick up other 
characteristics of instruments as well. Further, the analysis doesn’t provide insight 
into how each of these issues affects policy development. Therefore, I build on this 
analysis by carrying out a series of case studies, examining how data sharing policies 
are developed in three countries with large climate-relevant satellite programs.   
 
Domestic Agency-Level Comparative Case Studies 
The domestic level case studies include the U.S. National Air and Space 
Administration (NASA), the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(NOAA), the United States Geological Survey (USGS), the Japan Aerospace 
Exploration Agency (JAXA), Japan Meteorological Agency (JMA), the European 
Space Agency (ESA), and the European Organization for the Exploitation of 
Meteorological Satellites (EUMETSAT). These three countries and regions – the 
United States, Europe, and Japan – were together responsible for approximately half 
of the unclassified government Earth observation instruments that operated between 
2000 and 2012. The United States operated the largest portion (35 percent of 
instruments flown during this period), and Europe had a medium-sized program (12 
percent), similar in size to the Earth observation program in Russia, China, and India. 
Japan’s program is the smallest of the three cases chosen, with a 3 percent share of 
global Earth observation instruments operated in this period. Its program was similar 
in size to France and the Ukraine. Focusing on these three cases provides insight into 
policies that govern a large portion of relevant climate data while also providing some 




structured interviews with at least two individuals from each agency, these cases 
provide insight into the process of data sharing policy development as well as the 
motivations driving policy changes. The case studies demonstrate how data sharing 
policies in each of these organizations developed over time. They discuss internal 
discussions and arguments, and identify the primary determinants of policy 
development and policy change. 
 
Across all seven cases there are a number of common trends. Most of the 
organizations began with informal data sharing, often with an international 
component, followed by efforts at cost recovery or commercialization that required 
restrictions on data sharing, which later gave way in favor of more open data sharing 
policies emphasizing data use. In all cases, economic, normative, and institutional 
arguments played a significant role in policy development. Economic arguments 
revolved around whether data should be treated as a public good or a commodity, and 
were informed over time by experience. In general, efforts at cost recovery and 
commercialization failed to generate significant revenues while free data policies led 
to significantly higher data use by both the research and commercial communities. 
Normative arguments about government’s responsibility to act in the public interest 
were particularly salient within the weather community, where it is widely 
acknowledged that governments should share data that is needed to support forecasts 
that save lives and property. Governments also often make arguments about the 
proper role of government, either as a repository or a public trust, providing moral 




weather play an important role in encouraging data sharing within the weather 
community, and all organizations examined share data according to the procedures of 
the World Meteorological Organization. Arguments about the need to share data in 
order to understand the climate system had less of an impact, though the importance 
of this issue is growing. Though all of the countries examined are also members of 
the Group on Earth Observations, they do not all fully comply with its data sharing 
principles. 
 
These three cases demonstrate the role the economic, normative, and institutional 
arguments play in these three examples. They also illustrate that by giving different 
priorities to these various concerns and varying in their evaluation of the arguments, 
nations have implemented different policies at different times. 
 
International Case Studies 
The neoliberal institutional literature also suggests that international organizations 
can plan an important role in encouraging cooperation. Therefore, I look at two of the 
most active international organizations with regard to international sharing of data 
collected by Earth observation satellites. The World Meteorological Organization 
(WMO) and the Group on Earth Observations (GEO) both include international 
satellite data sharing as one if their primary goals. Almost every country in the world 
is a part of WMO, and more than 80 participate in GEO. Both organizations have 
developed data sharing principles. The discussions and viewpoints expressed by 




and barriers to data sharing on an international scale. Further, examination of these 
organizations can provide further insight into whether and how each organization 
actually affects the development of national data sharing policies. 
 
Both organizations were formed based on the argument that particular issues, weather 
for WMO and a combination of societal issues in GEO, require international 
cooperation. This argument has been central to getting members to join the 
organization and to share data. However, within the WMO, for example, this 
argument only goes so far, providing a significant incentive to share data for official 
weather forecasting, but not necessarily for other uses. In GEO, this argument has 
been less effective, and data sharing is not uniform among members, even for official 
uses. Both organizations have also made a major contribution by providing a forum in 
which discussions of data sharing policies could take place. Nations have used these 
forums, particularly GEO, as a location in which to tout the benefits of data sharing 
policies that comply with the organization’s principles. This has raised understanding 
and visibility of the effects of free and open data sharing policies. This increased 
understanding then informs policy making on the domestic agency level, and a trend 
towards increasingly open data sharing has been seen among GEO members. 
 
Conclusions, Policy Implications, Future Research 
Climate data is essential to understanding the climate system, but given the large 
quantities of data required, it isn’t practical for any one nation to collect all of the 




and a number of international organizations promoting data sharing, some data is 
shared and some is not. Current thinking on data sharing provides a wide range of 
potential incentives or barriers, but does not provide insight into which of these 
arguments is most important in policy-making. I used a comprehensive data set, 
quantitative analysis, and finally, a series of multi-level case studies, to better 
understand the process of data sharing policy development and the motivations 
driving policy changes.  
 
Based on this analysis, I found issues in the economic, normative, and institutional 
realms are most important in determining data sharing policies. Limitations in data 
sharing are due to 1) a belief that data can efficiently be treated as a commodity, a 
viewpoint which conflicts with experience for nearly all climate data; 2) the lack of a 
normative justification for sharing climate data (though this norm exists for weather 
data), and 3) the lack of agreement that international cooperation and data sharing are 
required to adequately monitor climate change (again, this norm does exist for 
weather data). These limitations exist due to uncertainties about the nature of the 
market for climate data, the lack of understanding of climate impacts and the ability 
to mitigate them, and a lack of understanding of the requirements of climate science 
and operational activities. 
 
To address these issues, countries should adopt free and open policies, recognizing 
that social benefit is maximized when data is treated as a public good and freely 




not viable. Countries should share climate data internationally because it has the 
potential to save lives and property (similar to weather data), creating a moral 
requirement for sharing. Finally, countries should agree on a minimal set of climate 
data that must be shared to adequately monitor climate. This agreement should be 
institutionalized by a resolution within the WMO framework, similar to WMO 
Resolution 40, which addressed weather data sharing 
 
Though experience with a variety of data sharing policies has greatly reduced these 
uncertainties, additional research could help to further improve understanding of data 
sharing policies. For example, quantitative analysis related to the Landsat system 
could provide a meaningful contribution to the empirical literature on the market for 
satellite data and the effects of various pricing and restriction policies. This system 
has gone through the most changes in terms of data pricing and number of users, and 
both have been well documented. This would be most effective if combined with data 






Chapter 2: Climate Science, Monitoring, and Data Sharing 
 
In this chapter, I provide an explanation of the ways in which scientific research and 
operational activates related to climate change rely on observational data. I then look 
at existing efforts to define and prioritize these measurement needs and describe how 
satellites contribute to climate monitoring. Finally, I discuss the importance of 
sharing climate data collected by satellites and present evidence and anecdotes of the 
challenges posed to climate science activities by current data sharing restrictions.  
 
2.1 Data are Essential to Climate Research and Operations 
 
The scientific study of the climate system brings together the work of many different 
disciplines. Understanding the climate system requires an understanding of conditions 
and dynamics in the atmosphere, the oceans, and on land. It must incorporate 
information about the biosphere (plants and animals on the Earth) and the cryosphere 
(glaciers, land ice, and sea ice), and it requires an understanding of the interactions 
among each of these systems. The current scientific understanding of climate change 
is based on direct measurements, detailed analysis and research on specific climate 
dynamics, and complex models, all of which require a significant amount of data. 
 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), a body formed under UN 
auspices to provide an integrated view of climate change, stated in its 2007 




statement on direct observations, including increases in global temperature in the air 
and ocean, increasing snow and ice melt, and rising sea levels.27 Direct measurements 
such as these are essential in describing and understanding the current state of the 
climate system.  
 
Changes in climate are often relatively small and occur over long periods of time. 
Meanwhile, short-term changes in weather, for example, can be much larger. This is 
well illustrated by temperature changes. The global average temperature is estimated 
to have risen approximately one degree Celsius in the past one hundred years. By 
contrast, the temperature in one area may change by ten degrees Celsius or more in 
one day. The ability to determine small long-term changes despite these large short-
term effects is based on the continuous collection of data at a high level of accuracy 
over long time periods. Surface temperature data have been collected using ground-
based stations since the mid-19th century, and satellite measurements of surface 
temperature have been collected since the late 1970s. Organizations like the Hadley 
Center in the United Kingdom and the Goddard Institute for Space Studies in the 
United States collect and maintain these measurements, and analysts are able to show 
that the change in climate is beyond any errors in measurement or uncertainties from 
geographic variability.28 
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Climate change, on a basic level, is driven by an imbalance between the amount of 
energy reaching the Earth from the sun and the amount of energy radiated by the 
Earth back into space. Direct measurements of incoming solar radiation and outgoing 
radiation from the Earth, some of which can only be taken by satellites, help to 
determine the state of Earth’s radiation balance. However, to understand climate 
change, it’s also necessary to understand what is driving this imbalance. This is done 
by carrying out focused research and analysis on one or more direct measurements 
and the dynamics of the climate system.  
 
An important distinction made by climate scientists is between forcings and 
feedbacks. Forcings are influences external to the climate system that can cause the 
climate system to change. Forcings include the buildup of greenhouse gases, injection 
of aerosols into the atmosphere by volcanic eruptions and human activity, changes in 
land cover, and changes in solar irradiance.  
 
Direct measurements of concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, such 
as carbon dioxide (CO2) and methane (CH4), show that concentrations of these gases 
have grown rapidly in the past century. Research on the effects of these increases 
combines this information with understandings of established scientific theory. For 
example, it is well known that some molecules, including carbon dioxide and 
methane, do not absorb radiation at the visible wavelengths emitted by the sun, but 
strongly absorb radiation at infrared wavelengths emitted by the Earth. Because of 




blanket and warming the Earth, leading to their designation as “greenhouse gases.” 
Measurements of rising concentrations of greenhouse gases, research on the 
interaction of radiation and particular molecules, and scientific understanding of the 
greenhouse effect are combined to demonstrate the impact of these forcing factors. 29 
 
Additionally, different types of measurements and research are needed to test the 
implications of existing theories, potentially providing further confirmation. For 
example, if warming was caused by greenhouse gases, scientists would expect to see 
warming occurring equally for days and nights, since this effect would operate at all 
times. By contrast, if warming were caused by changes in solar irradiation, greater 
warming would be expected to occur during the day rather than at night. 
Measurements of changes in temperature during each of these periods shows that both 
days and nights have experienced warming, and the warming seen at night has been 
greater than the warming observed in the daytime.30 Similar studies related to 
temperature distributions and changes within the upper and lower atmosphere provide 
similar results.31   
 
Additional measurements and research are also required to provide greater insight 
into the causes of changes in forcing factors. For example, the understanding that 
increases in carbon dioxide are largely attributable to increases in fossil fuel use is 
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based on a number of different measurements and studies. First, the amount of fossil 
fuels consumed by humans is fairly accurately measured, often at a national level, and 
these levels correlate closely to the increases of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. 
This understanding is further supported by measurements of changing atmospheric 
concentrations of particular variants of carbon, called carbon isotopes. Fossil fuels 
contain carbon with high ratios of carbon-12 to carbon-13 compared to the carbon 
naturally occurring in the ocean and atmosphere. So, when these fossil fuels are 
burned, carbon dioxide with high ratios of carbon-12 to carbon-13 is released into the 
atmosphere and begins to build up there. Since systematic measurement began in 
1977, there has been a steady increase in the carbon-12 to carbon-13 ratio in the 
atmosphere.32  
 
Some other forcing factors are more complex and less well understood than 
greenhouse gases. For example, aerosols, tiny particles suspended in the air, can have 
different effects on the atmosphere depending on their composition. Some, like 
smoke particles and dust from dessert surfaces, having a cooling effect, while others, 
such as black carbon (soot), having a warming effect. The effect of aerosols is 
particularly difficult to study and understand because it is hard to measure on a global 
level with a high level of accuracy. Aerosols originate from point sources, like 
factories or wildfires, so their concentrations differ significantly from place to place. 
                                                
32 IPCC Fourth Assessment Report: Climate Change 2007: Chapter 2 Changes in Atmospheric 
Constituents and in Radiative Forcing. Rep. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 





Further, they usually only remain in the atmosphere for a matter of days.33 NASA 
identifies the effect of aerosols as a key uncertainty with regard to forcings that 
requires improved measurements.34  
 
Similarly, uncertainties exist with respect to solar irradiance. Since 1978, solar 
irradiance has been monitored continuously by satellite, and the sun has displayed no 
statistically significant long-term change. The sun operates on an 11-year solar cycle 
during which the total irradiance changes approximately 0.15 percent. This change is 
too small and the cycles too short to have an appreciable influence on Earth’s climate. 
However, it is possible that some temperature variation in the past 1000 years could 
be related to variations in solar irradiance, and NASA notes that the relatively short 
period for which direct measurements are available leads to significant uncertainty 
regarding the long-term dynamics of solar irradiance.35 
 
Compared to forcings, feedbacks are often even more complex; a feedback is the 
result of a process that in turn influences the process itself, and it can have an 
amplifying (positive feedback) and/or dampening (negative feedback) effect on 
global warming. One of the commonly cited examples of feedbacks is ice cover. As 
warming from the buildup of atmospheric CO2 causes sea ice to melt, there is less 
white ice to reflect solar energy, and a higher proportion of that energy gets absorbed 
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by the dark ocean, which enhances the warming, which then causes the ice to melt 
even faster. Because the change in albedo amplifies the warming, it is a positive 
feedback.36  
 
Clouds represent an even more complex type of feedback than ice-cover, because 
they exert two competing influences: they reflect solar radiation back to space, but 
they also trap infrared radiation emitted from below. The formation of clouds depends 
on a number of other characteristics of the climate, such as water vapor 
concentrations, aerosols, and temperatures. In general, high clouds tend to be net 
warmers, whereas low clouds are net coolers. However, cloud feedback is considered 
the least certain of the feedbacks, because the interaction of clouds with the solar and 
terrestrial radiation depends on the total mass of the water, the size and shape of the 
droplets or particles, and the way they are distributed within the cloud. Improving 
scientific understanding of this feedback requires improved monitoring of each of 
these components. The IPCC identified cloud feedbacks as one of the highest research 
priorities; because of the large role of clouds in the climate system, even relatively 
small changes could result in speeding warming, slowing warming, or even reversing 
warming.37 
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While the focused research described above usually requires a relatively small 
number of measurements regarding a particular forcing or feedback factor, climate 
models require data on a very wide range of factors. The most complex models, 
referred to as “general circulation models,” take into account not only the dynamics 
within the atmosphere, oceans, or land, but also the interactions between them. These 
computer models combine data and measurements on a wide variety of factors with 
theories and equations describing the dynamics of the Earth system. Given these 
measurements and inputs, models are able to recreate climate conditions observed in 
real-life, such as seasonal cycles and atmospheric and oceanic circulation patterns. 
These models can be used both to confirm and improve understandings of the causes 
of climate change and to predict future changes in climate.38  
 
For example, climate models reinforce the view that climate change is due to 
anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions. Looking at the results of many different 
models, the IPCC found that when models were run with both anthropogenic and 
natural forcings, the simulations closely replicated the observed warming. But when 
they were run with only natural forcings - volcanic eruptions and variances in solar 
irradiance - the simulations displayed a significant and increasing deviation from the 
observed trend as of around 1960. To reproduce the actual warming experienced, the 
models required the input of anthropogenic forcings, specifically those due to 
greenhouse gases and aerosols.39 
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Climate models are one of the most important sources for climate projections. Models 
estimate future warming of about 1.8 to 4.0 degrees Celsius, depending on future 
greenhouse gas emission levels, and provide a number of insights into likely future 
climate impacts.40 While these models are very useful for projecting integrated global 
effects based on various scenarios, they have significantly less ability to accurately 
predict climate changes on smaller scales, such as the regional or national level. This 
is an issue, because these are the scales on which climate impacts must be understood 
in order to design and implement adaptation measures. Knowing that there will be 
more climate variability is important, but it is essential for policy makers or 
individuals to know, for example, whether their particular region is likely experience 
more droughts, floods, or both. One of the challenges for improving these models is 
the high computational requirement, but model development is also limited by a lack 
of accurate, long-duration measurements, many of which are best collected by 
satellites.41 
 
Climate change is a global concern, rather than just a scientific interest, because of 
the potential for widespread, and in some cases devastating, impacts on individuals. 
Building on studies of the climate system and climate model results, a final area of 
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climate science research focuses specifically on climate impacts and potential 
methods for mitigating or adapting to these effects. For example, rising sea levels 
have the potential to displace millions of people around the world and lead to billions 
of dollars in damage and loss of property. Changes in seasonal rainfall and snowmelt 
patterns, and increases in droughts and floods, can limit the ability of individuals to 
access sufficient safe drinking water and can lead to loss of agricultural productivity. 
These effects could lead to higher costs for food and water, and in poorer nations, 
may lead to increased starvation and death. Increased drought is also associated with 
an increase in the number and severity of forest fires, a trend already occurring in 
some areas.42 Climate change is also associated with increased variability and severity 
of extreme weather. Though no one storm can be said to be caused by climate change, 
it does increase the likelihood of more severe storms in general. These storms lead to 
increased loss of life and property. Many of these effects, including rising sea levels 
and increased severity and numbers of droughts, floods, forest fires, and extreme 
weather events, can also lead to political instability and national security issues.43 
 
2.2. Priorities for Climate Data: Essential Climate Variables 
 
As illustrated above, accurate, long-term collection of climate data is essential to the 
study of climate change and to the many aspects of climate science. However, 
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because there are so many variables of interest to climate scientists, it is necessary to 
prioritize some measurements over others.  
 
In April 2003, the Global Climate Observing System (GCOS) group took the 
initiative to identify a fixed number of high priority climate observations. GCOS 
began by identifying the major issues of concern to the IPCC and the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) that would require collection 
of climate data. First, observations are needed to characterize the state of the global 
climate system and its variability. To do this, it is necessary to monitor both the 
natural and anthropogenic forcings and feedbacks on the climate system and identify 
the causes of climate change. Second, observations are essential for improving 
prediction of future global climate change, particularly at regional and national scales. 
Finally, the UNFCCC and IPCC require climate observations to assess risk and 
vulnerability, which allow improved impact assessment and inform efforts for 
adaptation.44  
 
Focusing on these needs, GCOS developed a list of climate variables that would have 
a high impact and are currently feasible for global implementation. The list includes 
variables related to the atmosphere, oceans, and land, and each is referred to as an 
Essential Climate Variable (ECV). As GCOS has continued to examine and adapt to 
perceived global needs, the requirements for understanding the global climate system, 
improving prediction abilities, and assessing risk and vulnerabilities have remained 
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central, and the list of approximately 50 variables has remained fairly consistent over 
time.45 
 
Table 2.1 Essential Climate Variables 
Domain Essential Climate Variables46 
Atmospheric  
(over land, 
sea, and ice) 
Surface: Air temperature, Wind speed and direction, Water vapor, 
Pressure, Precipitation, Surface radiation budget. 
Upper-air: Temperature, Wind speed and direction, Water vapor, 
Cloud properties, Earth radiation budget (including solar irradiance). 
Composition: Carbon dioxide, Methane, and other long-lived 
greenhouse gases, Ozone and Aerosol, supported by their precursors 
Ocean Surface: Sea-surface temperature, Sea-surface salinity, Sea level, 
Sea state, Sea ice, Surface current, Ocean color, Carbon dioxide 
partial pressure, Ocean acidity, Phytoplankton. 
Sub-surface: Temperature, Salinity, Current, Nutrients, Carbon 
dioxide partial pressure, Ocean acidity, Oxygen, Tracers 
Terrestrial River discharge, Water use, Groundwater, Lakes, Snow cover, 
Glaciers and ice caps, Ice sheets, Permafrost, Albedo, Land cover 
(including vegetation type), Fraction of absorbed photosynthetically 
active radiation (FAPAR), Leaf area index (LAI), Above-ground 
biomass, Soil carbon, Fire disturbance, Soil moisture 
 
Table 2.1 provides a list of Essential Climate Variables (ECV) developed by the Global Climate 
Observation System group. 
 
Although the identification of 50 high-priority variables is an important step forward 
in prioritizing some measurements over others, it is important to note that even within 
these confines, climate data collection is very complex. One reason for this is that the 
essential climate variables are defined at a relatively high level, such as the ECV 
“cloud properties,” while actual measurements are very specific, looking for example 
at cloud height, location, or composition. Adequate collection of a single essential 
climate variable often requires collection of many types of specific measurements. 
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Furthermore, requirements and standards for climate data collection are generally 
much more demanding than those for other disciplines, such as weather. Data must be 
collected continuously over long time periods and large geographic areas, and a high 
level of accuracy is required in order to separate small climatic changes from larger 
short-term dynamics. These requirements make global climate data collection a 
larger, more complex, and more expensive undertaking than existing data collection 
efforts for other needs. 
 
The GCOS climate monitoring principles, which accompany the essential climate 
variables, identify some of these standards and requirements. For example, the need 
for continuous, consistent data-collection means that the systems used to measure 
climate variables over time must either remain the same, or should have adequate 
overlap with new systems, allowing calibration of the measurements taken by each. 
Similarly, any changes in calibration, validation, or algorithms used to treat the data 
must be carefully assessed to understand the impact on the long-term dataset. It is 
particularly important, when working with climate data, that station operations and 
observing systems are maintained continuously, and do not experience gaps and 
interruptions in data collection. Data collection should be prioritized at stations with 
the longest existing historical records of collection, and new stations should be set up 




emphasizes that these requirements need to be taken into account in the original 
planning for and funding of observation systems.47 
 
2.3 Satellites Are Essential for Climate Data Collection  
 
Historically, measurements relevant to climate have been taken using systems on or 
near the Earth, such as ground stations, weather balloons, water gauges, ocean buoys, 
and mobile stations on ships. However, since the 1970’s, satellites have also been a 
very important contributor to global climate measurements.  
 
Recognizing the increasing importance of satellite measurements, GCOS wrote a 
supplemental report addressing the systematic observation requirements for satellite-
based products for climate. In this report, GCOS defined the ECVs largely dependent 
on satellite observations, as well as the type of satellite measurements required to 










                                                
47	  Implementation	  Plan	  for	  the	  Global	  Observing	  System	  for	  Climate	  in	  Support	  of	  the	  UNFCCC	  
(2010	  Update).	  Rep.	  no.	  GCOS-­‐138.	  Global	  Climate	  Observing	  System,	  Aug.	  2010.	  Web.	  19	  Mar.	  
2013.	  <http://www.wmo.int/pages/prog/gcos/Publications/gcos-­‐138.pdf>.	  
48 Systematic Observation Requirements for Satellite-based Products for Climate Supplemental Details 
to the Satellite-based Component of the Implementation Plan for the Global Observing System for 
Climate in Support of the UNFCCC. Rep. no. GCOS-107. Global Climate Observing System, Sept. 




Table 2.2 Essential Climate Variables Largely Dependent on Satellites 
Domain Essential Climate Variables 
Atmospheric  
(over land, 
sea, and ice) 
Precipitation, Earth radiation budget (including solar irradiance), 
Upper-air temperature, Wind speed and direction, Water vapor, 
Cloud properties, Carbon dioxide, Ozone, Aerosol properties 
Oceanic Sea-surface temperature, Sea level, Sea ice, Ocean color (for 
biological activity), Sea state, Ocean salinity 
Terrestrial Lakes, Snow cover, Glaciers and ice caps, Albedo, Land cover 
(including vegetation type), Fraction of absorbed photosynthetically 
active radiation (FAPAR), Leaf area index (LAI), Biomass, Fire 
disturbance, Soil moisture 
 
Table 2.2 lists the Essential Climate Variables (ECV) that are largely dependent on satellites. These 
high-level variables are the most relevant of satellite data collection and sharing for climate. 
 
Satellite measurements offer a number of advantages over ground-based 
measurements. One essential climate variable, the Earth Radiation Budget, can only 
be measured from space, because the interference from the atmosphere prohibits 
accurate measurements on the ground. This variable measures the overall balance 
between incoming energy from the sun and outgoing thermal and reflected energy 
from the Earth, and is one of the most basic elements for understanding climate 
change.49 
 
Even for measurements that can also be collected on the ground, satellites offer 
unique benefits due to their ability to provide comprehensive global coverage. In fact, 
the Committee on Earth Observing Satellites argues, “only satellites provide the 
global coverage needed to observe and document global climate change.” 50 Earth 
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observation satellites are generally either in a polar orbit or a geosynchronous orbit. 
Polar-orbiting satellites travel in low, north-south orbits that take them over the poles, 
and allow them to monitor each point on the Earth approximately twice a day. 
Additional satellites in the same type of orbit can make it possible to monitor each 
point more than twice a day. Geosynchronous satellites are much farther away, 
orbiting in sync with the Earth’s rotation. The great distance allows these satellites to 
view the entire disk of the Earth at one time, and the special orbit allows them to 
continuously monitor one area. Earth observation satellites in other orbits are rare, 
though they do exist. These satellites may be optimized to provide greater coverage of 
specific areas, such as the equatorial regions, which may be of particular interest to 
countries in these zones. 51 
 
Because of their comprehensive coverage, satellites are often the only source of 
adequate information on remote areas. For example, though ocean buoys provide 
important information, it is impossible to match satellites’ spatial coverage of the 
oceans. Satellites are also particularly important for understanding the Arctic and 
Antarctic, where in situ measurements are sparse and difficult to obtain. Some of the 
most dramatic climate-related changes occurring at this time are related to ice and 
snow cover in the Arctic, and satellites provide the most complete understanding of 
these regions.  
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Another benefit of satellites is the use of the same measurement technique over the 
entire globe. Measurements taken on the ground are often done by different groups 
using different instruments and different methods, and these important differences are 
often not readily apparent. With satellites, scientists can be sure of the consistency of 
measurements taken in all regions, and this uniformity is a significant strength.52 The 
unobtrusive nature of satellite measurements may also be important, as particular 
nations or regions may not be interested in or capable of fielding or monitoring in situ 
measurements.53 
 
Though satellites have many capabilities, some of the essential climate variables can 
only be taken by systems located at or near the Earth. For example, satellites can 
monitor conditions on the surface of the ocean, but only deep-ocean surveys carried 
out by ships or buoys can take measurements below the surface.54 Ground-based 
systems are also required for determining certain elements of groundwater and some 
aspects of biodiversity, which are not accessible via satellite.55 
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Even when the satellite data provide the primary source for observing an ECV, in situ 
observations are necessary for calibration and validation of satellite records.56 The 
collection of both space- and earth-based measurements increases the confidence in 
both data sets. In fact, measuring the same variable with two different observing 
systems is sometimes the only way to minimize the adverse impacts of certain 
biases.57 
 
Each type of system has important benefits as well as challenges, and satellite and 
non-satellite measurement systems need to be used in concert to take advantage of the 
unique benefits and challenges of each, such as the high spatial resolution and long 
histories of ground measurements and the comprehensive global coverage and 
consistency provided by satellites. However, as time goes on, the satellite 
measurements of climate change will increase in value and importance. Because long 
time series are essential to understanding the changing climate, each year that a 
satellite-based measurement continues to be collected in a well-calibrated and 
validated form, it becomes more valuable to the climate science community.58 In fact, 
continuity may be more important than excellent accuracy (within limits), because a 
long-term trend can often be determined as long as the dataset has the required 
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stability.59 Given their unique advantages, growing capabilities, and increasing 
importance, it is important to ensure that there is adequate global climate monitoring 
via satellite. 
 
2.4 The Current Global Monitoring System is Suboptimal Due to Lack of Sharing  
 
Many countries operate Earth observing satellites, usually within their space agencies 
and meteorological agencies. However, even taking into account all of these systems, 
there are some ECVs that are not collected. Even the United States, which maintains 
the largest and most advanced Earth observing system in the world, would require 
unprecedented funding increases in order to collect all ECVs robustly. Furthermore, 
even when considering just the data that is collected, the global system is still 
suboptimal due to limitations on the sharing of data. Even though data may be 
collected, restrictions on data sharing significantly limit its availability to contribute 
to the ability to understand and address climate change. 
 
Given that it is impractical for one country to collect all relevant data on its own, 
international data sharing is necessary in order to ensure adequate coverage of the 
essential climate variables, which represent the data required to support the work of 
the IPCC. Data sharing must occur to ensure an adequate understanding of global 
climate change and the ability to project and adapt to future changes in climate. Not 
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only is data sharing the only effective way to ensure sufficient global climate 
monitoring, it increases the speed with which climate knowledge is obtained. The 
value of data is in its use. The more quickly and widely data is made available, the 
more scientists, researchers, citizens, policy-makers, and others can use it, resulting in 
increased understanding, new products, and better policy making. 
 
Despite these benefits, there have been many reports of limitations on data sharing 
slowing scientific progress related to climate change. Climate modeling, in particular, 
requires input from many different sources, and progress has been slowed by 
difficulty in accessing data as well as restrictions on redistribution that limit sharing 
of models or model results. Data sharing restrictions that put greater restrictions on 
operational uses of data have been reported to create major barriers to projects 
attempting to move from research to operational status. This transition, which would 
ensure the long-term benefit of successful research or test projects, can be 
prohibitively expensive.  
 
A number of international organizations have been created over the past 50 years or 
more with the goal of increasing international data sharing. The World 
Meteorological Organization (WMO) was formed in 1950 to facilitate worldwide 
exchange of weather data. The Committee on Earth Observing Satellites (CEOS) was 
formed in 1984 to promote international cooperation and data sharing related to all 
Earth observation satellites. The Group on Earth Observations (GEO), formed in 




number of global issues, including climate. However, despite the demonstrated need 
for data sharing, the negative effects of restrictions on sharing, and the efforts of 
numerous international organizations, there is still a significant amount of data that is 
not shared. This dissertation examines why data is shared in some cases and not 





Chapter 3: Characterizing Climate Data Collection and 
Sharing 
 
To understand why data is shared in some cases and not others, it is first necessary to 
fully understand the current state of data collection and sharing; i.e., in which cases is 
data shared and in which cases is it not shared. In support of this goal, I created a 
dataset that includes all unclassified government satellites that operated at any time 
between 2000 and 2012. The dataset does not include commercial satellites, 
university satellites, or classified government satellites. 186 unclassified government 
satellites operated at some point during this period, carrying a total of 483 
instruments.  
  
The database includes technical characteristics, including the instruments on each 
satellite, the spatial resolution of those instruments, and the particular types of 
measurements each satellite can take. The ECVs are defined at a higher level of 
aggregation, and multiple specific types of measurements are required to adequately 
collect each ECV. Using this information, it was possible to map each instrument to 
the particular essential climate variables that it can support. The database also 
includes political characteristics, such as which country led development of the 
satellite, which other countries were involved in the program, and what the stated 
mission of the satellite was. Finally, it includes information about the data sharing 





This chapter provides an overview of the sources used to develop the dataset, and 
provides a few descriptive statistics that help to characterize the current global 
climate monitoring system. The data set is then used to highlight the gaps in the 
collection and sharing of data. 
 
3.1 Global Climate Monitoring Satellite Database Sources 
1) CEOS Mission, Instrument, and Measurement (MIM) Database 
The primary dataset used in this research is the Committee on Earth Observing 
Systems (CEOS) Mission, Instrument, and Measurement Database, updated April 
2012. The CEOS MIM database is updated annually based on a survey of CEOS 
member space agencies. The database provides data on the mission (satellite), 
instrument, and measurement level. The satellite-level table includes the agencies 
involved in the satellite, launch date, and end of life date. It also includes a 
description of the applications of the mission and the instruments on the mission. The 
MIM instrument table includes information about the general instrument type, its 
applications and measurements, and gives a variety of technical characteristics of the 
instrument, such as its waveband, spatial resolution, swath width, and accuracy. There 
were some instruments in the CEOS MIMS database that were not mapped to a 
detailed measurement. These mappings were added based on comparisons to similar 
types of instruments in the CEOS database that did have instrument to measurement 
mapping, and based on information from satellite mission websites. The 





2) CEOS Systems Database 
The CEOS Systems Database Version 17, created January 18, 2012, traces the 
measurement types in the MIM database to the ECVs identified by GCOS. The 
mission data in the Systems Engineering Office (SEO) Systems Database is primarily 
based on the agency-provided ESA MIM Database content, but some “unofficial” 
updates have also been made to improve accuracy, and the connection of 
measurements to instruments and missions has not been reviewed by all agencies. 
Like the MIM database, the Systems Database includes tables on the mission, 
instrument, and measurement level. However, for the purposes of this research, it was 
only necessary to use the measurement-level data, which provides the measurement-
ECV mapping. In cases where a measurement was not mapped to an ECV, I carried 
out additional research to identify the correct ECV mapping. Checks were also 
carried out to ensure that each of the nearly 150 types of measurements was 
consistently mapped to the same ECV(s). Satellites that did not contribute to the 
collection of at least one ECV were removed from the database. 
 
3) Union of Concerned Scientists Satellite Database 
The Union of Concerned Scientists Satellite Database, updated April 1, 2012, is a 
listing of the more than 900 operational satellites currently in orbit around Earth. The 
UCS database includes basic information about the satellites and their orbits. For the 
purposes of this research, the database was used primarily to verify the completeness 
and accuracy of the CEOS database. Comparison of the two databases revealed about 




CEOS database, but which were not already included in the CEOS database. A 
number of these came from non-traditional space-faring nations, such as Algeria and 
Egypt, and may have been excluded from the CEOS database because of the 
relatively small national space programs in these countries. 
 
3) Satellite Program Websites 
Though the CEOS databases include significant detail about satellites, instruments, 
and measurements, there are some additional variables that are relevant to research on 
determinants of data-sharing policies that are not available. This additional 
information was collected from each of the satellite program websites. These 
variables include: the lead country developing the satellite; the countries involved in 
the satellite program; the launch mass of each satellite; whether the satellite is civil, 
military, dual-use, commercial, or university-run; whether the satellite is for research 
or operational purposes, whether climate was part of the original purpose of the 
satellite mission; and the launch mass of the satellite. Satellite program websites were 
also used to collect all relevant information about satellites that were not included in 
the CEOS database. For example, on the instrument-level, information on spatial 
resolution was collected from the websites.  
 
4) Existing Data-Sharing Policies and Websites 
To document and analyze the extent of data sharing of satellite-collected climate data, 
information on the data sharing policies and procedures for each of the climate-




websites. Data policies can vary in a number of ways, but for the purposes of the 
quantitative characterization, the primary focus was the cost of data access for 
research use and the restrictions on data access or use for research. Data policies can 
specify no cost, marginal cost, possible cost, or above marginal cost, and they can 
have no restrictions, some restrictions, or possible restrictions.  
 
Marginal cost refers to the cost of fulfilling user requests, with no attempt to recover 
the costs of the satellite systems or ground infrastructure. Possible cost refers to 
situations in which a data policy that requires an application must be provided, often 
in response to a call for proposals, and the agency evaluates the application to 
determine whether data will be freely provided or whether a higher cost will be 
charged. Restrictions include limitations on access to the data based on user, planned 
use, or some other criteria. It can also include restrictions on redistribution of the data 
or other requirements, such as special reporting requirements. “Possible restrictions” 
refers to cases in which restrictions are waived under certain conditions, such as 
selection as part of a project team. 
 
In some cases, it was impossible to find data or data policies online and attempts to 
contact data owners failed. When this occurred, the data policy was coded as 
“unknown.” In terms of data sharing policies, unknown can be considered to be 
similar to “unavailable,” but with a lower level of certainty. Data policies can also 
specify that data is not available to external researchers under any circumstances, and 





These two variables, cost and restrictions, were combined into one ordered data 
sharing variable with the following eight categories: 1) no cost and no restrictions, 2) 
no cost and some restrictions (on access, redistribution, or other requirements, such as 
reporting on use), 3) marginal cost and no restrictions, 4) marginal cost and some 
restrictions, 5) possible cost and possible restrictions, 6) above marginal cost and 
restrictions, 7) data is not made available (this is the case in which owners of the data 
explicitly state that it is not available to others), 8) data cannot be found or accessed. 
 
Though data sharing policies are written at the national government agency level (e.g. 
NASA and NOAA each have a data sharing policy) data-sharing procedures are often 
defined on the instrument level. For example, NASA has one overall data policy, but 
data from one type of instrument on a particular satellite may not be shared at all, 
while data collected by other instruments on that same satellite is made freely 
available. Therefore, while decision-making and policy making occur on the agency 
level, the unit of observation for measuring and understanding data sharing is the 
instrument level. Also, for the purposes of this research, Europe is considered as one 
entity, or country. This is because the European Space Agency (ESA) and European 
Organization for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites (EUMETSAT) each 
operate as one cohesive body, with decisions on data sharing made at this level. 
 
It is important to note that within this database, the data sharing policy applicable to 




given instrument in 2012, regardless of when the satellite was launched or when/if it 
has reached the end of its operational life. This is primarily due to the difficulty of 
collecting verifiable information on the changes in data-sharing policies over time. 
Though analyzing differences in data sharing policies across both time and 
instruments would be preferable, analyzing only differences in current policy across 
instruments is still useful for identifying whether there are observable patterns that 
can help explain why some data is currently shared (or restricted).  
 
Deletions and Additions to the Dataset 
To provide the most relevant data for examining the determinants of data sharing, the 
dataset was restricted in terms of time period and types of satellites included. These 
restrictions and their rationales are explained below. 
 
Restrict Time Period 
The time period examined in this research is restricted to the years between 2000 and 
2012. Climate-relevant satellites were excluded only if they reached the end of their 
operational life before the year 2000 or if they had not yet been launched as of 2012. 
The time period begins in 2000, because by that time climate-relevant satellites had 
become more common as both remote sensing technologies improved and awareness 
of climate change issues increased. The 2012 cut off ensures that the dataset only 
includes satellites that have already been launched and have collected data. This is 
done because the data sharing policies related to existing data are well established and 




contrast, satellites planned for future launch do not always have data sharing policies 
in place, and even if they do, it is impossible to verify their implementation. 
 
Remove commercial and university satellites 
The commercial satellites and satellites owned by universities collecting climate-
relevant data were removed from the database. This was done because the decision-
making and policy-making process with regard to data sharing in these organizations 
is likely to be significantly different from that done by national governments. 
Including information on commercial and university data-sharing policies is not 
helpful in understanding the determinants of data sharing policies for governments. 
 
The CEOS database does not include reconnaissance satellites, and no attempt was 
made to add these to the database. It is reasonable to keep these satellites out of the 
database, as these satellites are unlikely to be a primary target of international data 
sharing. 
 
Remove satellites lost during launch failures 
Satellites that were launched in the relevant time period but never became operational 
because of a failure on or immediately following the launch were removed from the 
database. Because no data was collected from these satellites, examining their data-





3.2 The State of Global Climate Monitoring via Satellite  
The resulting dataset includes 186 satellites, carrying 483 instruments collectively. 
The set of 483 instruments includes duplicates of the same instrument flown on 
different satellites; only about 300 unique types of instruments were flown in this 
period. Each of the instruments is capable of collecting one or more types of 
measurements. The 186 satellites, with their 483 instruments, took 2775 types of 
measurements. Like the 483 instruments, these 2775 types of measurements are not 
unique; many satellites and instruments collected the same type of measurement. 
There are only about 150 unique types of measurements, all of which were identified 
and defined within the CEOS databases.  
 
The number of satellites operating each year increased steadily from 2000 to 2012, 
with the number of satellites launched each year varying from about five to nearly 
twenty. More than 70% of satellites in this time period have expected lifespans of 10 
years or less, and nearly 40% have a lifespan of 5 years or less.  
 
This number of instruments operating each year has increased less rapidly than the 
number of satellites operating each year. This is due to a shift in focus from large 
satellites carrying many instruments to more specialized satellites, carrying fewer 









Figure 3.1 Number of Satellites Operating Each Year 
 
 
Figure 3.1 shows the total number of satellites that were operating each year. Satellites that were 
launched in that year are shown in red while satellites that were operating in that year, but launched 
previously, are shown in blue. 
 
There are currently 35 countries that own or are involved in at least one Earth 
observing satellite relevant to climate. The United States has the largest number of 
climate-relevant satellites – nearly triple the number of any other nation. However, 
India, China, Europe, Russia, France, and Japan are also involved in significant 
numbers of climate-relevant satellites. When considering the number of instruments, 
rather than simply the number of satellites, in which each country is involved, the 
relative size of each program differs slightly, with Europe and Russia both moving 
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Figure 3.2 Number of Satellites per Country 
 
Figure 3.2 shows the number of satellites that each country operated in the period from 2000 to 2012. 
The portion of satellites for which the country was the lead developer or operator is shown in red. 
Satellites for which the country was involved, but did not take the lead, are shown in blue. 
 
Figure 3.3 Portion of Satellites per Country (Lead Only) 
 
Figure 3.3 shows the portion of satellites for which each country was the lead out of the total 186 
satellites that operated from 2000 to 2012. The United States led development or operation of nearly a 
third of satellites during this period, but India, China, Europe, Russia, and others also maintained 



















































































































































































































Figure 3.4 Number of Instruments per Country 
 
Figure 3.4 shows the number of instruments that each country operated in the period from 2000 to 
2012. The portion of instruments for which the country was the lead developer or operator is shown in 
red. Instruments for which the country was involved, but did not take the lead, are shown in blue. 
 
Figure 3.5 Portion of Instruments per Country (Lead Only) 
 
Figure 3.5 shows the portion of instruments for which each country was the lead out of the total 483 
instruments that operated from 2000 to 2012. The United States led development or operation of more 










































































































































































































3.3 Gaps in Global Climate Satellite Data Collection and Sharing  
Data from about 40% of the 483 instruments that operated some time between 2000 
and 2012 is available for free without any restrictions. Another 25% is available for 
free with some restrictions, usually on redistribution of the data. As noted earlier, 
even this relatively low level of restriction can pose a challenge, particularly for 
climate modeling projects, which require inputs from many different sources. Data 
from the remaining 35% of instruments is significantly more difficult to access. 
 
 
Figure 3.6 Instrument Data Sharing, 2000-2012 
 
Figure 3.6 shows the data sharing policies that applied to the 483 instruments that operated at some 
time between 2000 and 2012. More than 60% of the data was not shared freely, i.e. data access was 
subject to either costs or restrictions. 
 
However, each instrument collects a different number of unique measurement types 
and operates for a different period of time. Therefore, it is important to look at the 
number of instruments that collected each type of measurement and also have 
corresponding policies to make that data freely available. To distinguish between 
gaps due to lack of data collection and those due to lack of data sharing, both cases 



















The areas of most concern are cases in which data is not available – either because 
there are no instruments collecting it or because access to data from instruments that 
do collect the measurement is limited by policies that involve costs or restrictions. 
Analysis of the dataset that takes into account the collection and sharing of detailed 
measurements over time shows that 22% of essential climate data is unavailable 
because it was not collected. However, restrictive data policies increase this 
percentage, and 31% of the data is not readily available to climate researchers when 
these policies are taken into account. Instances where data is not collected or not 
made freely available are shaded in red in the figures below. 
 
Determining whether each measurement was collected in a way that actually meets 
these demanding requirements would require extensive analysis of satellite 
capabilities and potential for synergies between different instruments that is beyond 
the scope of this work. However, as a rule of thumb, only types of measurements that 
are available from more than five instruments operating concurrently are considered 
robustly collected or available. These cases are shaded in green in the figures below. 
When data collection is considered alone, 46% of essential climate data is robustly 
collected, but when restrictive data policies are taken into account, this falls to only 
36% of the data that is robustly available. 
 
In less extreme cases, data may be collected and shared, but only by a small number 




the climate community for data that is continuously collected, calibrated with other 
systems, and accurate, with global coverage provided on a regular and frequent basis. 
Ensuring continuity of measurements requires overlaps in systems and also benefits 
from some level of redundancy or back-up systems to ensure coverage in the case of 
satellite or instrument malfunctions. Intercalibration requires that systems operate 
concurrently for at least some period of time, and accuracy also tends to improve with 
the addition of multiple measuring systems. Though one polar satellite can often 
provide global coverage on its own, it only views each point on the Earth 
approximately twice a day; additional satellites are needed to improve temporal 
coverage.  
 
Further, different instruments have different spatial resolutions and different 
capabilities in terms of differentiating among wavelengths. While they may all 
contribute to some extent to collection of an essential climate variable, any one 
instrument may not fully meet climate needs. The more instruments collect a given 
measurement, the greater the likelihood that these needs will be met by at least one 
instrument, or that needs can be met through re-analysis that creates integrated 
datasets based on multiple instruments. Confirming work with multiple datasets, or 
carrying out reanalysis also requires that this data be accessible, and not limited by 
restrictive data policies. Developing a new dataset through reanalysis of multiple 
sources is much less useful if one or more of those sources limit redistribution of the 





Two important points emerge from this analysis. First, the current climate monitoring 
system is inadequate – even including the efforts of every country, much of the data 
that we need to understand climate change is not collected robustly, or is not being 
collected at all. Second, restrictions on data sharing make the situation even worse. 
Lack of sharing means that we have a suboptimal system and are failing to benefit 
fully even from the data that is collected. The negative effects of restrictive data 
sharing policies are not only seen in the many anecdotal cases discussed earlier, but 
can also be shown quantitatively to have a meaningful impact on availability of 
essential climate data. 
 
 
Figure 3.7 Measurements Collected vs. Measurements Collected and Shared, 
2000-2012 
 
Figure 3.7 shows the proportion of measurement-years (including all detailed measurements needed to 
support the ECVs in the years 2000-2012) for which data was collected compared to the instances in 
which the data was both collected and shared. This chart shows that lack of sharing significantly 
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Measurements Collected vs.  
Measurements Collected and Shared, 2000-2012  
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2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Aerosol1absorption1optical1depth1(column/profile) 10 13 19 20 18 19 19 18 18 20 21 22 22
Aerosol1effective1radius1(column/profile) 11 12 15 15 12 13 14 13 13 17 18 17 17
Aerosol1Extinction1/1Backscatter1(column/profile) 8 11 15 18 16 16 15 14 14 17 18 16 15
Aerosol1optical1depth1(column/profile) 10 9 15 15 16 17 20 21 21 24 24 25 26
Atmospheric1Chemistry1H1BrO1(column/profile) 2 4 5 5 6 6 4 4 4 4 4 4 3
Atmospheric1Chemistry1H1C2H21(column/profile) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Atmospheric1Chemistry1H1C2H61(column/profile) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Atmospheric1Chemistry1H1CFCH111(column/profile) 0 0 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Atmospheric1Chemistry1H1CFCH121(column/profile) 0 0 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Atmospheric1Chemistry1H1CH3Br1(column/profile) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Atmospheric1Chemistry1H1CH41(column/profile) 5 5 9 9 11 11 9 9 9 10 10 10 11
Atmospheric1Chemistry1H1ClO1(column/profile) 0 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Atmospheric1Chemistry1H1ClONO21(column/profile) 0 0 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Atmospheric1Chemistry1H1CO1(column/profile) 1 2 5 5 7 7 8 8 8 8 8 8 9
Atmospheric1Chemistry1H1CO21(column/profile) 9 9 13 14 15 14 13 14 15 17 18 19 21
Atmospheric1Chemistry1H1COS1(column/profile) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Atmospheric1Chemistry1H1HCFCH221(column/profile) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Atmospheric1Chemistry1H1HCl1(column/profile) 1 1 1 2 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Atmospheric1Chemistry1H1HDO1(column/profile) 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Atmospheric1Chemistry1H1HNO31(column/profile) 0 1 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
Atmospheric1Chemistry1H1N2O1(column/profile) 0 1 4 4 6 6 7 7 7 7 7 7 8
Atmospheric1Chemistry1H1N2O51(column/profile) 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Atmospheric1Chemistry1H1NO1(column/profile) 1 1 2 3 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 3
Atmospheric1Chemistry1H1NO21(column/profile) 3 5 9 11 11 11 8 8 8 8 8 8 7
Atmospheric1Chemistry1H1OClO1(column/profile) 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1
Atmospheric1Chemistry1H1OH1(column/profile) 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Atmospheric1Chemistry1H1PSC1(column/profile) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Atmospheric1Chemistry1H1SF61(column/profile) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Atmospheric1Chemistry1H1SO21(column/profile) 1 1 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2
Atmospheric1pressure1(over1land1surface) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3
Atmospheric1pressure1(over1sea1surface) 0 0 0 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 5 5
Atmospheric1Specific1Humidity1(At1Surface) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Atmospheric1specific1humidity1(column/profile) 53 55 69 68 68 67 68 67 72 75 81 87 89
Atmospheric1stability1index 5 6 8 8 7 8 8 7 7 8 9 10 10
Atmospheric1temperature1(at1surface) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 4 4
Atmospheric1temperature1(column/profile) 38 44 52 53 55 50 47 48 52 55 59 60 64
Bathymetry 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 3
Cloud1base1height 5 5 5 6 6 4 7 7 7 7 7 8 8
Cloud1cover 24 24 29 29 26 26 30 30 29 32 33 36 35
Cloud1drop1size1(at1cloud1top) 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3
Cloud1ice1(column/profile) 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Cloud1ice1content1(at1cloud1top) 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 5 6 6 6
Cloud1ice1effective1radius1(column/profile) 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Cloud1imagery 20 20 24 23 22 24 28 27 29 32 34 37 37
Cloud1liquid1water1(column/profile) 21 24 29 31 32 29 30 29 31 30 31 31 34
Cloud1Mask 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Cloud1optical1depth 1 1 4 5 4 4 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
Cloud1top1height 24 26 33 34 33 32 32 31 31 34 36 38 39
Cloud1top1temperature 18 18 23 23 20 20 19 18 19 21 24 25 25
Cloud1type 22 24 32 34 34 36 37 39 43 45 49 52 52






Diffuse'attenuation'coefficient'(DAC) 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Dominant'wave'direction 2 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2
Dominant'wave'period 2 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2
Downwelling'long9wave'radiation'at'the'Earth'surface 2 2 5 5 5 6 8 8 8 8 8 10 12
Downwelling'short9wave'radiation'at'the'Earth'surface5 5 7 7 7 8 9 9 9 10 10 11 12
Downwelling'solar'radiation'at'TOA 8 8 9 12 12 12 11 11 12 12 13 14 14
Earth'surface'albedo 39 43 47 53 54 60 64 66 73 75 77 79 74
Electron'density'profile 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Fire'area 21 23 24 24 23 23 24 24 24 28 28 32 33
Fire'temperature 9 11 11 11 10 10 9 8 8 9 9 11 10
Fractionally'absorbed'PAR'(FPAR) 8 9 13 15 16 17 18 18 19 20 20 22 22
Freezing'Level'Height 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Geoid 3 4 6 6 6 6 6 6 8 9 10 9 8
Glacier'cover 5 5 5 6 6 6 6 10 11 11 13 14 14
Glacier'motion 3 2 4 4 4 4 5 9 10 10 12 12 10
Glacier'topography 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
Gravity'field 3 5 6 6 6 6 6 5 7 10 11 11 11
Gravity'gradients 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2
Height'of'the'Top'of'the'Planetary'Boundary'Layer 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Height'of'tropopause 2 4 6 7 7 8 7 7 8 9 10 10 11
Ice'sheet'topography 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Iceberg'fractional'cover 5 5 5 5 5 5 6 6 6 6 5 5 4
Iceberg'height 5 5 5 5 5 5 6 6 6 6 5 5 4
Lake'Surface'Height 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Land'cover 10 11 13 14 14 14 15 18 20 22 23 27 26
Land'surface'imagery 44 48 55 59 62 68 72 76 85 88 92 96 92
Land'surface'temperature 29 31 40 42 41 44 45 43 48 53 58 64 66
Land'surface'topography 19 19 22 25 25 27 32 37 39 36 39 40 36
Leaf'Area'Index'(LAI) 6 7 10 11 10 10 10 10 10 11 11 12 11
Lightning'detection 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3
Long9wave'cloud'emissivity 2 2 2 2 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Long9wave'Earth'surface'emissivity 7 7 13 13 13 14 16 16 17 17 17 18 19
Magnetic'field'(scalar) 8 8 9 9 11 10 11 10 10 11 11 10 10
Magnetic'field'(vector) 8 8 9 9 11 10 12 11 11 12 12 11 11
Melting'Layer'Depth'in'Clouds 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Normalized'Differential'Vegetation'Index'(NDVI) 12 13 17 17 16 16 16 16 16 19 19 21 21
Ocean'chlorophyll'concentration 5 6 10 10 8 7 7 8 10 10 12 12 10
Ocean'dynamic'topography 10 12 12 11 12 12 12 9 13 13 13 13 13
Ocean'imagery'and'water'leaving'radiance 32 32 35 31 32 33 35 34 36 37 40 41 38
Ocean'salinity 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 3 3
Ocean'surface'currents'(vector) 0 0 3 3 3 3 3 5 5 5 6 6 6
Ocean'suspended'sediment'concentration 3 4 8 8 7 6 6 7 9 10 11 10 8
Oil'spill'cover 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 5 5 5 5
Outgoing'long9wave'radiation'at'Earth'surface 2 2 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 7 8
Outgoing'long9wave'radiation'at'TOA 27 27 34 35 34 35 31 30 32 37 43 44 47
Outgoing'short9wave'radiation'at'TOA 5 5 7 7 7 8 8 8 9 9 10 13 15
Outgoing'spectral'radiance'at'TOA 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Ozone'profile 25 29 38 36 38 39 34 33 35 38 41 43 45
Permafrost 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Photosynthetically'Active'Radiation'(PAR) 2 3 6 6 6 6 6 6 7 7 7 7 6
Precipitation'index'(daily'cumulative) 0 0 2 2 1 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Precipitation'Profile'(liquid'or'solid) 4 4 5 5 5 6 8 8 8 9 9 11 13
Precipitation'rate'(liquid)'at'the'surface 40 42 48 49 48 48 49 46 47 52 56 59 61
Precipitation'rate'(solid)'at'the'surface 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 2 2
Sea'level 3 5 7 7 7 7 7 6 11 11 12 13 12
Sea'surface'temperature 30 33 43 44 42 44 43 42 45 50 56 59 59
Sea9ice'cover 35 36 43 38 39 40 41 43 46 51 54 57 55
Sea9ice'sheet'topography 11 9 10 10 11 11 12 12 11 11 12 11 9
Sea9ice'surface'temperature 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3
Sea9ice'thickness 21 22 18 13 16 17 16 14 15 17 18 16 15
Sea9ice'type 5 3 5 5 5 5 7 11 12 13 15 16 14
Short9wave'cloud'reflectance 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Short9wave'Earth'surface'bi9directional'reflectance 13 13 18 18 19 22 24 23 25 26 26 26 25





Table 3.2 provides a detailed view of the number of instruments that collected each of the detailed 
measurements that supports the Essential Climate Variables in each year from 2000 to 2012. 
Measurements that are collected robustly, by more than five instruments, are shown in green. 
Measurements that are not collected robustly are shaded in yellow, and data that are not collected by 
any instruments are shaded in red. 
 
  
Snow%Albedo 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Snow%cover 42 43 52 52 50 47 48 51 52 55 58 63 65
Snow%Detection%(mask) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Snow%melting%status%(wet/dry) 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
Snow%water%equivalent 10 10 15 16 15 14 16 17 17 17 17 17 18
Soil%moisture%at%the%surface 14 12 19 20 19 18 22 23 24 26 27 28 29
Soil%Moisture%in%the%Roots%Region 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Soil%type 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 7 8 8 9 10 10
Surface%Coherent%Change%Detection 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
Temperature%of%tropopause 10 10 13 14 14 13 10 10 12 12 14 14 15
Total%electron%content%(TEC) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Vegetation%Canopy%(cover) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Vegetation%Canopy%(height) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
Vegetation%Cover 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 5 5 5 4
Vegetation%type 28 28 37 42 42 44 46 51 55 56 57 59 56
Visibility 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Volcanic%ash 4 4 5 5 5 6 7 7 7 8 8 8 9
Water%vapour%imagery 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 3
Wave%Directional%Energy%Frequency%Spectrum 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Wind%profile%(horizontal) 17 16 19 21 19 21 20 19 18 19 21 21 19
Wind%profile%(vertical) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Wind%speed%over%sea%surface%(horizontal) 14 15 23 24 23 22 22 22 24 25 26 32 33
Wind%stress 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Wind%vector%over%land%surface%(horizontal) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1




Table 3.2 Number of Instruments that Collected and is Shared Freely Without 







2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Aerosol1absorption1optical1depth1(column/profile) 8 9 13 13 11 12 11 10 10 12 13 14 13
Aerosol1effective1radius1(column/profile) 8 9 12 12 10 11 11 10 10 12 13 13 12
Aerosol1Extinction1/1Backscatter1(column/profile) 5 6 8 9 8 8 8 7 7 8 9 8 7
Aerosol1optical1depth1(column/profile) 5 5 8 8 9 10 11 12 12 13 13 15 15
Atmospheric1Chemistry1H1BrO1(column/profile) 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Atmospheric1Chemistry1H1C2H21(column/profile) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Atmospheric1Chemistry1H1C2H61(column/profile) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Atmospheric1Chemistry1H1CFCH111(column/profile) 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Atmospheric1Chemistry1H1CFCH121(column/profile) 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Atmospheric1Chemistry1H1CH3Br1(column/profile) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Atmospheric1Chemistry1H1CH41(column/profile) 4 4 6 6 8 8 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
Atmospheric1Chemistry1H1ClO1(column/profile) 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Atmospheric1Chemistry1H1ClONO21(column/profile) 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Atmospheric1Chemistry1H1CO1(column/profile) 1 1 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Atmospheric1Chemistry1H1CO21(column/profile) 9 9 11 11 12 11 8 9 9 10 10 11 11
Atmospheric1Chemistry1H1COS1(column/profile) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Atmospheric1Chemistry1H1HCFCH221(column/profile) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Atmospheric1Chemistry1H1HCl1(column/profile) 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Atmospheric1Chemistry1H1HDO1(column/profile) 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Atmospheric1Chemistry1H1HNO31(column/profile) 0 0 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Atmospheric1Chemistry1H1N2O1(column/profile) 0 0 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Atmospheric1Chemistry1H1N2O51(column/profile) 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Atmospheric1Chemistry1H1NO1(column/profile) 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
Atmospheric1Chemistry1H1NO21(column/profile) 2 2 3 3 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Atmospheric1Chemistry1H1OClO1(column/profile) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Atmospheric1Chemistry1H1OH1(column/profile) 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Atmospheric1Chemistry1H1PSC1(column/profile) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Atmospheric1Chemistry1H1SF61(column/profile) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Atmospheric1Chemistry1H1SO21(column/profile) 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Atmospheric1pressure1(over1land1surface) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 3
Atmospheric1pressure1(over1sea1surface) 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 4 4
Atmospheric1Specific1Humidity1(At1Surface) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Atmospheric1specific1humidity1(column/profile) 35 37 48 49 48 46 44 43 45 48 49 53 53
Atmospheric1stability1index 5 6 7 7 6 6 6 5 5 6 7 7 6
Atmospheric1temperature1(at1surface) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Atmospheric1temperature1(column/profile) 34 35 41 42 43 38 33 33 33 35 36 38 37
Bathymetry 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Cloud1base1height 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 3 3
Cloud1cover 10 11 15 15 13 14 16 16 16 18 19 20 19
Cloud1drop1size1(at1cloud1top) 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3
Cloud1ice1(column/profile) 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Cloud1ice1content1(at1cloud1top) 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Cloud1ice1effective1radius1(column/profile) 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Cloud1imagery 13 14 16 16 15 16 18 17 17 19 20 21 20
Cloud1liquid1water1(column/profile) 18 18 24 24 23 20 21 21 21 20 20 20 20
Cloud1Mask 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Cloud1optical1depth 1 1 3 4 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
Cloud1top1height 16 17 21 21 20 20 18 17 17 19 20 21 20
Cloud1top1temperature 12 13 17 17 15 14 11 10 10 12 13 13 12
Cloud1type 6 6 11 14 14 17 18 18 18 19 19 19 19






Diffuse'attenuation'coefficient'(DAC) 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Dominant'wave'direction 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Dominant'wave'period 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Downwelling'long9wave'radiation'at'the'Earth'surface 2 2 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 6 6
Downwelling'short9wave'radiation'at'the'Earth'surface 5 5 7 7 7 8 8 8 8 9 9 10 10
Downwelling'solar'radiation'at'TOA 6 6 7 11 11 11 9 9 9 9 9 10 10
Earth'surface'albedo 10 10 13 14 13 14 14 14 14 15 15 16 16
Electron'density'profile 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Fire'area 16 17 19 19 18 18 16 15 15 17 18 21 20
Fire'temperature 6 7 8 8 7 7 7 6 6 7 8 10 9
Fractionally'absorbed'PAR'(FPAR) 7 7 9 9 9 10 10 10 10 11 11 11 11
Freezing'Level'Height 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Geoid 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 4
Glacier'cover 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Glacier'motion 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Glacier'topography 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Gravity'field 2 4 5 5 5 5 5 4 6 6 6 7 7
Gravity'gradients 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Height'of'the'Top'of'the'Planetary'Boundary'Layer 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Height'of'tropopause 2 2 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
Ice'sheet'topography 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Iceberg'fractional'cover 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Iceberg'height 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Lake'Surface'Height 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Land'cover 5 5 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 7 7
Land'surface'imagery 9 9 12 13 12 13 13 13 13 14 14 15 15
Land'surface'temperature 22 24 31 32 31 33 31 29 29 33 35 38 36
Land'surface'topography 1 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 3 3
Leaf'Area'Index'(LAI) 5 5 7 7 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 7 7
Lightning'detection 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2
Long9wave'cloud'emissivity 2 2 2 2 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Long9wave'Earth'surface'emissivity 6 6 12 12 12 13 13 13 13 13 13 14 14
Magnetic'field'(scalar) 5 5 6 7 7 6 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Magnetic'field'(vector) 5 5 6 7 7 6 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Melting'Layer'Depth'in'Clouds 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Normalized'Differential'Vegetation'Index'(NDVI) 10 10 13 13 12 12 10 10 10 11 11 12 12
Ocean'chlorophyll'concentration 2 2 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4
Ocean'dynamic'topography 3 6 7 7 7 7 7 4 8 8 8 8 8
Ocean'imagery'and'water'leaving'radiance 12 13 16 16 14 15 15 14 14 16 17 18 17
Ocean'salinity 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2
Ocean'surface'currents'(vector) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ocean'suspended'sediment'concentration 2 2 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Oil'spill'cover 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Outgoing'long9wave'radiation'at'Earth'surface 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 6 6
Outgoing'long9wave'radiation'at'TOA 23 24 30 32 31 31 23 22 22 26 27 28 27
Outgoing'short9wave'radiation'at'TOA 4 4 5 6 6 6 5 5 5 5 5 7 7
Outgoing'spectral'radiance'at'TOA 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Ozone'profile 19 20 25 25 27 27 21 20 20 23 24 25 24
Permafrost 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Photosynthetically'Active'Radiation'(PAR) 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Precipitation'index'(daily'cumulative) 0 0 2 2 1 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Precipitation'Profile'(liquid'or'solid) 4 4 5 5 5 6 7 7 7 8 8 9 10
Precipitation'rate'(liquid)'at'the'surface 30 32 39 41 38 37 36 34 34 38 40 42 41
Precipitation'rate'(solid)'at'the'surface 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 2 2
Sea'level 1 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 8 8 8 8 8
Sea'surface'temperature 20 22 29 30 27 29 27 25 25 29 31 33 32
Sea9ice'cover 11 11 19 19 17 19 19 19 19 20 20 22 22
Sea9ice'sheet'topography 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
Sea9ice'surface'temperature 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3
Sea9ice'thickness 4 4 5 6 6 7 7 7 7 8 8 7 7
Sea9ice'type 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Short9wave'cloud'reflectance 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Short9wave'Earth'surface'bi9directional'reflectance 6 6 9 9 8 9 9 9 9 10 10 10 10






Table 3.2 provides a detailed view of the number of instruments that collected and for which data are 
shared (freely, without restrictions) for each of the detailed measurements that supports the Essential 
Climate Variables in each year from 2000 to 2012. Measurements that are robustly available, 
collected and shared by more than five instruments, are shown in green. Measurements that are not 
robustly available are shaded in yellow, and data that are not freely available from any instruments 





Snow%Albedo 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Snow%cover 21 21 29 29 27 26 24 24 24 24 24 26 26
Snow%Detection%(mask) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Snow%melting%status%(wet/dry) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Snow%water%equivalent 9 9 14 15 14 13 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
Soil%moisture%at%the%surface 8 8 13 14 13 12 13 13 13 13 13 14 15
Soil%Moisture%in%the%Roots%Region 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Soil%type 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3
Surface%Coherent%Change%Detection 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Temperature%of%tropopause 10 10 13 13 13 12 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
Total%electron%content%(TEC) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Vegetation%Canopy%(cover) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Vegetation%Canopy%(height) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Vegetation%Cover 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Vegetation%type 8 8 10 10 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 10 10
Visibility 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Volcanic%ash 3 3 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 6 6 6 6
Water%vapour%imagery 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 3
Wave%Directional%Energy%Frequency%Spectrum 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Wind%profile%(horizontal) 9 10 12 13 12 13 12 11 11 12 13 13 12
Wind%profile%(vertical) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Wind%speed%over%sea%surface%(horizontal) 9 10 14 14 13 12 12 11 12 12 12 15 16
Wind%stress 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Wind%vector%over%land%surface%(horizontal) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1




Chapter 4: Potential Incentives and Barriers to Data 
Sharing – Theory and Literature Review 
 
The issue of data sharing has been debated in a broad range of fields, with unique 
issues and debates raised within disciplines of normative theory, economics, 
international relations, security theory, and organizational theory. Each of these 
disciplines provides important theoretical and experimental evidence and arguments 
related to data sharing. For the purpose of this research, I focus primarily on literature 
within these fields related to sharing publicly collected geospatial information, and 
particularly sharing of satellite remote sensing data, a specific type of geospatial 
information.  
 
A common focus of the literature is in detailing arguments in support of or against 
various types of data sharing – most often comparing free and open data sharing with 
efforts to commercialize or privatize data. Some focus on conflicts between 
competing goals such as scientific inquiry and national security while others attempt 
to provide a more comprehensive lists of related issues, including benefits and 
drawbacks or incentives and disincentives of sharing data. There are a small number 
of articles that aim to provide empirical evidence to test current theories or prevailing 
thought. 
 
In the following section, the ideas found in this literature are synthesized and 
discussed. Within each discipline, various arguments and open questions related to 




focus. Therefore, this discussion is broken into a number of distinct theoretical 
groupings. 
 
4.1 Normative Considerations 
Normative literature focuses on identifying what is right and wrong. Normative issues 
are particularly important with regard to satellite data sharing. First, because data 
sharing can have impacts on the lives and well-being of individuals, its important to 
consider the potential for data sharing policies to help or harm others. If data is being 
used for policy-making, some argue that citizens should be given access to the data 
both to improve the quality of policy-making and to ensure government transparency 
and accountability. Finally, a large portion of scientific research data and geographic 
data is produced using public funding, and many articles examine the normative 
responsibilities of the government as a proper steward of that data, either by making it 
freely available to the citizens who have already paid for the data through taxation, or 
by acting as a public trust and selling the data to minimize the financial burden borne 
by citizens. 
 
4.1.1 Public Safety 
It is commonly accepted that the government should provide data and information 
that enhances public safety and leads to the protection of lives and property, and the 




with respect to weather and natural disasters.60 Almost all nations collect and freely 
share data and products related to extreme weather forecasts, such as hurricanes. To 
restrict access to this data is widely seen as immoral. The 1986 United Nations 
remote sensing principles specifically call out the need to disclose data promoting 
“protection of the Earth’s natural environment” and “protection of mankind from 
natural disasters.” For example, the 2000 International Charter on Space and Natural 
Disasters, which has gained wide acceptance and membership, represents a successful 
legal framework to ensure all states afflicted by disasters can benefit from space-
based assets. When activated, all images of the natural disaster are provided free of 
charge from nations that are a part of the charter.61 Numerous authors also call out the 
public interest in maximizing the use of environmental data and climate data, which 
can be achieved in part through free and open sharing.62 However, the normative 
incentive to share data outside of the weather and natural disaster areas is less well 
developed.  
 
4.1.2 Government Policy-Making, Transparency, and Accountability 
Another ethical consideration is the special responsibility to share data or knowledge 
when it may be relevant to public policy. Access to data is important because analysis 
and research using the data can lead to improved policy making, and the government 
has an ethical responsibility to make the most well-informed and accurate decisions 
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possible.63  Rajabifard and Williamson argue that the objective of data sharing must 
include the desire to stimulate better government and foster environmental 
sustainability.64  
 
The National Research Council points out that without the ability to validate findings, 
it is possible that decisions or policies will be based on faulty conclusions. In addition 
to the potential harm to people and property that may be caused, these types of 
misguided actions are likely to lead to a reduction of public confidence in both the 
policy and research community.65 
 
Further, many argue that an open government is a normatively better government, and 
that an informed citizenry is essential to democracy.66 If government-collected data is 
used internally to make policy decisions that affect citizens, then citizens have a right 
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to also view and analyze that data; data sharing is required to ensure government 
transparency and accountability. 67  
 
The use of geographic data to make city planning decisions, school bus routes, and 
emergency service plans all clearly have a personal effect on individuals, and access 
to this type of data is often provided through open records laws.68 Though it may 
seem less personal, government actions related to climate change also affect the 
individuals within their own country and elsewhere, and many argue that it is 
necessary to facilitate access to this climate data as well.69 Ensuring that government 
decisions on climate and other environmental issues are credible and in the public 
interest requires that citizens and scientists have access to the data to independently 
test and validate results.70  
 
4.1.3 Equity and Fairness: Government as a Repository 
It is commonly argued that government-collected data should be provided for free 
because the public has already paid for it through general taxation and shouldn’t be 
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charged a second time.71 The National Research Council also argues that “fair use” 
requires that scientific and educational communities have access to government-
funded databases at no more than marginal cost.72  
 
Shaffer and Backlund argue that this holds true regardless whether the data is to be 
used for personal, research, or commercial purposes. They ask, “If commercial 
housing developers want to understand earthquake risks and geological structure in an 
area, should they have to pay more for that understanding than a scientist who is 
publishing in a scientific journal?” 73 Uhrlich and Shroder further emphasize that 
when a fee is charged, the poorest and most disadvantaged individuals are the most 
likely to be unable to access data.74 The policy of treating government as a repository 
is particularly compelling when free distribution of the data is likely to increase the 
well being of the community as a whole, or when many individuals in the general 
population have an interest in acquiring the data.75  
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4.1.4 Equity and Fairness: Government as a Public Trust 
Some argue that rather than acting as a repository, it would be more equitable for 
government to act as a public trust. In this view, governments are custodians of 
databases for the general public, and they should try to set a price for the data that 
covers as much of the cost of gathering and maintaining the data as possible. 
Revenues can be used to offset the costs of government operations, relieving some of 
the pressure of general taxation.76 Part of the argument for this model is that those 
who benefit most from the data should be paying a greater portion of its costs. In 
particular, if some users make a commercial gain from use of the data, they should 
contribute more to data production.77 
 
The public trust model is most appropriate when there are only a few businesses or 
citizens that have the ability to take economic advantage of the information, due to 
the skills or information systems required, because in this case, freely shared 
government data would result primarily in private gain rather than public good.78 
Freely shared data in these cases may be seen as “unfairly subsidizing private profit at 
taxpayer expense.”79 There is ample evidence of this concern being salient, especially 
to policy-makers. Pira International reported that, “the concept of commercial 
companies being able to acquire, at very low cost, quantities of [public sector 
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information] and resell it for a variety of unregulated purposes to make a profit, is one 
that policy makers in the EU find uncomfortable.” In a paper examining the efforts of 
the city of Buena Vista, CA to develop a data access policy, King argues that if 
citizens believe the proper role of government is to act as public trust, then any 
“giveaway” of data could be seen as “dereliction of duty.”80 
 
Onrud points out a number of philosophical and practical problems with 
implementing a public trust for data. Historically, the idea of a public trust was meant 
to ensure that public resources would be protected from consumption by one 
generation so that they can be preserved for future generations. However, information 
can be provided to people now, and still be preserved, without deterioration, for 
future generations. A practical problem with operating a public trust is that it can be 
very difficult to estimate the actual number of private purchasers. Pricing that aims to 
fully recover costs is often quite high, making it more likely that inequities in ability 
to access the information will occur.81 
 
4.1.5 Efficiency as a Normative Goal 
It is a common assumption that efficiency is one of the goals of government, but it is 
important to also include this value in the context of normative discussions about the 
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role of government. Richard Taupier, discussing geographic information and data 
access in Massachusetts, defines efficient organizations as those that aim to maximize 
social welfare and minimize costs. The most efficient activities are those where the 
social welfare to cost ratio is the greatest.82 This normative goal is implicit in 
economic considerations, the topic of the following section. 
 
4. 2 Economic Theory 
Economic issues are discussed in the literature at great length, and are used more 
often than any other theoretical construct. Economic arguments revolve around 
whether data should be treated as a public good and made freely available or if it 
should be treated as a commodity and sold. At a basic level, it is well accepted that 
information is an impure public good, with properties congruent with both of these 
definitions, and economic theory suggests that it is possible to have an equally 
efficient system, i.e. one in which net social benefit is maximized, in which data is 
treated as a public good or in which data is treated as a commodity.  
 
However, there are many differing opinions on the application of these theories to 
reality, and the extent to which various assumptions behind the theories are met. 
Many papers and arguments look at how these practical issues affect the relative 
efficiency of the two systems. These theoretical and practical arguments center 
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around the amount of data produced, the costs, and the benefits. The three arguments 
address 1) whether or not the government, on its own, is able or willing to produce an 
efficient amount of the good (i.e. an amount equal to total social benefit) and whether 
data sales or private sector involvement make it possible to come closer to efficient 
production levels, 2) whether a commercial entity is able to develop data collection 
and distribution systems at lower prices compared to the government, thus lowering 
costs, and 3) the extent to which various barriers, in terms of costs or licensing 
restrictions, actually lower the use of the data and therefore the benefits of the data. In 
a few cases, empirical evidence has been brought to bear on the economic issues 
related to data sharing, providing some insight into how these theories can best be 
applied.  
 
Table 4.1 Economic Benefits and Drawbacks to Public Good vs. Commodity 
Models 




May be too low if 
government 
underestimates social 
benefit, or has practical 
limitations to spending 
Not affected by 
market incentives, 
government 
generally thought to 
be less efficient 
than industry 
Free data maximizes 





May be possible to 
produce greater 








Barriers on data 
decrease use and 
social benefit, but 
amount depends on 
specific price/ 
restriction regime, 
and is unknown 
 
Before looking at the differing views on the most efficient way to treat data, it is 
useful to look at the shared understanding of the economic characteristics of data. 




one person does not diminish the benefits received by all other consumers of the data. 
Further, if a good is non-rival, it follows that once it is provided, the marginal cost of 
another person’s consuming it is zero.  
 
Information is also non-excludable once it has been released to the public. However, 
individuals can be excluded if the data is not released or if it is covered by legal 
restrictions on its use such as copyrights and licensing agreements. This combination 
of traits makes information an impure public good and makes it possible to treat data 
either as a public good or a commodity. 
 
Information also has a unique third trait: increasing returns to use. Kenneth Arrow 
addressed this in his landmark paper on “Allocation of Resources for Invention.”83 
This reflects the idea that the value of data is in its use; the more people use the data 
and build on the information, the greater the value of that data. The output based on 
the use of this data increases the public welfare, often reaching far beyond those who 
actually work with it – for example, by increasing understanding of climate change or 
providing a greater variety of options in the market for specialized products and 
services. These positive externalities greatly increase the benefits of data. 
Furthermore, even after the data is given away, it is still retained by its original 
producer and can continue to be used. 
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Returns to Use: Economic Growth 
A specific benefit of increasing returns to use is the overall effect on economic 
growth. This growth can stem from new discoveries and innovation, increased 
commercial activity, and improved efficiency in government or commercial sectors. It 
is a common belief that basic science research, which relies in part on fundamental 
facts and data, drives innovation and the creation of wealth around the world.84 
Information also helps to produce more products and increase effectiveness and 
efficiency.85 Onsrud argues that in an information economy, the proven way to 
maintain a strong economy is by ensuring citizens and business have access to the 
data and knowledge they need to provide better information services and products to 
the nation and the world.86 This important and unique aspect of information is often 
used in the literature as a justification for promoting the greatest possible 
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Returns to Use: More and Higher Quality Scientific Research 
In addition to the general benefit of openly sharing data implied by increasing returns 
to use, access to data is necessary for the proper functioning of science.88 The 
National Research Council’s 1985 report on “Sharing Research Data,” looked at these 
issues in detail. Availability of data reinforces open scientific inquiry and the 
openness of science. It allows verification, refutation, or refinement of original 
results, allowing scientists to check whether findings are robust to various 
assumptions and to replication of work with multiple data sets. This also reduces the 
incidence of faked and inaccurate results.89  
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Access to data also allows exploration of new questions, which is important because 
often the full extent of alternative or future uses of data is unforeseen at the time of 
data production. It allows the creation of new data by joining multiple datasets 
together, and it encourages multiple perspectives. This may be particularly important 
for climate science, where multidisciplinary research is essential. Data use can even 
improve future data collection, as it allows scientists to develop knowledge about 
analytic techniques and research that may allow them to suggest improvements for 
future measurement and collection methods.90  
 
Since economic efficiency requires maximizing the net social benefit of data, the 
most efficient method of producing and disseminating data will be determined by the 
costs of producing the systems and the benefits created by the use of data. Because 
data has increasing returns to use, social benefit is likely to be maximized when data 
distribution and use are maximized.91 Within the economic literature, arguments 
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focus on whether efficiency is maximized by treating data as a public good, with 
government production and free distribution, or by treating data as a commodity, with 
private or public production and sales of data. 
 
4.2.1 Data as a Public Good and Free Data Distribution 
Data can be viewed as a public good because it is non-rival in consumption and non-
excludable once released to the public.92 Furthermore, as mentioned above, the fact 
that information is non-rival implies that its marginal cost (the cost of one additional 
person consuming the data) is zero. This fact suggests that private provision will 
likely lead to efficiency problems. This is because if the marginal cost of providing 
the public good to another person is zero, the efficient price is zero. If an entrepreneur 
sets a price greater than zero in order to earn revenues, then some people who place a 
relatively low, but positive value on the good are inefficiently excluded.93 Also, 
because data has positive externalities that are not captured by the market, for 
example advances in climate science that benefit everyone, the private sector is likely 
to under-produce this good. Therefore, as with other public goods, such as national 
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defense, the implication is that net social benefit is maximized through government 
provision, i.e. data is produced most efficiently by the government. 
 
Practical Considerations: Efficient Level of Production 
It is important to note that despite its advantages over the private sector in this area, 
government data provision may still provide an inefficient amount of the good. As 
Paul Samuelson described in his 1954 publication, “The Pure Theory of Public 
Expenditure,” determining the efficient provision would require summing each 
individual’s marginal benefit from the production of the good to determine the 
marginal social benefit, and it is impossible to know these values in reality.94  
 
Government provision of environmental data may be limited not only by difficulties 
in determining the true social benefits, but also by the capabilities of the government. 
There are a number of public goods for which the benefits of production are higher 
than the costs of production, but practical limitations in government funding make it 
unlikely that all of these projects would be funded to the full, economically efficient 
level. The government does not and cannot take on every project or program in which 
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Practical Considerations: Maximizing Data Use 
The data sharing literature that focuses on the public good aspects of data advocates 
for government collection of data and distribution at zero cost.95 This includes free 
access to the data for all possible uses, including operational, scientific, social, 
commercial, and political uses.96 Given the fixed costs of data collection and 
dissemination systems, it is argued that free data provision leads to the greatest 
possible data use which in turn leads to maximization of social benefits, and is the 
most economically efficient outcome. Tulloch and Harvey put it simply, saying, “the 
more it is shared, the more it is used, and the greater becomes society’s ability to 
                                                
95	  King,	  John.	  "Problems	  in	  Public	  Access	  Policy	  for	  GIS	  Databases:	  An	  Economic	  
Perspective."	  Sharing	  Geographic	  Information.	  New	  Brunswick,	  NJ:	  Center	  for	  Urban	  Policy	  
Research,	  1995.	  N.	  pag.	  Print.	  
Bits	  of	  Power:	  Issues	  in	  Global	  Access	  to	  Scientific	  Data.	  Rep.	  National	  Research	  Council,	  
Committee	  on	  Issues	  in	  the	  Transborder	  Flow	  of	  Scientific	  Data,	  1997.	  Web.	  19	  Mar.	  2013.	  
<http://books.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=5504>.	  
Onsrud, Harlan. "The Tragedy of the Information Commons." Policy Issues in Modern 
Cartography (1998): 141-58. Web. 
Resolving	  Conflicts	  Arising	  from	  the	  Privatization	  of	  Environmental	  Data.	  Rep.	  National	  Research	  
Council,	  Committee	  on	  Geophysical	  and	  Environmental	  Data,	  2001.	  Web.	  19	  Mar.	  2013.	  
<http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=10237>.	  
Harris, R. "Global Monitoring for Environment and Security: Data Policy Considerations." Space 
Policy 19.4 (2003): 265-76. Web. 
Barton, John H., and Keith E. Maskus. "Economic Perspectives on a Multilateral Agreement on Open 
Access to Basic Science and Technology." SCRIPTed (2004): n. pag. Print. 
Rao,	  M.,	  and	  K.	  Sridharamurthi.	  "Keeping	  up	  with	  Remote	  Sensing	  and	  GI	  Advances—Policy	  and	  
Legal	  Perspectives."	  Space	  Policy	  22.4	  (2006):	  262-­‐73.	  Web.	  
Smith, L., and C. Doldirina. "Remote Sensing: A Case for Moving Space Data towards the Public 
Good." Space Policy 24.1 (2008): 22-32. Web. 
Thomas, G. "International Cooperation in Remote Sensing for Global Change Research: Political and 
Economic Considerations." Space Policy 11.2 (1995): 131-41. Web. 
Taupier,	  Richard	  P.	  "Comments	  on	  the	  Economics	  of	  Geographic	  Information	  and	  Data	  Access	  in	  
the	  Commonwealth	  of	  Massachusetts."	  Sharing	  Geographic	  Information.	  New	  Brunswick,	  NJ:	  
Center	  for	  Urban	  Policy	  Research,	  1995.	  N.	  pag.	  Print.	  
Johnston, S. "Public Good or Commercial Opportunity? Case Studies in Remote Sensing 
Commercialization." Space Policy 19.1 (2003): 23-31. Web. 
96	  Harris,	  R.	  "Earth	  Observation	  Data	  Policy	  and	  Europe."	  Space	  Policy	  17.1	  (2001):	  55-­‐60.	  Web.	  
Arzberger, P., P. Schroeder, A. Beaulieu, G. Bowker, K. Casey, L. Laaksonen, D. Moorman, P. Uhlir, 
and P. Wouters. "Promoting Access to Public Research Data for Scientific, Economic, and Social 




evaluate and address the wide range of pressing problems to which such information 
may be applied.”97 
 
In theory, free provision of data without restrictions, a policy consistent only with 
government production of data, maximizes benefits by maximizing use of the data. 
Existing empirical research supports this theory. A 1999 report developed for the 
European Commission argued that the value-added sector, which uses data to create 
specialized information products to be sold, was much larger in the United States, 
where data was provided free, compared to Europe, where data policies were more 
restrictive. They argued that EU companies were at a serious disadvantage compared 
to their American counterparts, which benefit from the timely availability of public 
sector information.98 The National Research Council notes that these value-added 
products benefit industries such as agriculture, transportation, fishing, mining, 
recreation, and weather.99 There is also some empirical evidence that the returns to 
science are also considerable; the accelerated pace of discovery in genomics is often 
credited to action taken by that community to support the rapid and open sharing of 
data.100 
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Looking at the alternatives, it is likely that any cost imposed on the data will reduce 
the dissemination and the use of that data, thus reducing the overall social benefit. 
Part of the reason that government action is required to collect data is that while the 
value of the data to society as a whole is quite large, the value to any one user may be 
very small. By imposing even a nominal price on the data, the government may 
prevent scientists, companies, or other individuals from using the data to contribute to 
the public good. It is this reason that often leads authors to suggest that governments 
build the cost of data dissemination into the overall cost of the data collection project 
and ensure that data is disseminated without charge to all users. 
 
Practical Considerations: Zero Marginal Cost 
Part of the theoretical definition of a public good is that its marginal cost is zero. 
However, in reality the marginal cost of providing data to an addition user is unlikely 
to be zero and could in some cases be significant – for example, reaching thousands 
of dollars for one scene collected by a satellite.101 Because multiple people within the 
government typically use data that the government collects, it is reasonable to assume 
that even without data sharing, the government develops the algorithms, meta data, 
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and other documentation to make the data useful to others. It also must have some 
storage and access technology. However, if providing open access to the data is likely 
to greatly increase data requests, the government will need to invest in additional 
technology, for example, high capacity internet servers. It may also be important to 
provide additional documentation to make the data useful to people from other 
disciplines who may be less familiar with a particular type of data and how to use it. 
Efficient and user-friendly access portals may also need to be developed. All of these 
materials will need to be maintained over time.  
 
However, charging an above-zero marginal cost is not as straightforward as it may 
seem, and poses a number of efficiency issues. For practical reasons, it is necessary 
that a fixed price be set. Charging each user the actual marginal cost of fulfilling their 
request would be unpredictable and somewhat arbitrary. For example, if the 
government has an efficient data sharing system set up that served the first 1,000 
users, the actual marginal cost of serving the 1,001 user might be essentially zero. 
However, at some threshold, say 5,000 users, it may be necessary to upgrade the 
system. It would be absurd to expect that 5,000th user to pay the full costs of the 
system upgrade, even if it was truly the marginal cost of fulfilling his or her request. 
 
Prices could be set at the average cost per user, but over-estimating or under-
estimating the expected number of users, which depends significantly on the price 
that is set, could result in further inefficiencies. If the number of users is over-




not be covered. If the number of users is under-estimated, each of these users will 
have been charged above marginal cost, leading to an inefficiently low use of the 
data.102 
 
Finally, if the government decides to charge a fee for accessing data, the government 
will have to spend the time and develop the infrastructure necessary to assess the 
correct fee, accept payment, and manage the funds that are raised. This requires the 
development of a fee-accepting system.103 Because marginal costs tend to be quite 
small, in some cases the cost of administering the fees may be larger than the fees 
collected.104 
 
Even in 1962, Arrow noted that the cost of transmitting data is frequently very low. 
And many authors have noted that with the improvements and cost decreases in 
information technology that have occurred over time, and particularly with the growth 
of the internet, marginal costs of fulfilling user requests are smaller than ever.105 
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Further, some point out that if the data is provided without restrictions on re-
distribution, it is possible for users to share the data with others at no cost to the 
agency that originally developed the information.106 Together, these arguments 
suggest that building the cost of dissemination into overall program costs and then 
providing data for free is more efficient than charging each user a small marginal 
cost.  
 
4.2.2 Data as a Commodity and Data Sales 
In theory, treating data as a commodity and selling it to at least some users above 
marginal cost can be equally efficient to treating data as a public good. This is 
achieved through perfect price discrimination, in which each user is charged based on 
his or her willingness to pay for the data. As long as the price is not above the 
individual’s willingness to pay, each user will find the transaction beneficial, and data 
use will be maximized. Assuming the costs of data production and provision are not 
increased by this practice, overall social benefit will be maximized, and only the 
incidence of cost and benefits will change, with the data producer capturing more of 
the benefits and the consumer less. Further, if the private sector is involved in data 
sales, market incentives lead private industry to produce goods more efficiently than 
the government, reducing program costs.107 
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There are three primary models for data production and sales, all of which implement 
some type of price discrimination: government cost recovery, public-private 
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partnerships, and commercial entities that sell to governments and other customers. 
Cost recovery refers to “a mechanism for pricing access to information in order to 
allay all or some of the costs incurred by the government agency holding the 
[information].”108 The National Research Council defines commercialization in this 
area as the financial exploitation of government data and privatization as the transfer 
of government functions to the private sector.109  
 
Furthermore, there is ample evidence that it is possible to sell data and information 
products successfully. Kenneth Arrow elaborates on information as a commodity in 
his 1962 paper on the “Allocation of Resources for Invention,” noting, “information 
frequently has economic value, in the sense that anyone possessing the information 
can make greater profits than would otherwise be the case.” He also notes that there is 
already a market for the sale of certain types of information, such as newspapers.110 
Environmental data in particular have numerous uses and can have high economic 
value in agriculture, mining, transportation, and numerous other areas.111 The 
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National Academy of Public Administration estimated that $3.56 trillion of U.S. 
economic activity was directly related to geographic information in 1998.112  
 
Practical Considerations: Efficient Level of Production 
In theory, the government should collect and provide data at a level consistent with 
the social benefit of that data. However, as mentioned earlier, this may not happen 
due to practical limitations on government spending. Building on this observation, 
one of the major benefits of treating data as a commodity is that private investment in 
data collection systems, either as part of a public-private partnership or a fully 
commercial venture, result in more data collection than would otherwise take place, 
bringing production closer to the economically efficient level. If private companies 
are providing additional data that the government could not afford to procure, this 
increases overall social benefit.113 
 
Some suggest that this argument could be extended to government cost recovery. 
Limits on government spending and budgetary pressures are commonly cited as one 
of the reasons that governments turn to cost recovery, and the implication is that 
governments could not afford data collection at the same level without these 
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measures.114 However, empirical evidence shows that government cost recovery 
generates very little revenue, often just two or three percent of total project costs, and 
does not have a major impact on data collection capabilities.115 
 
One reason to believe that commercial involvement leads to additional data collection 
is that government and commercial data producers focus on meeting the needs of 
different types of users. Governments are primarily interested in data with scientific 
or operational value, or data that will inform public-policy making. Commercial data 
providers are driven by potential revenues, which largely come from commercial data 
users in the agricultural, mining, oil, or other industries. Evidence suggests that the 
data needs of these users are quite different. 116 The National Research Council notes 
that commercial uses of data often involve high-resolution images taken of limited 
areas over limited times based on purchaser request. By contrast, environmental 
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research requires consistent coverage over time and space and full disclosure of 
instrument specifications and calibration.117  
 
With regard to satellite remote sensing, high-resolution data and synthetic aperture 
radar data seem to have the greatest value to private industry. Nearly all satellite 
remote sensing companies that develop and operate their own satellites specialize in 
one or both of these types of data. Medium and low-resolution satellite data has 
significantly less value on the commercial market. In 2001, NASA and the USGS 
consulted with the commercial remote sensing industry in developing a procurement 
approach for the follow-on to the Landsat-7 satellite, which collects medium-
resolution imagery that has proven very valuable for scientific research. The industry 
argued the market was insufficient to support a private sector-only option.118 If, as in 
this example, commercial industry is interested in providing data primarily of interest 
to commercial users while government is left to collect data whose primary value is 
scientific, the combination of commercial and government funding may lead to 
greater data provision than would otherwise occur.119  
 
However, though there are many differences between commercial and scientific data 
needs, and certain data may be more useful for one group than the other, there are 
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also significant overlaps in data use.120 For example, a program was carried out in 
which NASA bought some high-resolution remote sensing data from a commercial 
operator and provided it to scientists for evaluation and use. The scientists reported 
that the data was very valuable for research.121 In another case, the SeaWIFS 
instrument, which provided sea color data of great interest to scientists, was 
developed as part of a public-private partnership. The private vendor owned and 
operated the satellite, selling the most up-to-date information, and then releasing data 
to the government for free distribution after a set period of time.122 
 
Practical Considerations: Minimizing Production Costs 
The second consideration in determining whether data should be treated as a public 
good and provided for free or treated as a commodity and sold is based on differences 
in the cost of production. Some argue that even government cost recovery is more 
efficient than free provision because funds from data sales reduce dependence on 
general taxation. However, this does not seem to have a meaningful effect, 
particularly because revenues from cost-recovery are so low in practice.123 Instead, 
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the primary production efficiency benefits stem from the involvement of private 
industry. 
 
Allowing information to be privatized can create incentives for innovation and 
efficiency. The U.S. patent system provides a good example. On the surface, it may 
seem that social benefit would be maximized by making all information regarding 
new ideas and inventions available to everyone right away. However, this would 
eliminate the incentive for individuals or companies to invent new products, since 
they would not be able to reap any of the benefits of their invention. Therefore, to 
create an incentive to do the research and work necessary to invent new products, 
governments grant patents on those inventions, allowing the company or individual to 
appropriate at least some of the financial benefits the new invention will enable.124 
 
Similar logic lies behind an argument for legal protections for environmental data.125 
Granting companies the right to appropriate some of the benefits of their data 
collection creates the incentive necessary for the development of such a system. 
Further, in a commercial market, data producers have incentives to create systems 
that best meet customer needs and to develop these systems at the lowest cost 
possible. In this way, privatization incentivizes innovation and advancements in data 
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collection technologies, resulting in more capable and/or less expensive data 
collection systems.126 Advocates of privatization argue that the resulting 
improvements in cost and quality of data collection systems outweigh the reductions 
in data use caused by legal restrictions and higher access costs.127 If the government 
purchases an open data license from a data collection company and then provides the 
data for free or at a low cost for certain types of users, for example, scientists and 
researchers, then commercial data collection simply represents an alternative 
procurement method of the government, and one in which costs are likely lower.  
 
Unfortunately, the specific characteristics of remote sensing technology are likely to 
decrease the effectiveness of normal market incentives. Remote sensing satellites 
have high fixed costs and very low marginal costs, characteristics that lead to natural 
monopolies. When natural monopolies exist, a small number of firms are likely to 
dominate the market, other firms will be discouraged from entering, and prices will 
be inefficiently high. The lack of competition also reduces the incentive for 
innovation and cost reductions.128 
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Practical Considerations: Maximizing Data Use 
The notion that data sales can result in the same level of data use as free provision of 
data is based on the theory of perfect price discrimination. Of course, it is not possible 
in reality for a data distributer to know each potential user’s willingness to pay.129 
Even approximating this practice by negotiating unique prices for each new customer 
would likely be prohibitively expensive, time-consuming, and inefficient.130  Instead, 
price discrimination is usually implemented through a pricing policy that 
discriminates between a small number of groups. Government cost recovery and 
public-private partnerships often implement “tiered” policies, in which multiple 
pricing tiers are developed for different types of consumers.131 The merits of such a 
policy are commonly discussed in the literature.132 
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In cases where data is entirely privatized, with no government involvement, tiered 
policies are less common. However, price discrimination can still occur if the 
government purchases data licenses that allow it to make that data available to 
scientists or others at a lower cost. 133 Similarly, the government could provide 
funding directly to scientists for commercial data purchases. Both Harris and the 
National Research Council consider this scenario, arguing that if the cost of data was 
included in the grants researchers get from the government for their research 
programs, this would make it possible for scientists to access commercial data. In this 
method, the public good, data, is still being publicly funded, suggesting that the 
program would be efficient. It could even be considered superior, since the funding is 
now in the hands of the consumer of data and can be used as a kind of market 
signal.134 However, the National Research Council concluded that this method of 
funding would have a number of disadvantages. First, while a data collection agency 
has the incentive and voice to request a stable level of funding from Congress, 
individual scientists are likely to have a harder time ensuring that overall funding 
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remains the same. Smaller, individual grants are also more likely to be affected 
significantly by shortfalls in the national budget.135 
 
Regardless of exactly how tiered policies are implemented, the data costs and legal 
restrictions required by this model will reduce data use, therefore reducing social 
benefits. Since the marginal cost of data provision is essentially zero, any individual 
whose willingness to pay is above zero but below the price set for their user group 
will be inefficiently excluded. The higher the prices, the less the data is shared, and 
the less it is used.136 Additional inefficiencies occur when high prices drive others to 
build redundant systems, use inferior data, or not use the data at all.137  
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A number of scholars suggest that scientists often get priced out of the market 
entirely.138 As discussed earlier, free sharing of data within the scientific community 
is essential to the proper functioning of science, and intellectual property rights can 
particularly harm scientific progress through limits on redistribution.139 Further, 
research, operational, and commercial uses are often treated differently in tiered 
policies. However, Harris argues that the transition from research to operations often 
is not clear; systems may have a mix of fully operational elements and pre-
operational elements.140 Overpeck noted that about half of international 
environmental modeling groups were restricted from sharing digital climate model 
data beyond the research community because of intellectual property rights imposed 
by governments.141 
 
This effect extends to commercial users, who are often the primary target of efforts at 
cost-recovery or commercialization. The increase in cost means that only some 
interested firms will be able to utilize the data, and all firms for which the value of the 
data is above marginal cost but below the market price will be inefficiently excluded 
from the market. This results in a reduction in the size of the value-added sector 
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overall, and a reduction in the variety and quality of products available for public 
consumption.142 
 
There is evidence that this effect could be quite large. In fact, “Commercial 
Exploitation of Europe’s Public Sector Information,” released in 2000, included the 
surprising result that efforts at cost recovery may actually lead to a net financial loss 
to the government. According to the report, “although governments gain income from 
the commercial license fees, they lose the taxation and employment benefits from the 
higher volumes of commercial activity that would be generated by abandoning 
charges. We find that a conservative projection of a doubling of market size resulting 
from eliminating license fees would produce additional taxation revenues to more 
than offset the lost income from PSI charges [in Europe].” The doubling of market 
size was seen as conservative because while European and U.S. economies are of 
similar size, the United States’ information market was estimated to be two to five 
times larger than Europe’s.143 
 
As described in the case of marginal cost pricing, the need to charge users a fee for 
data use is a transaction cost that adds to administration overhead, resulting in higher 
costs and inefficiency.144 It also takes time, effort, and legal skill to draft a good 
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contract or license. Lawyers may need to be consulted when dealing with particular 
user requests. Once contracts and licenses are involved, there is also the possibility of 
breach of contract lawsuits and other legal action.145 Further, efforts at policing the 
policy, ensuring that data provided for research use is not used for commercial 
purposes, for example, would add additional costs.146  
 
Consumers of data face transaction costs, as well, as they negotiate and abide by 
licensing agreements. Some argue that smaller companies may not have the legal 
resources to investigate and negotiate complex contracts or licensing regimes.147 
Scientists are likely to face even greater difficulties in dealing with these issues; they 
are less likely to have the time and resources to understand and maneuver legal 
barriers.148 For environmental research, it is often necessary to use data from multiple 
sources. If scientists have to go through multiple different permissions processes, this 
process could be overly burdensome, even if the data is free, and could result in less 
research being done.149 
 
The U.S. Landsat remote sensing satellite is often used as an example to demonstrate 
the detrimental effects of treating Earth observation data as a commodity. Wulder et 
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al documents this case, explaining that in 2001, when Landsat images were sold at a 
price of $600 per scene, the Earth Resources Observation Science (EROS) Center 
provided about 25,000 images to users. When data was made free in 2008, use of the 
data rapidly increased; EROS provided approximately 2.5 million images in 2010. In 
addition to the increase in throughput, the paper also noted a rapid increase in 
scientific investigations and applications using Landsat, including widespread use by 
end users in a variety of disciplines. Though some of this increase is likely due to 
advancements in technical capability to analyze these types of datasets, it still 
provides a strong case that making data available for free, rather than charging a fee, 
will dramatically increase its use.150 
 
Practical Considerations: Supporting Commercial Sector Development 
As discussed above, commercial data provision can have a number of benefits, 
particularly in promoting innovation and lowering costs. Due to these benefits, it is 
commonly agreed that one of the proper roles of government is to help spur the 
development of new commercial industries.151 While there might be short-term 
inefficiencies in subsidizing these industries, governments believe that there will be 
long-term economic benefits. However, some argue that there is no viable 
commercial market for commercial remote sensing data without the government, 
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even in the long run, and that by subsidizing these companies the government is only 
distorting the market and unnecessarily restricting data use.152 
 
Practical Considerations: False Cost-Benefit Analysis 
The discussion here focuses exclusively on economic efficiency defined as 
maximization of net social benefit. However, even policies that have similar net 
social benefits often differ in the incidence of costs and benefits. This can lead to 
certain policies looking more attractive to particular users.153 For example, Harris and 
Olby point out that opinions on data pricing often differ between the data provider 
and the data user organizations, because users prefer to view the data as a public good 
(in which free data provision is the norm), while producers see it as a commodity 
(which results in data sales).154 
 
The 2000 Pira Report warns that cost recovery may look like an obvious way for 
governments to improve efficiency by minimizing costs of creating public sector 
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information and maximizing the value for the money directly. However, they point 
out that while government agencies may see a greater benefit within their agency 
from data sales, this may not be the best approach to maximizing economic value of 
public sector information to society as a whole.155 
 
4.3 Institutional Theory 
The application of economic theory is one of the most commonly discussed in the 
literature, but the importance of institutional theories, particularly related to the 
provision of global public goods and international cooperation is clear from the global 
nature of climate change. This section examines how these theories relate to 
international sharing of satellite data for climate, and how the related literature has 
built on these themes. 
 
4.3.1 Global Public Goods 
As discussed earlier, public goods are those that are non-excludable and non-rival in 
consumption. They often have externalities – results of an action that have effects 
outside of the transaction. We noted that data, which is a form of information or 
knowledge, has these attributes, and thus is a public good. It is interesting to note that 
climate change also meets these criteria, though it may be thought of more as a 
“public bad,” as its effects are generally deleterious.  
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In 1999, the United Nations Development Program released a landmark publication 
entitled, “Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 21st Century.” This 
collection of papers provided a definition of global public goods, noted the challenges 
often associated with their provision, and addressed specific subject areas where the 
theory applies – including both knowledge and climate change.156 
 
The editors, Kaul, Gurnberg, and Stern, begin by defining global public goods, 
stating, “a pure global public good is marked by universality—that is, it benefits all 
countries, people and generations. An impure global public good would tend towards 
universality in that it would benefit more than one group of countries, and would not 
discriminate against any population segment or set of generations.”157 
 
It is widely recognized within the literature on data sharing that scientific data and 
climate change both have characteristics that make them inherently global issues.158 
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The National Research Council explains, “Data in science are universal—they have 
the same validity for scientists everywhere.”159 Harris mentions the intergenerational 
aspect of environmental data, stating that the value of the data may actually increase 
over time, thus benefiting future generations even more, particularly for climate 
change, which relies on long-term records.160 
 
This definition has important implications. The efficient production of a public good 
requires that it be produced up to the point that the marginal cost equals the marginal 
social benefit, where the marginal social benefit is defined as the sum of all individual 
benefits. For a global public good, the definition is the same, but now the marginal 
social benefits should also include the sum of benefits from individuals in multiple 
nations and multiple generations. Nations rarely consider the benefits to citizens of 
other nations when determining how much of a good to produce. It seems to be even 
more rare for countries to consider the benefits to generations other than those 
currently living. Because they do not take into account these full benefits, global 
public goods generally suffer from under-provision.161  
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Kaul, Gurnberg, and Stern also present the important concept of final global public 
goods and intermediate global public goods. A final good is an outcome, such as a 
clean environment or the availability of knowledge. An intermediate public good 
contributes towards the provision of final public goods, though it may not have any 
intrinsic value on its own.162 The case of international data sharing is interesting, 
because this may be seen as both a final good – it involves accessibility of knowledge 
– and as an intermediate good – it contributes to the ability to understand and address 
the issue of climate change. The authors note that the most important type of 
intermediate global public goods may be international regimes, for example, those 
that facilitate consultations and negotiations among parties.163 A number of authors in 
the data sharing literature also note this important intermediate aspect of data, 
particularly in informing and enforcing international climate agreements.164 
 
4.3.2 International Cooperation 
The discussion of international regimes leads directly to the broader issues of 
international cooperation. One of the most important publications on this issue is 
Robert Keohane’s 1984 work, After Hegemony. In this publication, Keohane 
suggests that international cooperation can occur, even among purely self-interested 
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states, when they can achieve mutual benefits by overcoming various impediments to 
cooperation. This type of situation can be modeled using the ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ 
framework from game theory. If this game is played repeatedly, even a rational actor 
may choose cooperation. He argues that cooperation is particularly likely to occur 
within existing international regimes, because they help to reduce transaction costs 
among states – they allow a framework in which cooperation can take place. The 
repeated interactions allow states to build a reputation and to build mutual trust. 
Furthermore, he argues that rather than trying to exert resources to reconsider actions 
and decisions in each case of possible international cooperation, it may be even more 
beneficial for states to rely on existing rules and agreements and to benefit from 
existing international regimes. These regimes allow states to follow standard 
operating procedures or “rules of thumb.”165 
 
Keohane, along with Joseph Nye, expanded on this idea in their 1998 publication, 
“Power and Interdependence in the Information Age.” They argued that despite the 
growth in global information communications technologies and transnational 
organizations, geographically defined states continue to structure politics in the 
information age. However, they note that power may depend less on material 
resources and more on the ability to remain credible to a public with many diverse 
sources of information.166 
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The incentives and disincentives to engage in international cooperation identified in 
these landmark publications are also found in the literature on data sharing. As 
Keohane noted, to be incentivized to cooperate, self-interested nations must have 
mutual interests, because decisions are made based on rational decisions about the 
costs and benefits to the nation of engaging in cooperation. This condition is met 
when looking at international data sharing, particularly with regard to climate data. 
The global nature of both knowledge production and of climate change means that 
achieving domestic policy requires international cooperation.167 
 
When data is shared internationally, it increases the use of the data and the production 
of knowledge, leading to an overall increase in the social benefit. This benefits not 
only the nation with whom the data is shared, but also the nation that made the data 
available. It allows that country to get a greater return on its investment in the data 
collection technology, and in that way, contributes to that nation’s economic 
growth.168 Sharing of data is simply more efficient. Since the data has international 
utility, data sharing can reduce costs by helping to avoid the need for redundant 
systems.169 
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National governments are able to provide goods that have a high social benefit but 
relatively low individual benefits that would not otherwise be produced. Similarly, 
international cooperation can help to enable efficient provision of goods that 
individual nations value but have insufficient incentive to develop themselves.170 
 
In the case of adequate monitoring of climate change, international cooperation is not 
only a more efficient method of achieving this goal, it may be the only way to do so. 
This is because the amount of funding needed to develop and operate all of the 
satellite systems needed to adequately monitor climate change would be well above 
the historical funding levels of any one country for this type of activity. With this type 
of challenge, international cooperation leads to more than efficiency – it leads to 
effectiveness. 171 Schafer notes that this may have been the crucial factor leading to 
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international cooperation in weather monitoring in the end of the nineteenth century, 
noting, “Very early on, people learnt that it is most important to know the weather 
upwind in London to predict the next day’s weather in Hamburg.”172 Fellous notes 
that even if environmental satellites could be developed by one nation, the in situ data 
needed to verify and calibrate these measurements requires international 
cooperation.173 
 
Existing Data-Sharing Regimes 
Robert Keohane argues that cooperation is particularly likely to occur within existing 
international regimes, because they help to reduce transaction costs among states – 
they allow a framework in which cooperation can take place. The repeated 
interactions allow states to build a reputation and to build mutual trust. Furthermore, 
he argues that rather than trying to exert resources to reconsider actions and decisions 
in each case of possible international cooperation, it may be even more beneficial for 
states to rely on existing rules and agreements and to benefit from existing 
international regimes. These regimes allow states to follow standard operating 
procedures or “rules of thumb.”174 
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Keohane’s theory suggests that the existence of international organizations in which 
international agreements can be developed can be important for achieving long-term 
international cooperation. Landis notes that cooperation on the free international 
exchange of meteorological information, which is similar in many ways to climate 
data, has been taking place within the World Meteorological Organization for more 
than 100 years, and its continued operation is assumed by participating nations.175 
Moreover, this organization has the credibility that Keohane and Nye note as being 
essential to maintaining national power.176 Withee notes that space-based Earth 
observation in particular has a long history of cooperation and free sharing of data.177 
That said, international sharing of all environmental data is not the norm, and the lack 
of an existing regime for this activity may make cooperation more difficult.178 
Furthermore, a history of wavering political and financial commitment to 
environmental monitoring on the part of some nations may make it more difficult to 
make credible international commitments.179 
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A related argument is that international cooperation can lead to more international 
coordination; the discussions and relationships necessary to facilitate data sharing 
may lead to further alliances.180 The creation of standards necessary for sharing with 
one partner or within a narrow context may make more widespread sharing easier in 
the future.181 International agreements on data sharing may make international 
coordination of data collection more likely, for example. Looking at it from another 
angle, if scientific data are not widely shared or easy to access internationally, that 
may impede the ability of scientists from different nations to work together or for 
scientists to develop transnational datasets more useful for global problems.182 
 
4.4 Organizational Theory 
Organizational theory has many similarities to international relations, though the unit 
of examination is now the organization or agency rather than the country as a whole. 
Like international relations, organizational theory suggests that sharing is more likely 
where there are superordinate goals – goals that both organizations hold, and that 
cannot be achieved without cooperation.183 Efficiency and effectiveness are important 
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benefits of sharing.184 Just as existing regimes can make cooperation easier, the 
quality of existing relationships can be critical in successful data sharing among 
organizations.185 
 
However, authors note that even when it seems that data sharing would be beneficial, 
it is often not done.186 Organizational theory has a number of contributions distinct 
from the rational decision theory often used in economics and international relations 
that can help explain this paradox, based on intricacies of organizational structure and 
randomness as well as relationships between autonomy and power.187  
 
4.4.1 Garbage Can Model 
One of the most important models within organizational theory is the Garbage Can 
Model of Organizational Choice, developed by Cohen, March, and Olsen in 1972. 
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Traditionally, it was imagined that an organization would identify a problem, come 
up with a logical set of choice alternatives, and then choose among them, maximizing 
based on their primary goals or objectives. The Garbage Can Model provides another, 
arguably more realistic, model of decision-making. They suggest that the preferences 
of organizations are often ill-defined or inconsistent, that trial and error is often 
utilized rather than a full understanding of the effect of new processes, and that the 
individuals working on a particular issue, as well as the amount of time they have to 
devote to it, change over time. Problems, solutions, attentive individuals, and 
decision-making opportunities all exist in tandem. Decision-making is a complex 
process in which the decision made, the time it takes, and the problem that is solved 
depend on the choices, problems, and solutions available at the time, as well as the 
other time demands on decision makers.188 
 
These issues are commonly raised in the data-sharing literature. Meredith specifically 
references the garbage can theory in discussing the ambiguous environment in which 
data sharing decisions are made.189 Taupier notes that agencies are not single-minded 
in their objectives, and often do not operate based on clear, consistent principles.190 
Azad and Wiggins note that the returns on investments in data sharing are often 
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unclear or intangible.191 A specific example of conflicting goals is given by Harris, in 
reference to the United Kingdom’s civil space agency. That agency’s goals include 
helping to understand and protect the environment, opening up commercial and 
operational systems for the future, bringing in commercial returns, and generating 
uniquely valuable space science.192  
 
While benefits for the government as a whole may be general improvements for the 
population, agencies often have a more narrow focus. The National Research Council 
suggests that agencies in the United States focus primarily on fulfilling their specific 
missions, which results in continued funding by Congress.193 If data sharing is not 
seen as one of the agency’s explicit goals, officials within the agency may fight the 
idea that it should be paid for out of its budget.194 
 
Individual and organizational culture can also be important.195 People within an 
organization are more likely to support data sharing if it is seen as important to senior 
management.196 In fact, the attitudes or fundamental beliefs of those with authority 
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over decision-making can be a very important factor in organizational action.197 Data 
sharing can also be made easier in cases where individuals believe sharing is part of 
their professional culture.198 
 
4.4.2 Autonomy, Power, and Budget 
Another issue raised is the importance of autonomy. Agreeing to share data may 
reduce autonomy, for example, as international standards are adopted for data 
formatting or documentation.199 Once a sharing regime is in place, the organization 
loses some of its freedom to act independently.200 Creation of a data sharing system 
requires organizational change, including the creation of new tasks and structures.201 
 
A related issue is that of power. Information is often a source of power, ownership, 
and control, and therefore sharing that data can affect power relationships.202 Pinto 
and Onsrud argue that when agencies have few resources, they may have a desire to 
                                                
197 Harvey, F., and D. Tulloch. "Local‐government Data Sharing: Evaluating the Foundations of 
Spatial Data Infrastructures." International Journal of Geographical Information Science 20.7 (2006): 
743-68. Web. 
Onsrud, Harlan. "Is Cost Recovery Worthwhile." Proc. of URISA 1995 Annual Conference 
Proceedings, Washington, DC. Urban and Regional Information Systems Association, 1995. Web. 
198 Craig, William J. "White Knights of Spatial Data Infrastructure: The Role and Motivation of Key 
Individuals." Journal of the Urban and Regional Information Systems Association 16.2 (2005): 5-14. 
Web. 19 Mar. 2013. 
<http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.130.438&rep=rep1&type=pdf#page=5>. 
199 Azad, Bijan, and Lyna Wiggins. "Dynamics of Inter-Organizational Geographic Data Sharing: A 
Conceptual Framework for Research." Sharing Geographic Information. New Brunswick, NJ: Center 
for Urban Policy Research, 1995. 22-43. Print. 
200 Azad, Bijan, and Lyna Wiggins. "Dynamics of Inter-Organizational Geographic Data Sharing: A 
Conceptual Framework for Research." Sharing Geographic Information. New Brunswick, NJ: Center 
for Urban Policy Research, 1995. 22-43. Print. 
201	  Nedović-­‐Budić,	  Zorica,	  and	  Jeffrey	  K.	  Pinto.	  "Interorganizational	  GIS:	  Issues	  and	  
Prospects."	  The	  Annals	  of	  Regional	  Science	  33.2	  (1999):	  183-­‐95.	  Web.	  
202 Harvey, F., and D. Tulloch. "Local‐government Data Sharing: Evaluating the Foundations of 





hoard those that they do have, including data. When organizations are less resource 
constrained, they may actually be more willing to share their data with other 
organizations. Pinto and Onsrud concluded that “perceived organizational 
munificence will have a positive and significant direct effect on geographic 
information exchange.”203 
 
4.5 Security Theory 
National security is often seen as the foremost responsibility of nations. Therefore, it 
is not surprising that the potential security implications of international data sharing 
are an important and often-discussed issue in the literature. Even articles strongly 
supporting free and open data sharing often acknowledge that concern for national 
security is a legitimate reason to restrict access to data.204 However, there are a 
number of issues that complicate the incorporation of concerns about national 
security into the design of a data sharing policy. 
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4.5.1 Dual-Use Nature of Data  
One of the fundamental difficulties in determining Earth observation data sharing 
policies is that a significant portion of the data, particularly high resolution and radar 
data, is dual-use – it has value for both civil and military purposes.205 The 
implications for data access of each of these uses are diametrically opposed. If data 
can expose sensitive national security information, officials would prefer to not 
release the data at all. Data that is useful for civil purposes, including scientific 
research, is best utilized by distributing it to the greatest extent possible.206  
 
One of the important considerations in determining whether data should be made 
freely available is whether it is more useful for offensive purposes or for defensive 
purposes. Terrorists might find maps of public utilities useful in planning an attack, 
but those same maps might be invaluable to citizens trying to plan a recovery after a 
national disaster.207 Similarly, hydrological data are very important to understanding 
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environmental change, however, they are also seen to be of national strategic 
importance.208 
 
Robert Jervis provided some insight into the importance of this issue in his 1978 
article, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma.” He argued there are two 
variables crucial to determining the extent to which an increase in one state’s security 
decreases the security of others:  whether defensive weapons and policies can be 
distinguished from offensive ones, and whether defense or offense has the advantage. 
Jervis argues that when it is possible to distinguish defensive weapons from offensive 
weapons, it is possible for a state to make itself more secure without making others 
less secure. When defense has the advantage over offense, then a large increase in the 
security in one state will result in only a marginal decrease in the security of others. 
In this case, countries can all enjoy a relatively high level of security. In the opposite 
case, where the disposition of weapons is indistinguishable and offense has the 
advantage, he suggests that the world will be doubly dangerous, and cooperation will 
be very difficult to achieve.209 
 
The offensive uses of geospatial data were widely recognized after September 
eleventh. In the United States, many agencies removed previously available data out 
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of concern that it may have some value for terrorists.210 However, others ask whether 
restricting public access to data may actually harm homeland security. Terrorists may 
not have significant difficulty identifying urban water supply sources, but widely 
available maps may be very valuable to local response teams and policy makers in the 
event of a disaster.211 
 
Reconnaissance satellites are generally viewed as a stabilizing force. An increase in 
knowledge and certainty about the actions of other nations, for example, the ability to 
see any large-scale military mobilization almost immediately, reduces uncertainty 
about other nations’ intentions.212 However, the existence of commercial remote 
sensing satellites poses some unique challenges. In the past, the high-resolution 
imagery collected by reconnaissance satellites was limited to only a few nations with 
these capabilities. With commercial satellites, it is possible for any country to 
purchase imagery, and the location of tanks, troops, refugees, and natural resources 
can all be identified.213 Asymmetric access to this imagery, driven by ability to pay, 
poses a number of challenges.214 For example, a corporation could purchase data 
about a state and use the satellite data to learn more about a country’s natural 
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resources than the government itself may know. This knowledge could then be used 
to the company’s advantage in negotiating contracts for resource extraction.215 
Furthermore, data can be misinterpreted, particularly by those not familiar with a 
particular technology.216 On the other hand, benefits arise from the ability to easily 
share data collected by commercial satellites, for example with foreign coalition 
partners or domestic first responders, compared to that collected by reconnaissance 
satellites.217 
 
Recognizing these issues, the U.S. Federal National Geographic Data Committee 
developed “guidelines for providing appropriate access to geospatial data in response 
to security concerns.” They argued that decisions should be made based on three 
factors: risk to security, uniqueness of information, and net benefit of dissemination. 
In their view, data should only be safeguarded if it is sensitive, unique, and has 
security risks that outweigh the social benefits of dissemination.218 A report done by 
the RAND corporation had similar conclusions, and added that attackers generally 
have a wide array of methods for obtaining information, and that publicly accessible 
geospatial information was generally not their primary source.219 
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Another important consideration in determining the effect of national security 
concerns on data sharing is the practical ability of nations to restrict access to the 
data. This is particularly relevant in the area of commercial remote sensing.220 When 
this capability was first developed in the United States, the government imposed a 
restriction referred to as “shutter control,” that allowed it to restrict the collection 
and/or sale of data when deemed necessary for national security or foreign policy 
reasons.221 However, shutter control was never exercised, as the government seemed 
to prefer exclusive data buys, and in the Remote Sensing Policy of 2003, the shutter 
control option was no longer emphasized.222 Similarly, over time, the U.S. 
government has relaxed or removed limits on the resolution of commercial remote 
sensing systems.223 Part of this change was likely driven by the awareness that 
numerous commercial remote sensing companies were being developed in other 
countries where U.S. policies would not have an effect. Shutter control, or other 
efforts to limit satellite data, was simply not feasible.224 As satellite remote sensing 
technology and information becomes increasingly accessible via international 
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contractors and improved indigenous capabilities, efforts to restrict access to data 
from particular satellites become less effective.  
 
4.6 Domestic Political Considerations 
Data collection and sharing policies are reliant not only on the willingness of an 
organization to pursue data sharing, but also on the decisions of high-level 
bureaucrats or politicians to provide political and fiscal support for data sharing.225 In 
particular, ensuring this political support generally requires that these agencies can 
show the value of their data.226 The visibility of agency efforts and successes can play 
a significant role in agency funding. 
 
Presenting revenues is a very straightforward way to present the value of agency 
activities and is generally well received. Joffe reported that even when revenues made 
up a very small proportion of overall costs of data collection and sharing, efforts at 
cost recovery were viewed positively by high-level decision-makers. However, he 
suggests that it is also possible to show the value of data collection and sharing by 
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highlighting the extent to which the data is used and the benefits and revenue that are 
generated in society based on the use of the data.227 
 
An important corollary to the importance of showing the value of the data produced 
by an agency is the importance of being able to track where data are being used. This 
is particularly true because the costs of making data available are concentrated while 
the benefits of data sharing are widely dispersed.228 Organizations and agencies 
sharing geospatial data note the importance of getting credit for their activities as an 
incentive to greater data sharing.229 
 
4.7 Contribution of this Research 
As this review of theory and literature illustrates, there are a wide variety of 
arguments, from many different disciplinary areas, that apply to the issue of data 
sharing. However, this focus on arguments for and against data sharing is limited. It 
provides an understanding of the breadth of possible arguments that agencies may 
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marshal in developing their international data sharing policies, but it does not provide 
insight into the actual determinants of data sharing policies.  
 
It is critical to understand how nations develop their data sharing policies, and what 
issues are determinants in this process in order to allow meaningful progress in future 
policy development. Rather than understanding why a nation should or should not 
share data, I am interested in why a nation does or does not share data, in the 
particular case of climate data collected by satellites. Do nations restrict access to data 
for economic reasons, security concerns, or both? Do they take into account 
normative issues in developing policies, or are these significantly less important than 
other concerns? Do organizational issues, such as the history and strategic focus of an 
agency affect the policy chosen? Understanding this issue makes it possible to better 
design future policy, based on the actual concerns of policy-makers.  
 
I expect that the determinants of climate satellite data sharing policies will be a subset 
of the potential arguments provided in the literature, with some substantive arguments 
being much more important and more commonly cited by policy-makers than others. 
By determining whether this is in fact the case, and if so, which arguments are most 
important, I add an important new dimension to the existing literature on geospatial 
data sharing, providing insight specifically into the issues necessary for influencing 




Chapter 5:  Econometric Analysis of Data Sharing 
 
This section develops a quantitative model with the aim of determining the 
importance of the incentives and disincentives to international data sharing of 
climate-relevant data collected by satellites suggested by literature. The model will 
look at the relationship between data sharing policies applicable to each instrument in 
the database and other observable characteristics related to that instrument. The 
benefit of quantitative analysis is that it makes it possible to consider the relative roles 
of each of the theorized variables within a well-structured framework. However, there 
are also a number of drawbacks to using quantitative analysis to examine a largely 
qualitative question. In particular, each proxy variables imperfectly represents its 
associated theoretical incentive or disincentive and has the potential to pick up other 
characteristics related to the instrument. Specific concerns with each proxy variable 
are discussed later. Also, quantitative analysis can identify the correlation between 
incentives and data-sharing outcomes, but it cannot speak to the motivations or 
mechanisms behind these connections. Further, decision-making and policy-making 
are complex processes not easily modeled. For example, the choice to use an ordered 
probit rather than nested logit specification represents the belief that decision-makers 
examine the full range of data-sharing options available and choose among them, 
rather than choosing to share or not to share, and then deciding the degree of sharing. 
I believe this most accurately represents the reality of data-sharing decision making in 
most cases, though individual situations may vary. Due to these limitations of 




importance of the theoretical arguments. This is followed by qualitative analysis that 
further examines the barriers and incentives to data sharing and provides insight into 
the motivation for policy development and changes. 
 
5.1 Methodology 
This analysis uses an ordered probit model to test whether various proxies for data-
sharing incentives or disincentives actually play a role in international data sharing. 
An ordered probit model is most appropriate, because it allows analysis of a discrete 
dependent variable that has multiple potential ordinal outcomes. In this case, the 
dependent variable represents the data sharing policy for a particular instrument, 
ranging from freely available with no restrictions to unavailable under all 
circumstances. Also, the probit model makes it possible to estimate the model using 
marginal effects, which allows a straightforward interpretation of the results. An 
appendix also includes the same models run using an ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression model. Though OLS is not generally suited to analysis of discrete 
dependent variables, the estimates it provides have a straightforward interpretation. 
Also, the results from the OLS models for this analysis were similar to those in the 
probit model, demonstrating the robustness of results across model specifications. 
 
This analysis will provide insight into which incentives or disincentives are most 
important in determining international data sharing in the case of climate-monitoring 
satellites. To look at these issues, three sets of regressions have been run. The first 




available for all instruments and leads to a lower number of observations in the 
model. The second model is weighted by measurement and lifespan, to take into 
account the fact that some instruments may collect more measurements than others, 
and they operate for different periods of time. The third model repeats the unweighted 
analysis in the first model, but adds the spatial resolution variable. 
 
These models are run at the instrument level. That means each unit of observation 
represents a particular instrument on a specific satellite. For example, if two satellites 
each carry two instruments, one of which uses the same technology, this would result 
in four unique observations in the dataset. This level of specificity is necessary, 
because it is the level on which data sharing varies. It is possible for one satellite to 
host many instruments, and data from one or more of these instruments may be 
shared freely while others are restricted. Because each of these instruments can be 
traced back to the satellite used to capture it, or the country that led development of 
the satellite, the instruments can also be linked to satellite characteristics, such as the 
civil or military designation, and to country-level characteristics, such as the size of 
the satellite program. These variables can then be used in the analysis.  
 
5.2 Description of Variables Used 
Dependent Variable: Data sharing 
The dependent variable in these models represents the data sharing policy that applies 
to data collected by a specific instrument on a particular satellite. The variable can 




available at no cost, but with some restrictions, 3) data is made available at marginal 
cost, but with no restrictions once the data is purchased, 4) data is made available at 
marginal cost, with some restrictions, 5) data is sometimes associated with above 
marginal cost and restrictions (due to application requirements), 6) data is available 
above marginal cost, 7) data access is unknown (which is essentially equivalent to 
being unavailable), and 8) data is not made available. The data-sharing variable does 
not vary with time. It represents the state of data-sharing policies for a given 
instrument in 2012, regardless of when the satellite was launched or when/if it has 
reached the end of its operational life.  
 
Data from about half of the instruments considered in this research are shared freely, 
while data from the other half is made available with minor or major restrictions. 























Figure 5.1 Number of Instruments in Each Data-Sharing Policy Category 
 
Figure 5.1 shows the number of instruments that fall into each of the data sharing policy categories 
used in the regression analysis. 
 
Table 5.1 Dependent Variable Descriptive Statistics 
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World Bank Voice and Accountability Index (Proxy for Government Transparency): 
One of the theoretical determinants of data sharing policies is based on normative 
beliefs about the role of the government. In particular, normative theories suggested 
that data should be shared to enhance government transparency and to ensure fair 
access to citizens. Governments that highly value transparency would be expected to 
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other restrictions. However, measuring government transparency is difficult, and no 
one measure perfectly captures reality. This analysis makes use of the World Bank 
Voice and Accountability Index as a proxy variable. According to the World Bank, 
this variable “captures perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able 
to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, 
freedom of association, and a free media.”230 Therefore, based on the earlier 
theoretical discussion, governments with a higher score on the voice and 
accountability index should be more likely to share data. 
 
Figure 5.2 Number of Instruments in Each Voice and Accountability Index 
Range 
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Figure 5.3 Mean Voice and Accountability Index in Each Data Sharing Category 
  
Figure 5.3 shows the mean Voice and Accountability Index score for each data-sharing category. 
 
Economic 
Spatial Resolution (Proxy for Commodity Value): Economic arguments for and 
against free and open data sharing relate to whether the data is viewed as a public 
good or a commodity. One of the reasons for viewing the data as a commodity is that 
it has some commodity value. Therefore, this effect, if important, would be expected 
to play a particularly large role in decision-making when the commercial value of the 
data is high. High spatial resolution imagery has proven to be of most value; this is 
the primary product of nearly every commercial remote sensing firm. Therefore, data 
from a higher resolution instrument (i.e. with a spatial resolution of a lower number 
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Figure 5.4 Number of Instruments in Each Spatial Resolution Range 
   
Figure 5.4 shows the number of instruments that fall into each spatial resolution range. Satellites are 
clustered in the relatively high-resolution ranges, though a large number of satellites have very low 
resolution as well.  
 
 
Figure 5.5 Mean Spatial Resolution of Instruments in Each Data Sharing 
Category
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Number of Countries Involved (Proxy for Shared Interest): In the literature on 
international cooperation, it is noted that one of the most important factors for 
enabling cooperation is the recognition of a shared interest in the goal or outcome. In 
cases where more than one country was involved in the development of the satellite, 
there must have been some recognition that multiple countries would benefit from the 
information collected by such a satellite. Therefore, we would expect that data from 
instruments on satellites that were developed cooperatively would be more likely to 
be shared. One drawback to this proxy variable occurs in cases in which the 
cooperative agreement to create the satellite involved a barter that included access to 
the data as a component of the agreement. In those cases, data from satellites 
developed by more than one country may actually be less likely to be shared. 
 
Figure 5.6 Number of Instruments on Satellites with Varying Levels of 
International Participation 
   
Figure 5.7 shows the number of instruments on satellites with varying levels on international 
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Figure 5.7 Mean Number of Countries Involved in Each Data Sharing Category 
 
Figure 5.7 shows the mean number of countries involved for instruments in each of the data sharing 
categories. 
 
International Participation Index (Proxy for Existing Institutions): A basic theory in 
international relations suggests that international cooperation will be easier to achieve 
if there are existing institutions in which countries are able to develop new 
agreements. Therefore, we would expect countries that are involved in a greater 
number of institutions that address data sharing issues to be more likely to share their 
data. This index gives a country a score of zero to four, with one point for 
participation of each of four groups: the Group on Earth Observations (GEO), the 
Committee on Earth Observation Satellites (CEOS), the Global Climate Observation 
System (GCOS) and the Coordination Group for Meteorological Satellites (CGMS). 
Theory would predict that higher scores on this index would be associated with 
greater data sharing. One concern with this index is that it is difficult to determine 
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sharing. However, it is also likely the case, at least to some extent, that an interest in 
data sharing would make a country more likely to join these groups.  
 
Figure 5.8 Number of Countries Owned by Countries with each International 
Participation Index 
 
Figure 5.8 shows the number of instruments owned by countries undertaking various levels of 
international cooperation. 
 
Figure 5.9 Mean International Participation Index in Each Data Sharing 
Category 
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Organizational Theory  
National Portion of Global Earth Observation Satellites (Proxy for Program 
Resources): One of the potential determinants of data sharing discussed in the 
literature related to the desire for power and autonomy within organizations. The 
literature suggested that agencies that are smaller or have less resources are actually 
less likely to share data, because they feel a greater need to hold onto the power and 
autonomy that they can get from owning and controlling the data. It is difficult to get 
a reliable number for the budgets of all space and meteorological agencies, and even 
more difficult to determine the portion of that budget focused on Earth observation 
satellites and satellite data. Therefore, the proxy used here looks simply at the portion 
of the total global Earth observation satellites in which each country is involved (not 
just those for which it is the lead). This gives the relative size of the national program. 
Based on theory, we would expect those with relatively small programs to share less 













Figure 5.10 Frequency Distribution of National Portion of Global Earth 
Observation Satellites 
 
Figure 5.10 shows the number of instruments owned by countries based on the proportion of overall 
Earth observation satellites owned by that country. 
 
 
Figure 5.11 Mean National Portion of Global Earth Observation Satellites in 
Each Data Sharing Category 
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Research or Operational Agency (Proxy for Professional Culture): Another potential 
organizational effect on data sharing is related to the view of data sharing in the 
professional culture. In the space community, there are two distinct types of 
organizations that develop and operate Earth observation satellites: research 
organizations and operational organizations. Research organizations, like NASA, 
focus primarily on satellites that aim to answer a specific research question. 
Operational organizations generally focus on observations that need to be taken 
indefinitely, with weather information as the most common example. Historically, 
there has been strong support for international sharing of operational weather data, 
particularly non-real time data, while research data is sometimes considered 
proprietary. Therefore, the theory would predict that operational organizations are 
more likely to share data. 
 
Figure 5.12 Number of Instruments on Research vs. Operational Satellites 
  
Figure 5.12 shows the number of instruments carried on operational satellites and the number carried 
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Figure 5.13 Portion of Instruments in Each Data Sharing Category that are 
Operational 
  
Figure 5.13 shows the portion of instruments in each data-sharing category that are operational. 
 
Official Mission Includes Climate (Proxy for Agency Mission): Organizations 
frequently have conflicting goals and must base their actions not only on a strict cost 
benefit analysis, but also on their interpretation of their own mission. One potentially 
important consideration, therefore, is whether the satellite was specifically designed 
to include monitoring climate change as part of its mission. This proxy helps to 
illuminate whether data from satellites designed to monitor climate are more or less 
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Figure 5.14 Number of Instruments that Have Climate in Mission 
 Figure 5.14 shows the number of instruments that are on satellites with climate as a portion of their 
mission, and the number of instruments on satellites that do not have climate as an explicit part of 
their mission. 
 
Figure 5.15 Portion of Instruments in Each Data Sharing Category for which 
Climate is Part of the Mission 
 
Figure 5.15 shows the portion of instruments in each data-sharing category that are on a satellite with 
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Military, Dual-Use, or Civil (Proxy for Security Concerns): It is clear that satellite 
remote sensing imagery has significant military value. This is evidenced by the large 
number of reconnaissance satellites operated by numerous countries around the 
world. However, those satellites are not included in this analysis. Therefore, the 
question is whether security concerns are a determinant in data sharing for 
unclassified government satellites. It is reasonable to expect that the satellites with the 
greatest national security value would be those developed and operated for the 
military or specifically designed for both civil and military use (dual-use). This 
dummy variable is one for satellites that are military or dual-use and zero for civil. 
Theory would suggest that military or dual-use satellites would be less likely to be 
shared. 
 
Figure 5.16 Number of Instruments that are Military or Dual-Use vs. Civil  
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Figure 5.17 Portion of Instruments on Military or Dual-Use Satellites in Each 
Data Sharing Category 
 




There were also arguments in the literature about the importance of political factors, 
particularly the importance of demonstrating the value of sharing Earth observing 
satellite data. The literature suggests that efforts to educate decision-makers about the 
value of data use and raise awareness about data-use metrics may be more difficult 
than raising awareness about revenues from data sales and the benefits of these 
revenues. However, no proxy variables were found that could represent this level of 
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Table 5.2 Independent Variable Descriptive Statistics 
Variable n Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
Voice and Accountability 483 66.3 30 4.7 99.1 







Number of Countries 483 1.3 0.6 1 4 
International Participation Index 483 3.3 0.9 0 4 
National Portion of Global EO Climate Satellites 483 0.159 0.124 0.00
5 
0.323 
Operational 483 0.43 0.50 0 1 
Mission Includes Climate 483 .42 .49 0 1 
Military or Dual-Use 483 .34 .47 0 1 
Table 5.2 shows some basic descriptive statistics for the dependent variable, data sharing. 
 
5.3 Results 
Three groups of ordered probit models were run for this analysis. The first set is run 
without the spatial resolution variable, the second is weighted for number of 
measurements and lifespan, and the third is unweighted, but includes the spatial 
resolution variable. OLS specifications were also run, and are included in an 
appendix. The tables allow an analysis of which variables were statistically 
significant and in which direction they affect the results. Also, marginal effects are 
reported, rather than the coefficients, so it is possible to provide an interpretation of 















Table 5.3 Data Sharing, Ordered Probit, Marginal Effects 
 
Table 5.3 shows the marginal effects for each of the proxy variables across each of the data sharing 
categories. 
Notes: These tables report marginal effects. T-statistics in parentheses. 
     *Denotes statistically significant at the 5 percent level 
   **Denotes statistically significant at the 1 percent level 
 ***Denotes statistically significant at the 0.1 percent level 
Sources: CEOS MIM Database, CEOS System Database, Union of Concerned Scientists Satellite Database, 































Voice#and#Accountability 0.00245** E0.000355 E0.0000438 E0.000275* E0.00117* E0.000590* E0.0000159
(2.64) (E1.48) (E0.88) (E2.16) (E2.17) (E2.06) (E1.04)
0.0727 E0.0105 E0.00130 E0.00815 E0.0348 E0.0175 E0.000473
(1.35) (E0.85) (E0.84) (E1.33) (E1.38) (E1.33) (E0.91)
E0.0721 0.0104 0.00129 0.00808 0.0345 0.0173 0.000469
(E1.24) (0.81) (0.90) (1.09) (1.29) (1.23) (0.86)
3.481*** E0.504 E0.0622 E0.390** E1.664*** E0.837*** E0.0226
(6.89) (E1.32) (E1.01) (E2.65) (E5.10) (E3.82) (E1.22)
Operational 0.160* E0.0232 E0.00286 E0.0179 E0.0765* E0.0385* E0.00104
(2.42) (E1.17) (E0.94) (E1.80) (E2.51) (E1.98) (E0.98)
Mission#Includes#Climate 0.443*** E0.0642 E0.00792 E0.0496* E0.212*** E0.107*** E0.00288
(4.78) (E1.26) (E1.00) (E2.55) (E4.23) (E3.38) (E1.21)
Military#or#DualEUse E0.176** 0.0255 0.00314 0.0197 0.0840** 0.0423* 0.00114
(E2.63) (1.08) (0.91) (1.93) (3.00) (2.35) (1.10)










Table 5.4 Data Sharing, Ordered Probit, Marginal Effects, Weighted by Number 
of Measurements and Lifespan 
 
Table 5.4 shows the marginal effects for each of the proxy variables across each of the data sharing 
categories. It is weighted by the number of measurements each instrument can take and by the lifespan 
of the instrument. 
 
Notes: These tables report marginal effects. T-Statistics in parenthesis. 
     *Denotes statistically significant at the 5 percent level 
   **Denotes statistically significant at the 1 percent level 
 ***Denotes statistically significant at the 0.1 percent level 
Sources: CEOS MIM Database, CEOS System Database, Union of Concerned Scientists Satellite Database, 




















Voice#and#Accountability 0.00368* E0.00222* E0.0000581 E0.000511 E0.000687 E0.000200 E0.00000276
(2.15) (E2.06) (E0.88) (E1.46) (E1.63) (E1.53) (E0.74)
E0.0723 0.0437 0.00114 0.0100 0.0135 0.00394 0.0000542
(E1.35) (1.37) (0.77) (1.08) (1.16) (1.10) (0.69)
E0.0233 0.0141 0.000369 0.00324 0.00436 0.00127 0.0000175
(E0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) (0.30) (0.30) (0.28)
4.029*** E2.432** E0.0636 E0.559* E0.752** E0.219* E0.00302
(5.64) (E2.99) (E1.00) (E2.43) (E3.22) (E2.15) (E0.80)
Operational 0.0502 E0.0303 E0.000793 E0.00697 E0.00936 E0.00273 E0.0000376
(0.62) (E0.60) (E0.54) (E0.63) (E0.62) (E0.60) (E0.44)
Mission#Includes#Climate 0.280** E0.169* E0.00442 E0.0388* E0.0522* E0.0152 E0.000210
(2.97) (E2.34) (E0.95) (E2.00) (E2.21) (E1.75) (E0.77)
Military#or#DualEUse E0.216** 0.130** 0.00341 0.0300* 0.0403* 0.0118 0.000162
(E3.23) (2.58) (0.93) (2.12) (2.14) (1.65) (0.77)










Table 5.5 Data Sharing, Ordered Probit, Marginal Effects, Including Spatial 
Resolution 
 
Table 5.5 shows the marginal effects for each of the proxy variables across each of the data sharing 
categories. It includes the spatial resolution proxy variable. 
 
Notes: These tables report marginal effects. T-Statistics in parenthesis. 
     *Denotes statistically significant at the 5 percent level 
   **Denotes statistically significant at the 1 percent level 
 ***Denotes statistically significant at the 0.1 percent level 
Sources: CEOS MIM Database, CEOS System Database, Union of Concerned Scientists Satellite Database, 
Satellite Mission Websites 
 
Many of the proxy variables were statistically significant across multiple models. 
Countries with a higher score on the World Bank Accountability Index are more 
likely to share their data to a greater degree. Also, the larger the portion of global 
Earth observation satellites a nation was involved in, the more likely they were to 


















Voice#and#Accountability 0.00179** 0.00107* 0.0000183 0.0000170 G0.00107* G0.00175** G0.0000751
(2.77) (2.46) (1.05) (0.37) (G2.49) (G2.75) (G1.62)
0.00379 0.00226 0.0000388 0.0000360 G0.00226 G0.00370 G0.000159
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (G0.13) (G0.13) (G0.13)
0.0383 0.0228 0.000391 0.000363 G0.0228 G0.0374 G0.00161
(1.29) (1.25) (0.83) (0.35) (G1.26) (G1.28) (G1.12)
1.333*** 0.794*** 0.0136 0.0127 G0.794*** G1.303*** G0.0559
(4.40) (3.72) (1.15) (0.37) (G3.57) (G4.79) (G1.77)
Operational 0.0741 0.0442 0.000759 0.000704 G0.0442 G0.0725 G0.00311
(1.83) (1.73) (0.97) (0.36) (G1.76) (G1.81) (G1.37)
Mission#Includes#Climate 0.257*** 0.153*** 0.00263 0.00244 G0.153*** G0.251*** G0.0108
(5.22) (3.76) (1.12) (0.37) (G3.80) (G5.24) (G1.84)
Military#or#DualGUse G0.0811* G0.0483* G0.000830 G0.000770 0.0483* 0.0793* 0.00340
(G2.14) (G2.00) (G1.04) (G0.37) (2.02) (2.15) (1.44)
Spatial#Resolution 0.00000276 0.00000164 2.82eG08 2.62eG08 G0.00000164 G0.00000270*G0.000000116
(1.91) (1.93) (1.06) (0.38) (G1.81) (G2.01) (G1.44)










data from instruments on those satellites was more likely to be shared. If the satellite 
was specifically designated as military or dual use, sharing was less likely. The 
dummy variable representing operational or research status was only significant in the 
first model, but in that case, it was positive, indicating that data collected by satellites 
developed by operational agencies (generally meteorological agencies) is more likely 
to be shared. The results for the number of countries involved, the international 
participation index, and spatial resolution were not significant. 
 
5.4 Discussion 
The fact that the many of the proxy variables were statistically significant supports 
the idea that the theoretical arguments discussed in the literature do represent 
important incentives and disincentives to data sharing. Furthermore, each of the proxy 
variables that was statistically significant had an effect that matched the direction 
suggested by the literature.  
 
As expected, the higher the score on the World Bank Accountability Index, the more 
likely a country was to share data more freely and openly. This suggests that valuing 
transparency is important as an incentive for sharing data.  
 
The analysis also showed that countries that were involved in a larger portion of the 
overall global Earth observation satellites over this period were more likely to share 




organizations to hoard the resources they do have, and makes them less likely to share 
their data.  
 
The fact that climate was part of a satellite mission had a positive effect in terms of 
data sharing. This suggests that there is support for sharing of climate data, in 
particular. 
 
If a satellite was designed for military or dual-use purposes, the data was less likely to 
be shared. This supports the theory that national security concerns are one of the 
disincentives to sharing satellite data. 
 
Finally, though it was not significant in all cases, the effect of a satellite being 
considered operational, rather than research, did increase the likelihood that data 
would be shared. Again, this agrees with the theory that suggested the professional 
culture of sharing in meteorology (operational) agencies would make data from these 
organizations more likely to be shared overall. 
 
These results provide some indication that the incentives and barriers suggested by 
the literature are playing a role in data sharing policies. However, the proxy variables 
have a limited ability to capture each theoretical argument, and the analysis doesn’t 
provide insight into how each of these issues affects policy development. Therefore, 




Chapter 6:  Domestic Agency-Level Comparative Case 
Studies 
 
The quantitative analysis in the previous chapter provided some indication of which 
barriers and incentives are important in international sharing of climate data collected 
by satellites. However, to further investigate the incentives and barriers to data 
sharing and the determinants of data sharing policy development and changes, I carry 
out a series of case studies on agencies that operate climate-relevant satellites in three 
nations with relatively large satellite Earth observation programs. The series will 
include a total of seven government agencies from the United States, Europe, and 
Japan: the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the U.S. 
National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Association (NOAA), and the United 
States Geological Survey (USGS), the European Space Agency (ESA), the European 
Organization for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites (EUMETSAT), the 


















Table 6.1 Domestic Case Study Agency Statistics231 










NASA $17,770.0 $1,760.5 19 
NOAA $4,905.3 $1,878.0 17 
USGS $1,068.0 $144.1 2 
Europe ESA $5,090.0 $1,121.4 7 
EUMETSAT $417.52 $417.52 8 
Japan JAXA $2,180.0 $237.0 4 
JMA $860  3 
Table 6.1 shows a variety of descriptive statistics about the size of the agencies for which case studies 
were carried out. 
 
There are 35 nations that were involved in the operation of at least one climate-
relevant satellite between 2000 and 2012. These seven agencies were chosen because 
they come from three of the countries with the largest number of climate-relevant 
satellites, and they have some variation in their current data sharing policies. While 
Russian, Indian, and Chinese space and meteorological agencies also have a large 
number of relevant satellites and would be interesting cases, the major challenges of 
contacting and communicating with policy-makers in these countries were restrictive. 
France, Germany, and Italy also have large Earth observation programs, even 
independent of their contributions to the European agencies, but these were not 
chosen because of their close connection to the European cases already included. 
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Countries with much smaller satellite programs generally have less impact on global 
data sharing issues, do not have official policies, and are more difficult to contact. 
However, analysis of a group of these smaller actors could provide insight into major 
differences from larger programs, and analysis of any of these additional groups of 
cases would be an interesting area for future research.  
 
Government agencies are of great interest, because this is the level on which data-
sharing policies are developed. Though an agency may choose different levels of 
restriction for data related to specific satellites or instruments, the data-sharing policy 
outlining these decisions is developed and approved for the agency as a whole. 
Therefore, examination of these agencies illuminates not only how data sharing 
policies developed and changed over time within each agency, but also why agencies 
changed their policies – the motivations for policy change. Similarities in the 
determinants of data sharing policies in these countries are used to identify incentives 
and barriers to data sharing that are likely operating in other countries as well. It is 
also possible to see the extent to which determinants vary by country, or type of 
agency (research or operational), type of satellite, and other theoretically important 
attributes. 
 
The case studies included analysis of agency-level data sharing policies and related 
documents. They also build on interviews with at least two policy-makers at each 
agency who were involved in, or aware of, the development of the agency’s data-




policy, these interviews focused specifically on incentives and barriers to data sharing 
considered by the agency and the primary determinants in the final policy choice.  
 
These case studies will show that all seven agencies had similar substantive concerns 
with regard to developing and choosing data sharing policies, in particular, concerns 
about economic efficiency, normative considerations related to responsibilities to 
share certain types of data as well as the proper role of government, and the 
importance of sharing data to address global challenges. However, their 
determinations on how to address these concerns differ both from agency to agency 
and also over time. Almost all agencies followed a similar pattern of development, 
moving from an informal policy of sharing to restrictive policies aimed at cost 
recovery or commercialization, and then towards a free and open sharing policy. 
However, even within each country, these steps often occurred at different times, for 
different lengths of time, and to greater and lesser extents for each agency.  
 
6.1 United States 
The United States has multiple agencies that operate Earth observing satellites, and as 
a whole, the United States has the largest Earth observing satellite system in the 
world, collecting data related to many essential climate variables. The two primary 
agencies of interest are the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) 
and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).  Though the 
United States Geological Survey (USGS) only operates one series of Earth 




sharing issues. Also, it is important to note that although all three agencies are subject 
to many of the same government-wide policies and trends, they are located in 
different departments – NOAA is within the Department of Commerce, and USGS is 
in the Department of Interior. This means that they also report to, and have funding 
authorized by, different Congressional sub-committees. These differences help to 
explain the diversity in the data sharing policy drafts across these three U.S. agencies 
operating Earth observing satellites. 
 
Table 6.2 Essential Climate Variable coverage with U.S.-led satellites only 
 
Table 6.2 shows the number of instruments on U.S.-led satellites collecting each essential climate 
variable each year from 2000 to 2012. 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Aerosol1Properties 9 10 12 13 13 14 14 14 14 16 17 17 16
Aerosols 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Albedo 7 7 9 9 9 10 10 10 10 11 11 11 11
Biomass 9 9 11 11 11 11 9 9 9 10 10 11 11
Carbon1Dioxide,1Methane,1and1Greenhouse1Gases7 7 9 9 10 10 7 7 7 8 8 9 9
Cloud1Properties 19 20 22 25 25 23 23 23 23 25 26 26 25
Earth1Radiation1Budget 15 16 18 19 18 18 15 14 14 16 17 18 17
FAPAR 6 6 8 8 8 9 9 9 9 10 10 10 10
Fire1Disturbance 13 14 16 16 15 15 13 12 12 14 15 16 15
Glaciers1and1Ice1Caps,1and1Ice1Sheets 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
LAI 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 6 6
Lakes 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Land1Cover 15 17 19 20 20 20 18 17 18 20 21 20 19
Ocean1Color 10 11 13 13 12 13 13 12 12 14 15 16 15
Ocean1Currents 1 2 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 3
Ocean1salinity 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ozone 13 14 16 16 16 16 12 11 11 13 14 15 14
Precipitation 15 16 18 19 18 16 16 15 15 17 18 19 18
Sea1Ice 6 6 8 10 10 11 11 11 11 12 12 12 12
Sea1Level 5 6 7 8 8 7 8 7 8 8 8 8 8
Sea1State 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2
Sea1Surface1Temperature 12 13 15 16 15 15 13 12 12 14 15 16 15
Snow1Cover 14 14 16 18 18 16 15 15 15 16 16 17 17
Soil1Moisture 9 9 12 14 14 13 14 14 14 14 14 15 15
Surface1Temperature 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Surface1Wind1Speed1and1Direction 10 11 13 14 14 13 13 12 13 12 12 13 13
Upper1Air1Temperature 17 18 20 21 21 19 22 22 22 24 25 26 25
UpperVair1Wind 9 10 12 12 11 11 10 9 9 10 11 11 10




6.1.1 National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)  
NASA Vision: To reach for new heights and reveal the unknown so that what we do 
and learn will benefit all humankind.232 
 
Early Development and Unofficial Data Sharing 
In 1958, the National Aeronautics and Space Act transformed the National Advisory 
Committee for Aeronautics into the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA), creating a new civil agency. The act called for NASA to “provide for 
research into problems of flight within and outside the earth's atmosphere.” This 
included developing satellites and the associated equipment.233 
 
At that time, the Department of Defense had already been developing the first 
weather satellite, the Television Infrared Operational Satellite (TIROS), but it was 
handed off to NASA shortly after its formation. NASA developed a second series of 
meteorological satellites, the Nimbus satellite system, with the first three launches 
occurring in the 1960s. NASA continued launching Earth observing satellites, with 
six launches in the 1970s and another six in the 1980s.234 Despite the focus on 
weather data collection, these satellites included technology demonstrations and new 
types of observing instruments. 
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Throughout this period, NASA had no official data sharing policy. This was due in 
part to the technology demonstration focus of the program at that time; it was still a 
period where NASA was determining what Earth observing satellites could do and 
how they would be most useful. The number of scientists interested in investigating 
the potential of this new technology at such an early stage was relatively small and 
sharing was informal. In addition, the relatively small number of active satellites and 
the limitations of then contemporary data storage and sharing technologies were 
further limitations on widespread sharing. 
 
However, as time progressed, these technology demonstrations proved that there was 
great potential to learn about the Earth using remote sensing satellites. During the late 
1970s and early 1980s, awareness of global environmental issues, and climate change 
in particular, began to increase. In this period, NASA’s observations and research 
concerning the ozone hole over Antarctica also provided it with experience and public 
recognition as a leader on environmental issues.235 In 1973, NASA Administrator 
James Fletcher testified to Congress that NASA could be called an environmental 
agency, and that understanding the Earth and its environment may be NASA’s 
essential task. In 1983, NASA created an Earth System Sciences Committee that 
worked with other government agencies to organize an initiative to study global 
change. 236 
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Growth of Earth Science and the First Data Sharing Policy 
With the value of Earth observing satellites proven, and NASA’s role as a leader in 
Earth science established, NASA’s ambitions grew. This began with planning of the 
“Mission to Planet Earth” in the early 1980s.237 The centerpiece of this new mission 
was the “Earth Observing System,” a comprehensive system of satellites, driven in 
part by the need for long-term, comprehensive observations to better understand the 
causes and effects of global change.238 In 1986, the program plan included two very 
large and capable satellites with many sensors, to be launched by the early 2000s, and 
a series of smaller precursor missions in the 1990s. Total costs were projected to be 
$30 billion over 30 years, with $17 billion expected to be spent by 2000.239  
 
When President George H. W. Bush entered office in 1989, he made global change 
the first “presidential priority” in science and technology, and named NASA’s Earth 
Observation System the largest component. The program was officially adopted as a 
top priority in the newly formed interagency U.S. Global Change Research Program 
in 1990.240 The increasing size and importance of the program was recognized within 
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NASA. Starting in the 1990s and lasting over a decade, NASA’s Earth Science office 
was moved out of the Space Sciences and Application area and elevated to a level 
equal to other major offices such as Spaceflight and Space Sciences.241 
 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, as plans for the Mission to Planet Earth and the 
Earth Observing System took form, NASA recognized the need to develop a plan to 
deal with the unprecedented amount of data that would be collected. The technical 
portion of this was the Earth Observation Satellite Data and Information System 
(EOSDIS), which would include data acquisition, archiving, and distribution centers. 
Along with these technical commitments, NASA began to examine its data sharing 
practices and develop a new, official data sharing policy.242  
 
A number of NASA officials took the position that data should be shared openly and 
freely. They argued that data sharing was fundamental to science, the focus of their 
program, and that making data available to the greatest extent possible was the most 
efficient way to ensure more research gets done and more knowledge is produced. If 
each mission team, agency, or even country, kept its data to itself, progress on 
interdisciplinary and global issues like climate change would be very slow, if not 
impossible. Data from one instrument needs to be compared to others, gaps in data 
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need to be filled in, and results need to be tested and re-tested. This type of science 
simply couldn’t be done without sharing data and information.243  
 
At this time, it was common for the principle investigators on a satellite program to 
be granted a period of exclusive use of the data, allowing them to be the first to 
review data and publish new findings. For example, the Upper Atmosphere Research 
Satellite (UARS) science team and principle investigators, a group of about 40 
people, had two years of exclusive access to data collected by this mission after it 
launched in 1991.244 As NASA officials developed the first official data sharing 
policy, they targeted the elimination of this practice as the first step in increasing data 
availability.245 Eliminating this practice would help achieve the goal of maximizing 
data use and benefits.246  
 
In March 1991, NASA released its Earth science data policy. This policy stated that 
data from NASA’s Earth observation satellites would be made available free of 
charge and without any period of exclusive use “for use in Federally-funded research, 
development, and application programs and cooperative research programs.” It noted 
that NOAA would have free access to all data with potential operational applications, 
and that data would also be available for free for educational and informational 
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activities in the public interest and in keeping with any binding agreements with 
foreign or domestic institutions that establish a quid pro quo.247 
 
However, it noted that, “Access terms will specify that such users will not engage in 
commercial applications of NASA-provided data without authorization.”248 This 
caveat was driven in large part by an interest on the part of Congress, as well as some 
within the agency, in selling Earth observation data. It was believed that this practice 
would lead to greater efficiency, decrease NASA budget requirements, and promote 
activity in the private sector.249  
 
Just a few months after NASA’s policy was announced, the “Bromley Principles” 
were released. Officially called the “Data Management for Global Change Research 
Policy Statements,” these principles were developed within the U.S. Global Change 
Research Program, led by Presidential Science Advisor Allen Bromley. The 
principles were discussed and agreed to by thirteen government agencies, including 
NASA, NOAA, and USGS. The policy endorsed “full and open access” to data for 
global change research.250  
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Similar to the NASA policy, this policy stated, “Full and open sharing of the full suite 
of global data sets for all global change researchers is a fundamental objective.” It 
specified, “Data should be provided at the lowest possible cost to global change 
researchers in the interest of full and open access to data. This cost should, as a first 
principle, be no more than the marginal cost of filling a specific user request. 
Agencies should act to streamline administrative arrangements for exchanging data 
among researchers.” It also noted that agencies should develop plans for commercial 
access to global change databases, but did not address any specific procedures or 
costs related to this access.251 
 
NASA’s Data Sharing Policy Update 
In the early 1990s, NASA’s plans for the Earth Observing System were scaled back, 
largely due to budget pressures. The program had already been redesigned to include 
six smaller satellites, rather than two very large ones, and in 1991, Congress directed 
NASA to cap spending at $11 billion by 2000, approximately two-thirds the amount 
originally projected.  
 
In 1992, Dan Goldin became NASA Administrator and implemented his “faster, 
better, cheaper” initiative for the agency; the Earth Observing System did not meet 
his criteria.252 As budget pressures increased, interest within the government in data 
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sales continued. Despite the restriction on commercial use included in NASA’s 
policy, a Government Accountability Office Report released in June 1992 criticized 
NASA for not going far enough in engaging the commercial sector. In particular, it 
noted that NASA did not sufficiently consider commercial needs in developing plans 
for satellite systems, and did not have clear plans in place for access to data by 
commercial entities.253 
 
President Clinton entered office in 1992, but environmental priorities were focused 
more on carbon dioxide reductions and other mitigation actions rather than long-term 
observations. The administration also prioritized deficit reduction, and by 1995, the 
Earth Observing System was cut to $6.8 billion, a third of the original projected 
amount. The reduced program included numerous small satellites and three medium-
sized “flag-ship” missions: Aqua, Aura, and Terra, focusing on water, atmosphere, 
and land respectively.254 Despite these cutbacks, the Earth Observing System would 
be the most comprehensive national Earth observing system ever undertaken. To deal 
with all of the data being collected, NASA developed the Earth Observation System 
Data and Information System (EOSDIS). EOSDIS would help to ensure that all of the 
data was collected, managed, and made quickly available.255 
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NASA’s data policy was set to expire at the end of 1998, and as that time grew near, 
NASA’s data policy was examined and discussed. There was still a group within the 
government that believed commercialization of satellites and satellite data, whenever 
possible, would be the most efficient action. There was some support for marginal 
cost pricing, and a sense that this would be the most economically efficient method, 
allowing NASA to get some returns based on data use.  However, others in the Earth 
Science program believed the best way to achieve NASA’s mission was by providing 
data free of charge without any restrictions.256 They argued that any costs or 
restrictions on the data, even those necessary to distinguish between research and 
commercial uses, would decrease data dissemination and use.257 
 
In addition to the view that it was the most efficient way to achieve its mission, a 
number of individuals within NASA espoused the view that data sharing was a moral 
obligation – it was just the right thing to do.  They argue that NASA is not, and 
should not be, in the business of trying to make money.258 They explained that 
taxpayers had already paid for development and operation of the system and should 
not be required to pay again to access the data.259 
 
Individuals in NASA’s Earth Science office also felt that charging for data just didn’t 
make economic sense. Why spend a billion dollars developing and launching a 
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satellite and then nickel-and-dime the users by charging for data? There were 
complaints that charging meant that some NASA employees would need to spend 
their time accepting payments and making bank runs, all for a monetary benefit that 
was very small compared to the cost of the satellite.260 Even if $100,000 was made 
from selling satellite data at marginal cost, that revenue would reflect only one tenth 
of one percent of the cost of a billion-dollar satellite like Terra, Aqua, or Aura.261 This 
small benefit was not believed to be worth the effort on the part of NASA nor was it 
worth the disincentive to data use that it created for potential users.262 They also 
pointed to the experience of the Landsat system, which had recently been returned to 
government control after a failed effort to commercialize the system.263 Advocates for 
a fully open data policy argued that open access would generate more revenue and 
contribute more to economic growth than cost recovery by increasing activity in the 
value-added sector, which would create new products and businesses.264   
 
One of the primary arguments of the group advocating for free and open sharing came 
from a government-wide policy originally released in 1985 that had recently been 
revised.265  The 1994 revision of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 
circular A-130 on the management of federal information resources emphasized the 
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need for improved public access to government information. This document also 
stated that agencies must “set user charges for information dissemination products at 
a level sufficient to recover the cost of dissemination but no higher.”266  
 
NASA advocates of free and open data sharing emphasized an exception to this 
requirement that allowed data to be provided without any cost to the user. This 
portion of OMB Circular A-130 stated that costs could be waived, “where the agency 
plans to establish user charges at less than cost of dissemination because of a 
determination that higher charges would constitute a significant barrier to properly 
performing the agency's functions, including reaching members of the public whom 
the agency has a responsibility to inform.”267 
 
NASA officials argued that NASA’s mission of promoting research and increased 
understanding of the Earth required disseminating the data as widely as possible, and 
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even marginal cost could be a barrier to access. This was particularly true if marginal 
cost was interpreted, as it was in the case of some agencies, to include the man-hours 
required to fulfill requests and the infrastructure costs of maintaining archiving 
systems, in addition to costs of media and mailing.268  
 
Arguments for free and open data sharing won out, and NASA’s 1998 policy, which 
is still in place as of 2012, “promotes the full and open sharing of all data with the 
research and applications communities, private industry, academia, and the general 
public.” The policy notes that the greater the availability of data, the more quickly 
and effectively it can be utilized for science and applications that benefit the general 
public. It explains that NASA collects and archives data in order to promote scientific 
research and thus acts to maximize access to data. NASA’s 1998 data policy includes 
full and open data sharing from all Earth observing satellites as soon as data becomes 
available, continuing the stipulation that no period of exclusive access to NASA Earth 
Science data will be provided. The policy states that all data users will be treated 
equally, and that data will only be restricted when it is obtained from international 
systems and restriction is required under a memorandum of understanding.269 
 
Difficulties for Earth Science and Data Policy Stability 
By the end of the 1990s, NASA had launched more than ten satellites associated with 
the Earth Observing System, including the flagship Terra satellite. In 2002, NASA’s 
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mission was updated, reflecting the importance of its Earth science mission. The new 
mission was: “To understand and protect our home planet; To explore the Universe 
and search for life; To inspire the next generation of explorers …as only NASA 
can.”270 Aqua was launched the same year, and Aura two years later.271  
 
Figure 6.1 NASA Total Budget and Earth Science Budget Over Time 
 
Figure 6.2 shows NASA’s total budget and its Earth Science Budget from 1996 to 2013. Note that 
classification of the Earth Observation program within NASA budget changed over this time period. 
 
However, as development of the flagship Earth Observing System systems came to a 
close, NASA Earth Science saw its budget steadily decrease.  In 2005, President 
George W. Bush announced a new vision for space exploration, shifting the priorities 
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of the agency.272 The Earth Science office within NASA was combined with the 
office focused on studies of the Sun, creating the Earth-Sun System “theme,” and this 
group was moved within the Science Mission Directorate. At the same time, the 
agency’s mission was amended again, removing the portion about understanding and 
protecting the home planet. NASA’s new mission was “to pioneer the future in space 
exploration, scientific discovery, and aeronautics research.”273  
 
A 2005 interim report by the National Research Council stated that this change in 
priorities put NASA’s ability to fulfill its obligations in jeopardy, particular with 
regard to efforts related to climate change. The report argued that mission 
cancellations, scale-backs, and reductions in budget had put the U.S. system of 
environmental satellites “at risk of collapse.”274 The National Research Council’s 
final report, released in 2007, reported that concerns had greatly increased, as 
additional missions had been canceled in the intervening two years.275 By 2010, 
NASA’s Earth observation budget was more than thirty percent below its 2000 
budget in real dollars.276  
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In July 2010, NASA outlined plans for a “climate-centric architecture for Earth 
observations and applications from space,” supported by the Obama Administration. 
As part of this initiative, NASA Earth Science was expected to receive $10.3 billion 
from FY 2011 to 2015, returning it to 2000 levels.277 The full increase to 
approximately $2 billion annually has not occurred, but NASA Earth Science did get 
an eighteen percent increase in the 2011 budget, bringing it to approximately $1.7 
billion. Levels are now expected to remain constant at this level throughout the 
decade.278 Despite these increases, a 2012 report by the National Research Council 
argued that programs were being developed at a slower pace than expected and that 
the program was still at risk of collapse. The report argued that U.S. Earth observing 
instruments in space by 2020 could be as little as 25 percent of the current number.279 
 
Since the release of its updated policy in 1998, the Earth Science program has 
experienced numerous ups and downs, but its data sharing policy has not changed. 
Despite the strong support within NASA for free and open data, it is not immune to 
arguments for restricting data, particularly in attempts to recover costs. Though these 
occasionally come from newcomers to the agency, they are generally seen as external 
pressures, most commonly from those whose primary concerns have to do with the 
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national budget. When budgets are tight, members of Congress and others look for 
ways to save, and selling data often appears to them to be a good option.  
 
However, NASA officials are adamant about the success of NASA’s current policy 
and the need to keep data freely available. The agency collects metrics on data use 
and data users, providing evidence of the effectiveness of the policy. Officials argue 
that open data sharing remains central to NASA’s mission as a research agency. 
NASA officials have also made a conscious effort to promote the policy not only 
internally, but also internationally, particularly in the multilateral Group on Earth 
Observations. In part, this allows NASA to take a leadership role in the international 
arena, which is viewed positively domestically. Being a leader also allowed NASA to 
develop a data policy that would provide mutual benefit if adopted by other countries. 
NASA’s success in distributing large volumes of data, supported by the careful 
collection of metrics, and the United States’ relatively large value-added sector are 
both pointed to as success stories, illustrating the benefits of NASA’s policy.280 
 
Overall, the NASA argument seems to be based primarily on a moral and economic 
argument that Earth observation data should not be subject to any restrictions, and 
should be shared to the greatest extent possible to bring the greatest benefit to the 
public. This is almost always combined with the argument that it isn’t possible to 
have commercialization or cost-recovery with respect to scientific data, anyway, and 
that evidence has shown that commercialization of scientific Earth observing 
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satellites is impossible, and cost-recovery does not offer meaningful monetary 
returns. The primary barrier to free and open data sharing is seen as coming from 
external actors driven by larger government budgetary concerns. 
 
NASA officials’ views on data sharing in the case where commercialization is 
possible pose an interesting issue. The United States is home to DigitalGlobe (which 
recently combined with rival GeoEye), a company that sells high-resolution remote 
sensing satellite imagery. DigitalGlobe’s primary customer is the U.S. government, 
particularly the military and intelligence agencies. NASA officials acknowledge that 
in addition to its commercial value, the data sold by DigitalGlobe (and other 
commercial remote sensing firms) also has fairly significant scientific value. For 
example, it can be used to understand boundary conditions for environmental 
modeling or to look at surface features such as water pools on ice that are not visible 
using other types of satellite data. An experimental data buy of similar high-
resolution commercial remote sensing data by NASA in 1999 demonstrated that this 
type of data was useful to scientific researchers.281 However, the costs of commercial 
data are generally prohibitively high for most researchers, and, unsurprisingly, 
research use of the data is low relative to use of freely available data.  
 
In general, NASA officials didn’t seem to feel strongly that the sale of commercially 
collected data was an issue. It did not raise the type of moral or economic arguments 
given in defense of making other scientifically relevant data available. This raises the 
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question of how practical arguments about the feasibility of cost recovery or 
commercialization affect NASA policy-making.  With respect to the scientific data 
that they collect, NASA officials feel strongly that as few restrictions as possible 
should be put on the data. In the case that commercialization is possible, as with high-
resolution imagery, NASA does not get involved, leaving action to the private sector.  
 
Of course, NASA does not have the authority to prohibit commercial remote sensing 
firms from operating, nor can it compel them to make their data freely available to 
research users or others. Further, commercial activity is generally viewed as positive 
in the United States, so it is likely that if NASA attempted to develop a high-
resolution imagery satellite that would provide data for free in the pursuit of science, 
thus undermining the business case of the commercial remote sensing industry, this 
program would not be approved by Congress. This knowledge might prohibit NASA 
from even attempting such an activity. NASA officials argue that high resolution is 
not a priority right now, and therefore NASA would not choose to develop a high-
resolution imaging satellite, regardless commercial activity. However, accuracy can 
be very important for climate studies, and it is possible that as research advances, this 
type of data will become a priority. Until that point is reached, it is not possible to 
know for sure how NASA and other decision-makers would respond. 
 
NASA has been a leader in both development and operation of Earth observation 
satellites and in the development of free and open data policies. Beginning very early 




removing exclusive-use periods and discrimination among types of users, and 
rejecting even marginal cost fees. Now it has the most open data access policy in the 
world. NOAA, though operating in the same political environment and referencing 
many of the same initiatives, policies, and reviews, followed a somewhat different 
path. Unofficial sharing at NOAA was followed by sustained efforts at cost recovery, 
though ultimately, a free and open data sharing policy was adapted. 
 
6.1.2 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) National 
Environmental Satellite Data and Information Service (NESDIS) 
The NESDIS vision is to be the world’s most comprehensive source and recognized 
authority for satellite products, environmental information, and official assessments 
of the environment in support of societal and economic decisions.282 
 
Worldwide Data Sharing in Early Years 
The ability to improve understanding of weather phenomena and to improve weather 
forecasting was one of the first clear beneficial applications of Earth observation 
satellites. In May 1961, President Kennedy announced in a speech before a Joint 
Session of Congress that 75 million dollars would be devoted to developing a satellite 
system for worldwide weather observation as quickly as possible.283 By 1965, NASA 
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(NOAA NESDIS had not yet been created) had launched ten weather satellites, and 
the Weather Bureau was using them in operational weather monitoring.284 
 
Worldwide sharing of weather data was commonplace even before the invention of 
weather satellites, and when weather satellites were developed this practice 
continued.285  Broadcasts from early U.S. weather satellites were made available to 
any ground station in line of sight without restrictions on collection and use or any 
requirement to pre-notify the United States.286 Over the lifetime of third Television 
Infrared Observation Satellite (TIROS 3), launched in 1961, “approximately thirty 
countries conducted intensified observational programs to coincide with the passage 
of the satellite overhead.”287 A 1962 report related to the Nimbus meteorological 
satellite system, another series of research and technology demonstration satellites, 
noted that data from the system would be distributed via facsimile, radio, and 
teletypewriter. It specifically stated that, “distribution will be made to users in the 
United States and abroad, it being understood that all data are freely available to the 
world community.”288 
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This early decision to share data stemmed from both self-interest and accepted moral 
obligation. Weather is an interconnected, global phenomenon, and adequate 
forecasting requires cooperation with others. It is in each country’s interest to 
participate in a system that encourages international sharing of meteorological data, 
ensuring that data relevant for its own needs is provided. Secondly, weather can be 
dangerous, and life-saving weather forecasts rely on international data sharing. It is 
generally accepted that data and information should be shared if they can significantly 
contribution to improving health or safety.  
 
By the mid 1960s, the Weather Bureau began financing meteorological satellite 
development jointly with NASA, as the program transitioned from a technology 
demonstration program to fully operational program.289 NASA developed the first 
geostationary satellite in 1966, allowing continuous monitoring of weather over the 
United States, a key operational need.290 
 
In 1970, President Nixon created the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA) within the Department of Commerce, which also houses the 
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National Weather Service (formerly the Weather Bureau).291 NOAA took over 
responsibility for developing and operating the weather satellite program, though 
NASA still built and launched the satellites. Accordingly, after 1970, each polar 
orbiting meteorological satellite launched successfully was given a NOAA 
designation. NOAA 1 through 5 were launched between 1970 and 1976.292 Also 
known as the Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites (POES), this series 
has had multiple upgrades throughout its history. By 2010, 19 polar-orbiting satellites 
had been successfully launched.293 The first Geostationary Operational 
Environmental Satellite (GOES) was launched in 1975, followed by 15 additional 
successful GOES satellite launches by 2010.294 NOAA contributed to international 
data sharing systems developed within the World Meteorological Organization and 
generally made data freely available to other countries. Though NOAA did not have a 
formal data policy in place for access by individuals, it became common to charge a 
small fee to recover the cost of fulfilling a data request (copying and shipping, for 
example).295 
 
                                                
291	  "Reorganization	  Plan	  4	  of	  1970."	  NOAA	  Central	  Library.	  N.p.,	  n.d.	  Web.	  28	  Mar.	  2013.	  
<http://www.lib.noaa.gov/noaainfo/heritage/ReorganizationPlan4.html>.	  
"NOAA	  Legacy."	  NOAA	  History.	  N.p.,	  8	  June	  2006.	  Web.	  28	  Mar.	  2013.	  
<http://www.history.noaa.gov/noaa.html>.	  
292	  Wells,	  Helen	  T.,	  Susan	  H.	  Whiteley,	  and	  Carrie	  E.	  Karegeannes.	  "Satellites."	  Origins	  of	  NASA	  
Names.	  Washington,	  D.C.:	  Scientific	  and	  Technical	  Information	  Office,	  National	  Aeronautics	  and	  
Space	  Administration,	  1976.	  N.	  pag.	  NASA	  History	  Office.	  Web.	  28	  Mar.	  2013.	  
<http://history.nasa.gov/SP-­‐4402/ch2.htm>.	  
293	  "POES	  Spacecraft	  Status	  Main	  Page."	  Polar-­‐orbiting	  Operational	  Environmental	  Satellites.	  
NOAA,	  11	  Mar.	  2013.	  Web.	  28	  Mar.	  2013.	  <http://www.oso.noaa.gov/poesstatus/>.	  
294	  "The	  Geostationary	  Operational	  Environmental	  Satellites:	  GOES-­‐P."	  Current	  Missions.	  NASA,	  
28	  Feb.	  2013.	  Web.	  28	  Mar.	  2013.	  <http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/GOES-­‐
P/main/index.html>.	  
295	  Landis,	  Robert.	  The	  Road	  to	  Resolution	  40	  and	  Beyond:	  Part	  I	  Data	  Exchange.	  Working	  paper.	  





Cost Recovery Efforts Begin 
As the capabilities of meteorological satellites increased, along with the quality and 
quantity of data, there was broad recognition that meteorological satellite data had 
significant value. In particular, data that was not directly related to traditional weather 
warnings or forecasts clearly had value outside the meteorological industry and did 
not fit as neatly into the old model of data sharing, which emphasized only 
meteorological uses of the data. As seen in the NASA case study, pressure to restrict 
access to data through fees and agreements came from outside the agency. 
Recognition of the value of this data combined with tightening budgets and growing 
belief in the efficiency of commercialization and privatization, led Congress to pass a 
law in 1988 authorizing the Secretary of Commerce to assess fees for access to 
environmental data archived by NOAA NESDIS.296  This law was reinforced by the 
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, which also included plans for increased 
government revenues based on the “fair” increases in fees and services offered by 
NOAA.297 In accordance with this new law, NOAA developed a schedule of fees for 
its environmental data and products that were above the marginal cost of fulfilling 
user requests. 
 
Despite this move towards data sales, NOAA remained committed to free and open 
exchange of meteorological data, an activity that was still seen as essential to 
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understanding the weather, an inherently global system.298 The difficulty of balancing 
these two contradictory goals is seen in the elaboration of NOAA policy at the time. 
In 1991, NOAA and the Privatization Branch of the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) jointly developed a policy statement, “The National Weather Service 
(NWS) and Private Weather Industry: A Public-Private Partnership.” It promoted the 
concept of a public-private partnership with respect to weather services, including 
data sales, and also emphasized “the need to protect the free and open international 
exchange of data.”299 NOAA also participated in the U.S. Global Change Research 
Program to develop the Bromley Principles, released in 1991, which advocated for 
free and open sharing of data relevant to global change research, even though this 
policy was not being implemented within NOAA at the time.300  
 
Interests in the ethical responsibilities of the government to collect and share data and 
information that saves lives also remained central. Addressing concerns raised during 
a public comment period for its policy, NOAA and OMB stated that the National 
Weather Service would remain the single official voice for issuing weather warnings. 
They also noted that the National Weather Service would ensure the continued 
collection and sharing of information needed for the protection of life and property, 
                                                
298	  Personal	  Interviews.	  
299	  United	  States.	  NOAA.	  Policy	  Statement	  on	  the	  Weather	  Service/Private	  Sector	  Roles.	  N.p.:	  n.p.,	  
1991.	  Industrial	  Meteorology.	  National	  Weather	  Service.	  Web.	  29	  Mar.	  2013.	  
<http://www.nws.noaa.gov/im/fedreg.htm>.	  
300	  United	  States.	  Executive	  Office	  of	  the	  President.	  Office	  of	  Science	  and	  Technology	  Policy.	  Data	  
Management	  for	  Global	  Change	  Research	  Policy	  Statements.	  By	  Allan	  Bromley.	  N.p.:	  n.p.,	  1991.	  U.S.	  





even if some data collection was contracted out to the private sector.301 The 1992 
Land Remote Sensing Act went further, expressly prohibiting any attempts at 
commercialization of the weather satellite program, at that time or in the future.302  
 
Also in the early 1990s, the United States was engaged in a debate on 
commercialization and data sharing within the World Meteorological Organization 
(WMO). Despite the recent law requiring NOAA to recover costs by selling its data at 
“fair” prices, within the WMO, the U.S. representatives advocated for continued free 
and open sharing of weather data without restrictions. The U.S. provided the primary 
counterpoint to European desires to put into place a data sharing policy in which 
some data would be restricted and sold to commercial entities to allow cost recovery 
for National Meteorological Services.303 Perhaps not surprisingly, the United States 
was not successful in maintaining the norm of free and open international data 
exchange. In 1995, the WMO passed Resolution 40, which formalized the practice of 
restricting access to some data to allow commercial sales.304  
 
On the technical side, NOAA continued efforts to improve data access. NOAA 
NESDIS developed the Satellite Active Archive (later known as the CLASS system) 
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in 1995, originally to allow users to access data from the Advanced Very High 
Resolution Radiometer (AVHRR) satellite instrument via the internet.305 Additional 
data was added to this archive over time, and the number of online users requesting 
access to this data grew dramatically throughout the late 1990s.306  
 
This increase in data access came with a cost. In a 1997 issue of the Federal Register, 
NOAA stated that it would recover the cost of disseminating its data and information, 
including the cost of a required upgrade in data handling capabilities, though fees on 
the user community, consistent with OMB Circular A-130. However, it also stated 
that because NOAA is responsible for promoting research and education, which 
would be hindered by additional fees, prices would not be increased for other 
Governmental entities, universities, nonprofit organizations, and depository 
libraries.307 This essentially implemented a two-tier pricing policy for NOAA data, 
though it was not specifically called out as such.308  
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Decline of Cost Recovery and Return of Free Data Exchange 
While NASA officials had only made the argument in theory, NOAA officials were 
able to point to experience in arguing that efforts at cost recovery had not been 
successful. Even at their highest levels, in 1996, revenue from data sales were only 
about 0.2% of NOAA’s budget for the year.309 As more data was made available 
online, many users were charged little or no fee, reflecting the low marginal cost. 
This led to an increasing number of requests for data, but decreasing revenues.310 
 
Common frustrations related to NOAA’s data policy were addressed in a 2001 
NOAA report, “The Nation’s Environmental Data: Treasures at Risk.” The report 
noted that archiving and disseminating environmental data were central to NOAA’s 
mission, and lamented that guidelines provided by OMB Circular A-130 were flexible 
enough to allow greatly varying interpretations. The report argued that though NOAA 
had been mandated to collect user fees to offset the costs of data services, anticipated 
increases in revenues never materialized and had actually decreased. It stated that 
NOAA was nearing a situation in which it would be more expensive to carry out a 
program attempting cost recovery than it would be to simply provide data for free. It 
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also stated that cost-recovery policies had alienated some users, particularly in the 
research community, reducing data use. They noted that there was no uniform policy 
guiding the use and re-use of NOAA environmental data, and that data for which 
NOAA was charging were being distributed for free by a number of websites, 
including those of other Federal government agencies.311  
 
Arguments related to the ineffectiveness of cost recovery efforts were paired with 
arguments about the efficiency of free data policies in encouraging data use and 
maximizing benefits.312 The same 2001 NOAA report stated, “The accessibility of 
data is key to the value of data. A data set has no value if no one knows it exists, if it 
is on a media or in a format that makes it unusable, or if the cost associated with 
being given access to the data is higher than the user can afford to pay.”313 A 2003 
follow-up report expands on this, noting that ensuring the widest possible use of 
government-collected weather data improves warning systems vital to public safety, 
is essential for the academic sector, and leads to growth of a healthy value-added 
meteorological industry.314 Both reports also emphasized the global nature of both 
weather and climate, harkening back to one of the earliest arguments for free and 
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open data sharing.315 Based on these arguments, NOAA data policies continued to 
open up throughout the 2000s. 
 
In 2003, NOAA’s leader at the time, Admiral Conrad Lautenbacher, initiated the first 
Global Earth Observation Summit, which involved ministerial-level representation 
from several dozen of world’s nations and expressly promoted the need for 
international cooperation and data sharing.316 It was believed that high-level 
government involvement in a data-sharing regime would be necessary to ensure that 
efforts at free and open data sharing had the support of upper-level decision-makers 
that might otherwise be focused on budget alone.317 
 
In 2005, NOAA’s Private-Public Partnership Policy was updated. The new policy 
stated that it was based on “the premise that government information is a valuable 
national resource, and the economic benefits to society are maximized when 
government information is available in a timely and equitable manner to all.”318 
NOAA’s 2006 Policy on Partnerships in the Provision of Environmental Information 
states that “NOAA will carry out activities that contribute to its mission, including… 
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providing open and unrestricted access to publicly-funded observations, analyses, 
model results, forecasts, and related information products in a timely manner and at 
the lowest possible cost to users.” It also includes a clause specifically regarding 
interactions with other entities: “The nation benefits from government information 
disseminated both by Federal agencies and by diverse nonfederal parties, including 
commercial and not-for-profit entities. NOAA recognizes cooperation, not 
competition, with private sector and academic and research entities best serves the 
public interest and best meets the varied needs of specific individuals, organizations, 
and economic entities.”319  
 
The NOAA National Data Centers Free Data Distribution Policy of March 2009 
further elaborated on this policy, listing 11 groups, such as other NOAA offices and 
the U.S. Congress, and circumstances, such as existing data agreements or natural 
disasters, for which free data distribution is allowed. Of course, this meant that in 
some cases, data was not provided for free. In accordance with U.S. legal code, the 
policy stated that data would be provided free of charge to “Federal, State, and local 
government agencies, to universities, and to other nonprofit institutions at the cost of 
reproduction and transmission, if such data, information, and products are to be used 
for research and not for commercial purposes.”320 
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In 2011, NOAA released a new data access and distribution policy that applied to 
satellite data and products made available within 1-2 hours of initial observation (near 
real-time). The policy, which is still the most current as of January 2013, notes, 
“NESDIS recognizes the need for full and open exchange of environmental satellite 
data, metadata and products, as provided for by relevant international and national 
laws and policies, agreements, organizational policies and the availability of 
resources.” It states that one of the preferred methods to distribute NESDIS satellite 
data and products was through “publicly available distribution services such as the 
Global Telecommunication System (GTS), NOAA satellite direct broadcast services, 
public Internet websites, and the NOAA Data Centers, including the Comprehensive 
Large Array data Stewardship System (CLASS).”321 
 
The CLASS website provides further information. The website distributes data from 
all NOAA POES and GOES satellites and from all DOD DMSP satellites, and the 
data from newly launched satellites are made available as soon as they are declared 
operational. Users can download this data freely, though they are requested to limit 
data sets ordered to less than 500 per day. If very large data sets are needed, CLASS 
can be contacted to arrange an offline data option, though these requests are subject to 
review due to the time and labor required to fill them. Orders on media rather than 
online can also be made, though there is a fee ($25 per unit for CDs, $100 per unit for 
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magnetic tapes, plus shipping and handling). The website does not mention any 
restrictions on data use.322   
 
However, the 2011 NOAA policy on data access and distribution does not apply to 
archive products, such as climate data records, which require reprocessing of long-
term temporal data and are thus not deemed operational. These are held at the 
NESDIS data centers.323 The NOAA National Data Centers (NNDC) Online Data 
Access Policy states, “Due to various Federal Laws and Regulations, NNDC is 
required to charge for some of its online data to recover the cost of data 
dissemination. This includes hardware and personnel costs incurred by each Data 
Center. Charges are required for most domains (e.g., .com, .org, .net). All online data 
are now free for all .gov, .edu, .k12, .mil, .us, and a few other specific domains.”324 
The authorization to assess user fees for access to environmental information is 
provided to NOAA NESDIS under 15 U.S. Code 1534. The Federal Register includes 
a full schedule of fees for access to NOAA environmental data effective in 2013, 
including numerous satellite data products. However, these fees relate primarily to 
non-digital or processed products.325 In practice, almost all climate-relevant data 
collected by NOAA satellites is available to all users at no cost.  
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Within NOAA, there were four major incentives and one major barrier to data 
sharing. Two of these incentives stemmed from NOAA’s history as a weather agency. 
First, was an awareness of the global nature of meteorology, and later, climate 
change. There was recognition that these global environmental challenges required 
global cooperation and data sharing. Secondly, there was an ethical argument made 
that sharing weather data was in the public interest – an argument that is particularly 
strong when dealing with extreme weather and natural disasters. Finally, a belief that 
efficiency would be maximized by encouraging maximum use of the data via low 
costs and easy access policies, also drove efforts to make NOAA satellite data freely 
available. The primary barrier to these efforts was a contrasting view of 
environmental data as a commodity, and a desire by high-level decision-makers 
concerned with budget issues to attempt cost recovery through data sales, particularly 
to commercial entities. The final incentive for free and open data sharing was a 
practical rebuttal to the cost-recovery argument, stating that cost-recovery simply 
wasn’t possible to any meaningful degree. 
 
While NASA never truly made an attempt at cost recovery, NOAA made significant 
attempts to recover costs for over a decade. USGS went even further than NOAA, at 
one point attempting to fully privatize its Earth observing satellite system. However, 
like NOAA, USGS found that efforts to sell data from Earth observing satellites were 
not fruitful, and certainly not viable as a fully private venture. Though it took more 




ethical responsibility, and the importance of addressing global challenges to support 
the move to a fully free and open data policy.  
 
6.1.3 United States Geological Survey (USGS) and Landsat  
The USGS serves the Nation by providing reliable scientific information to describe 
and understand the Earth; minimize loss of life and property from natural disasters; 
manage water, biological, energy, and mineral resources; and enhance and protect 
our quality of life.326 
 
The United States Geological Survey (USGS) is a science organization, established in 
1879, whose mission includes “providing reliable scientific information to describe 
and understand the Earth.” USGS has been involved in the Landsat series of satellites 
since the beginning of the program and is currently the lead agency for the Landsat 
program, including data archiving and distribution. However, this was not always the 
case: Landsat has at various times been operated by different agencies and even 
companies. This case study, therefore, will focus primarily on the development of the 
Landsat system and changes in its policy, rather than exclusively on USGS as an 
Earth science agency. 
 
The emphasis on Landsat is important. Though the Landsat series includes only seven 
medium-resolution imaging satellites, it is one of the most important cases of 
changing data sharing policy. The series has provided a continuous set of data for 40 
                                                





years, including data that is essential for understanding land use change and data that 
can be combined with other information for a multitude of uses. Throughout its 
complicated history, Landsat ownership and data access policies and prices have 
changed numerous times, providing a natural experiment on the effect of these 
policies on data use.  This has made it one of the most commonly cited examples in 
discussions of the effect of various data sharing policies.327 
 
International Cooperation and Unofficial Sharing in Early Years 
In a speech before the United Nations in 1969, Richard Nixon announced that the 
United States would be developing the first “Earth resource survey satellites,” an 
activity that was considered sensitive at the time. However, Nixon emphasized the 
peaceful nature of these efforts, stating, “this program will be dedicated to producing 
information not only for the United States, but also for the world community.”328  
 
The first satellite in the Landsat series was developed by NASA in 1972 and was 
originally named the Earth Resources Technology Satellite (ERTS). Landsat 2 
followed in 1975 and Landsat 3 in 1978. NASA maintained responsibility for 
operating the system through the 1970s, though the USGS was responsible for 
archiving data and creating products and useable images.329 Throughout this period, 
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NASA also made efforts to encourage use of this data, providing research grants and 
training to universities and other organizations.330 In accordance with President 
Nixon’s vision for the program, international ground stations were put in place to 
directly receive Landsat data. Landsat data could also be ordered through the Earth 
Resources Observations Systems (EROS) Data Center for the cost of reproduction 
and distribution ($200 per scene), though NASA generally made data available for 
free on an unofficial basis.331 
 
Though the Landsat program had so far been successful at NASA, the continuity 
desired for Landsat was more like that in weather satellite programs than in the one-
satellite research programs favored by NASA. In 1980, control of the Landsat 
program was turned over to NOAA, which had been successful in running the 
operational weather satellite program. However, the White House directive 
transferring control of the program also specified that its goal was “the eventual 
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operation by the private sector of civil land remote sensing activities.”332 Landsat 4 
and 5 were launched in 1982 and 1984, respectively.333 
 
Though the international data receiving stations stayed in place, and could still access 
Landsat data for free, the Landsat data policy changed shortly after this move to 
NOAA. Once again driven by desires by high-level policy makers for cost recovery, 
Congress mandated that Landsat costs should be recovered through data sales, and 
prices rose to $650 per scene. This price was raised again in 1983, bringing prices 
closer to those expected to prevail when Landsat was commercialized. Both of these 
changes were associated with decreases in the amount of data distributed. Data sales 
were estimated at between two and nine million dollars, a quarter of which were sales 
of data to other U.S. government agencies. Again, even at their highest levels, 
revenues were less than one percent of system costs.334  
 
Privatization of Landsat 
Despite the inability of NOAA to generate significant revenues from Landsat data 
sales, plans went ahead to privatize the system, following a belief, particularly in the 
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Reagan Administration, that transition of government functions to the private sector 
would improve efficiency. This action met little resistance, as Landsat’s unique 
mission, which required a continuous series of satellites that didn’t fit the NASA 
mold, and the programs focus on land, which didn’t fit NOAA’s focus on weather, 
meant that Landsat had no clear home agency advocating to retain control of the 
satellite. The Land Remote Sensing Commercialization Act of 1984 mandated that 
operation and data marketing of civil land remote-sensing systems, including Landsat, 
should be transitioned to private industry. It noted that unenhanced data must be made 
available on a non-discriminatory basis, and that collection of data must be continued 
for at least six years.335 In 1985, the Earth Observation Satellite Company (EOSAT) 
signed a contract with NOAA to take responsibility for operation and data marketing 
and sales for Landsat 4 and 5, while NOAA continued to control the data receiving 
stations on the ground. Under the contract, EOSAT was also responsible for 
developing Landsat 6 and 7, for which the government would provide a total of $250 
million in subsidies over five years.336  
 
The requirement to provide non-discriminatory access to data was designed to ensure 
a level playing field for value-added services. However, it was also interpreted to 
mean that EOSAT must charge the same price to all users. Therefore, both research 
and commercial users suddenly faced prices of thousands of dollars per scene. 
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EOSAT saw revenues increase slowly from 1986 to 1990.337 At the same time, the 
number of orders dropped from 35,000 in 1984 to about 8,000 in 1990.338 By 1995, 
EOSAT was reported to have made $80 million dollars.339 This was approximately 
double the cost of operating the Landsat system, but only about five percent of the 
costs of building and launching Landsat 4 and 5 (which had been paid for by the 
government).340 Also, as a result of high prices, some government entities, including 
NOAA, were no longer able to afford Landsat images.341 Some expressed frustration 
with the model, in which the government paid for development of the system and 
operation of the ground systems, but EOSAT sold the data and retained the revenue. 
As one government scientist put it, “We [the U.S. government] have the worst of all 
possible worlds: we are both spending the money and making sure we get nothing out 
of it.”342 
 
Though EOSAT’s contract included $250 million in government subsidies, EOSAT 
received only $27.5 million in 1986 and $5 million in 1987. In 1988, a new contract 
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stipulated that the U.S. Government would provide a one-time payment of $220 
million for hardware development, and EOSAT would only be responsible for the 
development of one satellite, Landsat-6. Meanwhile, NOAA found that it did not 
have sufficient funds to continue to operate the Landsat ground stations, and shut 
down data collection operations for a few months in 1988.343 
 
Development of Landsat-6 was slow, revenues for EOSAT remained relatively low, 
and budget shortfalls led NOAA to announce in March 1989 that it planned to 
shutdown Landsat 4 and 5. In response, a presidential statement in June 1989 
announced the provision of emergency funding for continued operations and noted, 
“It has become increasingly evident that commercializing the entire Landsat program 
would not be feasible until at least the end of the century.”344 With a subsidy from the 
U.S. government, and in collaboration with NASA, Landsat 6 was scheduled for 
launch in 1993. After a nearly decade-long hiatus in Landsat launches, both Landsat 4 
and 5 were operating beyond their design lives. Unfortunately, Landsat-6 suffered a 
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Return to Government Control 
The Land Remote Sensing Commercialization Act of 1992 returned the Landsat 
program to government management, noting, “Full commercialization of the Landsat 
program cannot be achieved within the foreseeable future.” Despite wide recognition 
of the complete failure of the Landsat privatization effort, the Act also stated, 
“commercialization of land remote sensing should remain a long-term goal of United 
States policy.”346 Congress maintained its desire to raise revenues and increase 
efficiency through data sales, even in the face of evidence that this was not 
productive. Contrary to this long-term goal, the Land Remote Sensing Act of 1992 
also recognized, “the cost of Landsat data has impeded the use of such data for 
scientific purposes,” and required that EOSAT, which continued to market and 
distribute Landsat 4 and 5 data until 2001, transition to a practice in which data were 
made available at no more than the cost of fulfilling user requests.347  
 
In 1996, Landsat 4 and 5 data was priced at $4400 per scene for the public and a 
maximum of $2500 per scene for the U.S. government and affiliated users (such as 
researchers with government grants) for non-commercial purposes. Archived data 
was available to government users for $425 per scene. Also, once the government 
purchased data, it could be copied and distributed without restriction to other U.S. 
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government and affiliated users for non-commercial purposes.348 In 1997, the U.S. 
government released prices for Landsat 7 data, which would go into effect after the 
satellite was launched in 1999. The stated objective was to provide data at the lowest 
possible cost, and the cost per scene was set at approximately $500.349 While data 
access did increase as prices decreased, revenues remained low relative to the costs of 
the program. 
 
In 2000, the Clinton Administration developed a Landsat Remote Sensing Strategy, 
which dictated that USGS take responsibility for the Landsat program and ensure 
continuation of Landsat-type data collection beyond Landsat-7.350 Shortly after 
Landsat was transitioned to its new home agency, USGS officials began to advocate a 
move from cost recovery (with scenes priced at a few hundred dollars a scene) to free 
and unrestricted data sharing.351 USGS officials argued that making data freely 
available would increase data use and result in greater benefits for society. Like 
NASA, they argued that since the systems had been developed at taxpayer expense, 
all taxpayers should have equal access. Finally, they pointed to OMB Circular A-130, 
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arguing that it required data be provided at the marginal cost of fulfilling user 
requests, which should be zero when data is accessed online.352  
 
There was some internal resistance to the change; even with revenues from data sales 
at less than one percent of the USGS budget, some USGS professionals as well as 
those in Congress, were loath to make changes that would make USGS about ten 
million dollars poorer. Commercial remote sensing companies, such as GeoEye and 
DigitalGlobe, argued that it would harm their business. There were also still 
arguments that cost recovery by the government was an economically efficient 
practice.  
 
However, proponents of a free and open policy were persistent in advocating a 
change. They argued that data sales were inefficient, with a large portion of sales just 
representing transfers of funds within the government, through purchases by other 
agencies or to scientists with government funding. They argued that the private sector 
would benefit from free and open data, leading to greater value-added applications. 
They pointed out that even at the lower prices developed after commercialization, the 
U.S. Department of Agriculture had stopped buying Landsat data, instead purchasing 
similar data at a lower price from India. 
 
A key event spurring the move to a free and open data policy ties back to the earliest 
days of Landsat and the existence of international ground stations around the world. 
During an official visit, USGS officials found that Brazil, which operated one of these 
                                                




ground stations, was distributing Landsat data online. USGS officials argued that if 
Brazil could afford to set up an online distribution system for Landsat data, then the 
United States should do so as well. Once provided online, the marginal cost would be 
essentially zero. Finally, advocates got high-level buy-in from Secretary of Interior 
Bob Kempthorn to make the policy change.353 
 
Looking to emphasize both the importance of international data sharing as well as to 
promote its own activities as widely as possible, USGS announced at the 2008 Group 
on Earth Observations Plenary that all Landsat data would be made available for 
download at no cost.354 The 2008 Landsat Data Distribution Policy stated that data 
would be provided to all users at no more than the cost of fulfilling user requests, 
which would not include the capital costs of satellites or ground systems. For data 
provided online, the cost would be zero. It also stated that there would be no delay 
between data reception, processing, and distribution, ensuring products would be 
provided in a timely and dependable manner.355 
 
The USGS argues that Landsat data are now considered a public good “similar to 
GPS and weather data.” USGS also noted that moving to free online distribution led 
to savings through the elimination of the billing and accounting system that had 
previously been required. As use of Landsat data has steadily increased, it has 
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become easy to demonstrate the value of this data for research, government, and 
commercial users, strengthening the case for continuing to provide free and open 
access to data.356 Even commercial remote sensing companies reported benefits, 
noting that customers were using Landsat data to identify particular areas for which 
higher-resolution was needed, and then turning to the commercial sector for this 
data.357 Following the transition to the free data policy, distribution of Landsat images 
has grown rapidly, from 25,000 scenes sold per year before the policy was 
implemented to 25,000 scenes accessed in a single day in 2012. In total, nearly ten 
million scenes have been distributed.358 The increase was particularly large for 
scientific and educational users, and data has been delivered to 186 countries.359 
 
The central role of economic determinants in the development of Landsat data policy 
is clear. On one side, originating from the presidential administration and legislative 
levels, was a view of the data as a commodity, and a desire to reduce government 
expenditures and increase efficiency through cost-recovery efforts or complete 
privatization. Counter to this position was an argument, generally coming from the 
agency and the scientific community, that data should be provided on a free and open 
basis to ensure the greatest possible utilization of the data, particularly for research. 
However, unlike the cases of NASA and NOAA, the Landsat program essentially 
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went through a trial and error process to arrive at a final policy. In the end, however, 
the dramatic increase in data use as Landsat moved from commercial sales to cost 
recovery and finally to free and open data sharing have proven to be one of the most 
striking examples of the benefits of open policies. 
 
6.2 Europe 
Within Europe, many countries have their own space agencies, and some, particularly 
France, Germany, and Italy, operate multiple national Earth observation satellites. 
However, the majority of European Earth observation activities are coordinated 
through the European Space Agency (ESA). For meteorological satellites, efforts are 
coordinated by the European Organization for Exploitation of Meteorological 
Satellites (EUMETSAT). Though the context for decisions within ESA and 
EUMETSAT were significantly different than those at NASA, the major trends are 
familiar: informal data sharing as technology is developed and refined, efforts at cost 
recovery once the value of the data has been recognized, followed by a move to 
increasingly free and open data policies when efforts at cost recovery prove 














Table 6.3 Essential Climate Variable coverage with European-led satellites only 
 
Table 6.3 shows the number of instruments on U.S.-led satellites collecting each essential climate 
variable each year from 2000 to 2012. 
 
6.2.1 European Space Agency (ESA) 
ESA's purpose shall be to provide for, and to promote, for exclusively peaceful 
purposes, cooperation among European States in space research and technology and 
their space applications, with a view to their being used for scientific purposes and 
for operational space applications systems360. 
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2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Aerosol1Properties 2 2 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Aerosols 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1
Albedo 2 2 4 4 4 5 6 6 6 6 6 6 7
Biomass 0 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 3
Carbon1Dioxide,1Methane,1and1Greenhouse1Gases0 0 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 3
Cloud1Properties 5 4 6 6 6 7 8 8 7 7 7 7 7
Earth1Radiation1Budget 1 1 2 2 2 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 5
FAPAR 0 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 4
Fire1Disturbance 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 2
Glaciers1and1Ice1Caps,1and1Ice1Sheets 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1
LAI 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Lakes 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1
Land1Cover 2 2 4 4 4 5 6 6 6 6 7 7 8
Ocean1Color 2 2 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Ocean1Currents 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1
Ocean1salinity 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
Ozone 2 1 3 3 3 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 6
Precipitation 4 3 4 4 4 5 6 6 5 5 5 5 6
Sea1Ice 2 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 4 4 4
Sea1Level 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 4 4 3
Sea1State 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1
Sea1Surface1Temperature 5 4 6 6 6 7 8 8 7 7 7 7 7
Snow1Cover 2 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Soil1Moisture 2 2 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 5 5 5 5
Surface1Temperature 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Surface1Wind1Speed1and1Direction 2 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Upper1Air1Temperature 1 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 4
UpperVair1Wind 3 3 4 4 4 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 4




International Cooperation and Unofficial Sharing in Early Years 
The predecessor of ESA, the European Space Research Organization (ESRO), was 
created in 1962 as a joint European space organization focused on developing 
spacecraft. In 1978, ESA was created by combining ESRO with its counterpart, the 
European Launch Development Organization (ELDO), which focused on developing 
a launch system.361 Because ESA is an international organization, its decision-making 
body is made up of representatives from each member state. Since its creation, 
membership has doubled, reaching 20 nations by 2012. Funding arrangements are 
also unique, with each ESA member required to provide funding to ESA’s mandatory 
program relative to its gross domestic product (GDP). This covers ESA’s general 
budget and science program, including technology development, as well as studies on 
future activities.362 The Earth Observation program is considered an optional 
program, in which individual members can choose the level of their financial 
contribution.363 
 
Europe’s earliest Earth observation activities began in the 1970s with data acquisition 
from international satellites at the Center for Earth Observation in Italy. This center 
then helped European researchers access data from other countries’ satellites, 
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including Landsat.364 The first Earth observation satellite developed by Europe was 
Meteosat-1, a geosynchronous meteorological satellite, launched in 1977.365 
Throughout the late 1970s and early 1980s, ESA continued to focus on technology 
development related to weather applications. However, like NASA, ESA eventually 
handed off these activities to a meteorological agency.366 ESA then turned to larger 
satellites focused on scientific data collection.  
 
In 1991, ESA launched the Earth Resource Satellite-1 (ERS-1), followed by ERS-2 in 
1995. Both were large, complex satellites carrying multiple instruments, including 
synthetic aperture radars that allowed them to take measurements of the Earth 
regardless of cloud cover.367 In the late 1980s and early 1990s, as ESA was 
developing these satellites, it signed bilateral memorandums of understanding 
concerning access to the data for foreign users with the United States, Japan, India, 
and other nations.368 This international sharing was consistent with existing official 
and unofficial practices of exchanging data from scientific satellites, particularly 
through the installation of ground stations in other nations. ESA officials also noted 
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that sharing data would help to illuminate potential uses or the data, demonstrating its 
value.369 
 
ESA developed principles related to provision of ERS data, noting that ESA retained 
ownership of the data and that fair prices would eventually be phased in, consistent 
with the economic value of the data. However, it stated that prices could be waived 
for particular types of users, particularly those working with ESA on scientific 
research.370 Though the satellites were developed primarily to address scientific 
questions, hopes were high that cost recovery would also be possible. Some member 
states had already demonstrated an interest in cost recovery and commercialization 
efforts within their own programs, particularly the SPOT program in France. A belief 
in the value and efficiency of cost recovery was expressed within ESA, and with 
some of the largest and most advanced satellites of their time, member states had 
reason to believe that data would have a high value.371 
 
Cost Recovery Begins 
ESA’s third large Earth observation satellite, Envisat, launched in 2002, was the 
largest civilian Earth observation satellite ever built. Like the ERS satellite, it carried 
a synthetic aperture radar as well as many other instruments.372 In 1998, in 
preparation for the upcoming launch, ESA approved an official Envisat data policy 
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whose objectives included maximizing beneficial use of Envisat data and balancing 
development of science, public utility, and commercial applications. With this policy, 
ESA laid out the plan to commercialize Envisat, charging market prices (set by data 
distributers) for access to the data by foreign, operational, and commercial users. 
Only those chosen by ESA to work on ESA-approved research projects would have 
the opportunity to access the data for free. The policy did this by establishing two 
tiers, or categories, based on how data would be used. 
 
Category one included ESA internal use, research and applications in support of 
mission objectives, and research in preparation for future operational use. All other 
uses, including operational and commercial use of the data, fell under category 
two.373 Researchers wishing to be certified as a category one user were required to go 
through a peer-review process developed by the ESA Earth Observation Program 
Board. Approved users were then required to report on and publish any findings and 
to present results in a symposia organized by ESA. In general, data for category one 
uses was to be provided at or near the cost of reproduction. This price could be 
waived for projects chosen in response to a specific Announcement of Opportunity 
from ESA.374 
 
ESA planned to distribute data to approved category one users itself at or near the 
cost of reproduction, while allowing distributing entities to set prices and distribute 
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data to category 2 users. ESA would provide data access to these approved 
distributers at or near the cost of reproduction. Foreign stations (similar to those 
operated by the United States and others for the ERS satellites) would be subject to an 
access fee for the right to receive high rate data from Envisat. Only ESA member 
states would not be subject to this fee.375 The data policy noted that the creation of a 
revenue stream for ESA was of less importance than other objectives. However, there 
was hope that implementation of the policy would “lead to a sustainable market led 
by user demand” and would “create the conditions for the private sector to invest in 
new products and services.”376 In 2000, the same policy was applied to the ERS 
satellites.377 
 
Cost Recovery is Largely Abandoned for Full and Open Sharing 
Unfortunately for ESA, these hopes did not turn into reality. The policy led to a 
significant decrease in international data sharing between ESA and other nations, 
particularly the United States, ending the precedent set with ERS.378 A commercial 
market for ESA’s satellite data did not materialize, and ESA did not see significant 
returns from its cost recovery efforts. Further, a report commissioned by the European 
Union showed that the value-added sector for geospatial information in Europe was 
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significantly smaller than that in the United States, suggesting that restricted access to 
data was leading to less commercial activity rather than more.379  
 
Following the 2002 launch of Envisat, ESA embarked on its Living Planet Program, 
which focused on developing smaller and more focused missions, referred to as Earth 
Explorer Missions, which could be launched more frequently. Interest in climate 
change was growing, and many of the scientific focus areas for the Living Planet 
Program directly related to the work of the International Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC).380 The first mission of the Living Planet Program, Cryosat, was launched in 
2005, but never entered orbit due to an error with the launch vehicle. However, this 
mission was followed by two additional Living Planet Program missions successfully 
launched in 2009: the Gravity field and Ocean Circulation Explorer (GOCE) and the 
Soil Moisture Ocean Salinity (SMOS) satellite. Cryosat-2, which specialized in 
measurements of ice cover and thickness, launched in 2010.381 As each of these 
satellites was launched, ESA’s existing tiered policy was applied to the data. 
However, as the years wore on and revenues did not increase, ESA members 
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recognized that a commercial market in scientific satellite data was not viable, and 
began to consider opening the data policy.382 
 
Also pushing for more openness was an emphasis by ESA on the importance of 
maximizing data use rather than agency revenues. ESA officials felt that the value of 
satellite programs could be better demonstrated by showing the many ways in which 
data could be used, rather than by demonstrating relatively small financial revenue. 
Europe was also becoming more interested in the issue of climate change, aiming to 
be a world leader on this issue. It was felt that progress on scientific and operational 
projects related to climate change could proceed more quickly if data was freely 
available.383  
 
The 2008 announcement at GEO that Landsat data would be made freely available 
provided a clear demonstration of willingness of other nations to abandon efforts at 
cost recovery in favor of full and open sharing, and this made an impression on 
decision-makers in Europe. Initial results from Landsat also suggested that 
transitioning to a free and open dataset could lead to large increases in data use.384 At 
the 2008 ESA Ministerial Conference, Earth observation was confirmed as one of 
ESA’s largest programs, and a climate change initiative was endorsed.385 Earth 
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observation continued to be a priority for ESA; in 2010, it became the highest-funded 
domain within the ESA budget, overtaking spending on launchers.386 
 
In 2009, the European Space Agency developed joint principles regarding data from 
the Sentinel satellites, which were being developed to support the European Union 
Global Monitoring for Environment and Security (GMES) program.  The principles 
stated that anyone could access Sentinel data, with no distinction made between 
public, commercial, and scientific use or between European and non-European users. 
Data would be provided free of charge online following a user registration process 
and the acceptance of “generic” terms and conditions.  
 
Reflecting the growing emphasis within Europe on the value of open data policies to 
scientific research and the development of the commercial value-added sector, the 
policy objectives included “promoting the use and sharing of GMES information and 
data,” “strengthening Earth observation markets in Europe, in particular the 
downstream sector,” and “supporting the European research communities.” The 
policy referenced the Global Earth Observation System of Systems (GEOSS) Data 
Sharing Principles as part of the legal and programmatic framework for the policy.387 
Dissemination would be limited only in exceptional, security related cases.388  
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In 2010, building on the consensus regarding the Sentinel data policy, ESA updated 
the policy regarding its existing satellites, this time distinguishing by the type of data 
rather than the type of data use. The European Space Agency Earth Observation Data 
Policy was approved in 2010 and applied to data from all ESA Missions, including 
ERS-1, ERS-2, Envisat, GOCE, SMOS, and Cryosat, as well as future Earth Explorer 
missions. The policy defines two groups of datasets: the free dataset and the 
restrained dataset. Data from both types of datasets are provided free of charge, and 
only user registration is needed to access the free dataset. For the restrained dataset, 
users must provide a project proposal. For all data, onward distribution requires 
special permission from ESA.389 
 
The policy also stated, “ESA will pursue its effort for enlarging the quantity of data 
available within the free dataset.”390 The restricted dataset includes SAR data from 
ERS and Envisat missions as well as requests for very large volume datasets. Part of 
the reason for the restriction is technical: the SAR instrument can be operated in 
different modes that do not fit all user requirements, so data is only processed and 
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made available in response to specific requests. Access to SAR data for research 
purposes requires the submission of a project proposal. If accepted, access to a 
specified quota of data is provided for free.391 
 
However, ESA has not completely given up its efforts at cost recovery. For non-
research users, or those that do not have an accepted project proposal, the SAR data is 
priced at market levels by data distributers, which pay ESA programming and/or 
production fees. Requests made through these distributing entities (generally for 
operational or commercial uses) have higher priority than requests made through the 
submission of a project proposal.392 
 
Although ESA and EUMETSAT are both governed by member nations from Europe, 
the concerns of members differed. EUMETSAT, which focused on the collection and 
distribution of weather data, was especially concerned with international data sharing 
for weather forecasting. However, like ESA, when member states expressed an 
interest in commercializing data sales and attempting to recover costs from the 
activities of their National Meteorological Agencies, EUMETSAT followed suit, 
attempting to balance these two goals. Eventually, commercialization efforts proved 
to be largely fruitless, and EUMETSAT began to loosen policy restrictions with the 
aim of increasing the size of its data user community. 
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6.2.2 European Organization for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites 
(EUMETSAT) 
The vision of EUMETSAT is to be the leading user-governed operational agency for 
European Earth observation satellite programs that are consistent with the objectives 
of its Convention. In this area EUMETSAT will be a trusted global partner of the 
provision of satellite data from geostationary and low-earth orbits. 
 
International Sharing of Weather Data 
In 1981, the same year that ESA launched Meteosat-2, an intergovernmental group 
agreed that a European Organization for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites 
(EUMETSAT) should be created to ensure continuity of a meteorological satellite 
system in Europe. In 1986, the EUMETSAT Convention entered into force with 16 
members, though this would grow to 26 members and 5 participating states by 
2012.393 EUMETSAT’s decision-making body was made up of representatives of the 
national meteorological services (NMSs), and the organization’s activities were 
funded through contributions by member states based on Gross Domestic Income.  
 
Under the convention, EUMETSAT’s primary objective was to “establish, maintain, 
and exploit European systems of operational meteorological satellites, taking into 
account as far as possible the recommendations of the World Meteorological 
                                                






Organization.”394 The Convention did not explicitly mention data sharing, though it 
did note that participation in the WMO and cooperation “in conformity with 
meteorological tradition” with member and non-member states were important to the 
organization. EUMETSAT signed numerous bilateral data exchange agreements with 
countries including Russia, China, India, Korea, and Japan, ensuring direct access to 
EUMETSAT data in return for similar access to their data.395  
 
Thus, in its earliest days of operation, EUMETSAT engaged in extensive data 
sharing, both on a bilateral basis and within the WMO. However, EUMETSAT’s 
status as a voluntary international organization posed special challenges. In particular, 
members felt that there needed to be some way to ensure that countries contributing 
to the system received special benefits. Otherwise, other countries, European 
countries in particular, could get all the benefits from EUMETSAT without paying 
any of the costs.396 Therefore, a 1988 resolution on “EUMETSAT Principles on 
Distribution and Charging” distinguished between requirements for data access for 
EUMETSAT member states and all others. Non-member states could acquire data by 
getting permission from EUMETSAT and would be charged a fee, though in some 
cases, data was available through bi-lateral agreements.397 As additional resolutions 
continued to amend and add to EUMETSAT’s data policy over the next few years, 
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the distinction between member and non-member states remained central, and was 
made possible through the use of licenses restricting use and redistribution.398  
 
In 1989, Meteosat-4 was launched as the first satellite funded by EUMETSAT, and 
was followed by Meteosat-5 though 10 over the next two decades.399 Beginning with 
Meteosat-4, EUMETSAT was in charge of collecting user requirements and jointly 
defining future satellite missions with ESA. While ESA continued to development 
and procure the satellites, once launched, responsibility for satellite operations and 
user relations belonged to EUMETSAT.400 
 
In the early 1990s, there was increasing pressure on national meteorological agencies 
to recover some of the costs of their activities, and data was seen as a valuable asset 
well suited to this use.401 Many countries’ NMSs began selling both data and 
commercial products. Just as had been seen in the United States, Europeans made 
normative arguments on fair data access based on the fact that satellites were built 
using taxpayer funds; however, the conclusion of the argument was the opposite of 
NASA’s. Europe argued that data are owned by all citizens, not just those interested 
in exploiting them, and, therefore, it is best for the government to get a return on the 
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public investment through data sales.402 As NMSs’ interest in commercial activities 
grew, private industry was also looking into the possibility of using satellite data to 
produce new commercial products.403 
 
The overlapping commercial interests of these private companies and the NMSs led 
to arguments among countries and between countries and commercial entities. Some 
countries argued that if data were made freely available to companies that use it to 
develop value added products, then those companies would be unfairly benefiting 
from the system without making a contribution. The NMSs argued that this unfair 
competition would prevent them from achieving cost recovery goals.404 Companies 
argued that data costs went too far in the other direction, with some NMSs pricing 
raw data at higher rates than their own value-added products, making it impossible for 
private companies to enter the value-added market.405 
 
In addition to arguments about commercialization, EUMETSAT recognized the 
importance of research using meteorological data, both to improve forecast ability 
and the quality of meteorological products, as well as to carry out research related to 
global climate change.406 It also needed to continue international data sharing within 
the WMO, consistent with its charter. EUMETSAT balanced these preferences by 
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developing a data sharing policy that differentiated by particular data, user and type 
of use.  
 
The policy called for a continuation of open data sharing with NMSs in other 
countries, with the stipulation that data would be provided only for their official use, 
and should not be further distributed. Commercial data users would be required to pay 
an access fee for certain data. EUMETSAT members would have free access to all 
data, but their commercial value-added branches would have to pay the same price as 
other commercial users, ensuring a level playing field. Archived and near-real time 
data could be accessed for free for research use, although it could not be redistributed. 
This policy, though complex, ensured maximum benefit to EUMETSAT members for 
official meteorological use, allowed for commercialization of some data, but also 
continued to contribute some data to the international community on free and open 
basis and support the research and educational community.407 
 
As EUMETSAT developed its own policy, it also helped to shape complementary 
data sharing principles within the WMO. EUMETSAT and its member states 
advocated for a tiered policy within WMO, in which access to some data could be 
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From Commercialization to a More Open Policy 
However, as with other environmental satellite data, EUMETSAT and its member 
states found that revenue generation from data sales was low. Over time, 
EUMETSAT’s policy has retained its complexity, differentiating by users, uses, and 
types of data, but the amount of data made freely available has increased. As of 2012, 
the only data not made freely available is near-real time Meteosat data, and even this 
is made freely available to less developed countries and in times of emergency.409 
However, despite change in fees and accessibility, licensing restrictions have largely 
remained the same. EUMETSAT has emphasized its ownership of the data, preferring 
that users access data directly from its servers and not from a third party that may or 
may not highlight the EUMETSAT contribution.410  This also allows EUMETSAT to 
track use through registration, providing another way to measure value of the data and 
maintain a close connection to the user community.411 
 
In 2006, EUMETSAT launched its first polar-orbiting weather satellite, Metop-A, 
followed by Metop-B in 2012. Both of these satellites were part of an agreement with 
the United States to develop an International Joint Polar System (IJPS) in which the 
U.S. and Europe developed polar-orbiting weather satellites in complementary orbits. 
As part of the agreement, all data from these satellites was made freely available.412  
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The Jason-2 satellite, which was also developed in partnership with the United States, 
launched in 2008.413 Jason data is also freely available to all.414 
 
From its founding, EUMETSAT highly valued international cooperation as part of the 
international meteorological community. However, early in its development, there 
was pressure to take advantage of the value of meteorological data to recover some 
costs. As time passed and revenues failed to grow, efforts to recover costs through 
data sales lessened, and more data was made freely available. Like ESA, a small 
amount of data is still sold, and restrictions on data use and redistribution still exist.415 
 
Japan, which has a smaller satellite program than the USA or Europe, maintains 
greater restrictions on its data, similar to the early European data sharing policies. 
However, it has not followed Europe’s move to free and open access, still hoping to 
recover some costs and spur commercial remote sensing activities in Japan. 
 
6.3 Japan 
There are only two agencies within Japan that operate satellites, the Japan Aerospace 
Exploration Agency (JAXA), which focuses primarily on research satellites, and the 
Japan Meteorological Agency (JMA), which runs the operational meteorological 
satellite program.  
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Table 6.4 Essential Climate Variable coverage with Japanese-led satellites only 
 
Table 6.4 shows the number of instruments on U.S.-led satellites collecting each essential climate 
variable each year from 2000 to 2012. 
 
6.3.1 Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) 
The National Space Development Agency of Japan (NASDA), the forerunner of the 
JAXA, was established in 1969 under the Ministry for Science and Technology.416 
Like NASA and ESA, JAXA’s first Earth observation satellite was an experimental 
meteorological satellite, the Geostationary Meteorological Satellite-1 (GMS-1). 
NASDA’s Earth Observation Center was created in 1978.  This center acted as a data 
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2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Aerosol1Properties 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Aerosols 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Albedo 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
Biomass 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
Carbon1Dioxide,1Methane,1and1Greenhouse1Gases0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
Cloud1Properties 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3
Earth1Radiation1Budget 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
FAPAR 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Fire1Disturbance 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
Glaciers1and1Ice1Caps,1and1Ice1Sheets 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
LAI 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Lakes 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Land1Cover 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
Ocean1Color 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
Ocean1Currents 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ocean1salinity 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Ozone 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Precipitation 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3
Sea1Ice 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
Sea1Level 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sea1State 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Sea1Surface1Temperature 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3
Snow1Cover 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
Soil1Moisture 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Surface1Temperature 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Surface1Wind1Speed1and1Direction 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Upper1Air1Temperature 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
UpperVair1Wind 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2




reception hub for data from the U.S. Landsat 3 satellite.417 The marine Observation 
Satellite Mission (MOS-1) was launched in 1987 to observe ocean phenomena. Like 
NASA and ESA, efforts carried out in the 1970s and 1980s were focused on 
technology development and satellites were considered experimental. No official data 
sharing policy was in place, and data was provided on an informal basis. 
 
The 1990s saw three additional Earth observation satellite launches: the Japanese 
Earth Resources Satellite (JERS-1) in 1992, the Advanced Earth Observing Satellite 
(ADEOS) in 1996, and the Tropical Rainfall Measuring Mission (TRMM), a join 
mission with NASA, in 1997. Corresponding with the launch of JERS-1 in 1992, 
NASDA implemented a two-tier policy that distinguished between research users and 
general-purpose users. Research users could access data at the cost of reproduction 
with the requirement that they report on their research to JAXA. Other users could 
access data through private data distributers, which received data from JAXA at a 
relatively low cost and were free to determine their own prices for users. This policy 
was also applied to ADEOS and ADEOS-II data.418 NASA was the lead agency for 
TRMM, so data were made freely available in accordance with NASA’s data 
policy.419  
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As in the United States and Europe, this policy was driven by a desire to balance the 
promotion of research with cost recovery and spurring the development of the 
commercial sector. In support of its policy, JAXA officials also expressed a belief 
that publicly-funded data are best held in a “public trust.” They argue that restricting 
access to data is necessary to properly control and protect Earth observation data as 
the property of the nation, including charging users, particularly commercial entities, 
a fee to access data.420 
 
In 1995, Japan established the Earth Observation Research Center, specifically aimed 
at data processing, analyzing, and archiving.421 A revision of the Fundamental Policy 
of Japan's Space Activities in 1996 emphasized the importance of Earth Observation 
and Earth Science as a priority area for development, and stated that NASDA would 
expand the scope of utilization of Earth observation technology. International 
cooperation was a key aspect of this plan, which stated, “In addition to these 
endeavors, we will establish a global Earth observation system through international 
consultation and coordination. This system seeks a harmonious integration of 
observing satellites from various countries.”422 However, in 1997, NASDA 
experienced significant funding cuts, forcing it to scale back plans for Earth 
observation satellites under development.423  
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In 2001, as part of a larger government reorganization, NASDA was moved to the 
Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology (MEXT). Following 
that move, both the Aqua Satellite, another joint project, this time with the United 
States and Brazil, and the ADEOS-II satellite were launched in 2002. A year later, in 
2003, NASDA changed its name to JAXA. At the same time, JAXA updated its data 
policy slightly, noting that researchers could now access data for free online, though 
redistribution was restricted. General users were still required to purchase data from 
distributing entities.424 
 
In 2005, JAXA released a long-term planning document, “JAXA 2025.” JAXA’s 
priorities under this vision included ensuring utilization of aerospace technologies, 
particularly systems that can help in management of natural disasters and protection 
of the global environment.425 The Greenhouse Gases Observing Satellite (GOSAT), 
launched in 2009, and the Global Change Observation Mission-Water (GCOM-W1), 
launched in 2012, were both aimed specifically at climate-related issues.426  
 
In 2008, Japan passed the “Basic Space Law,” removing legal barriers to conducting 
military space activities, emphasizing interest in dual-use technology, and expressly 
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supporting commercialization efforts, particularly in the launch industry.427 In the 
“Basic Space Plan” that followed the new law in 2009, JAXA stated that utilization of 
space assets, rather than just research and development, was essential. JAXA’s new 
plan included a focus on the environment, as well as an intent to provide data that 
could help in disaster monitoring and in addressing global warming. . It also notes 
that thought needed to be given to value-added possibilities, and concluded that Japan 
needed a standard data policy for provision of satellite data.428 
 
In 2012, Japan restructured its government, placing JAXA under the joint control of 
Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology (MEXT) and the 
Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI).429 METI has shown an interest in 
new programs, such as dual-use Earth observation and has expressed an interest in 
working more closely with the commercial sector.430 A new data policy is currently 
being developed, and is expected to differentiate between types of data. In particular, 
efforts will be made to sell high-resolution imaging data.431 
 
The desire to promote the growth of domestic industry seems to be the greatest 
incentive for efforts at data sales and cost-recovery within Japan. This motive has 
only gained strength as JAXA has come under the joint control of the Ministry of 
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Economy, Trade, and Industry. However, there has been very little information made 
available about the success of past efforts in generating revenue, and a robust 
commercial industry has not yet developed. In contrast to its relatively restrictive data 
policy, JAXA policy has emphasized the importance of data utilization, and the need 
to balance extensive data use with efforts at commercialization. On numerous 
occasions, JAXA has emphasized the importance of international cooperation and 
data sharing.432 Japan was one of the leaders in developing the Group on Earth 
Observations (GEO), a global organization that seeks to increase free and open 
sharing of environmental data.433  
 
This contradiction was acknowledged somewhat in a statement by Osamu Ochiai, 
Associated Senior Administrator of the Satellite Applications and Promotion Center, 
highlighted on JAXA’s website. Ochiai stated: “JAXA wants to continue to 
contribute to GEO in the future… If you want people to use new data in a wide range 
of areas, first of all, you have to make it easy - to lower the barriers to entry. The data 
provider needs to provide support to the users. I think this is true for any kind of 
service. Unfortunately, in my personal opinion, I think JAXA’s satellite data hasn’t 
yet reached a stage where it is widely utilized. By making our Earth observation data 
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freely available and encouraging its use, I think we can make it the international 
standard not just for GEO but for broader use as well.”434 Despite this sentiment, 
current discussions about new policy development suggest that efforts to engage the 
commercial sector will continue, and restrictions on data use will not be loosened. 
 
Despite interests in promoting data utilization, climate research, and international 
cooperation, JAXA policies have remained relatively restrictive since 1992. A strong 
interest in cost recovery and commercialization drive this policy and seem likely to 
continue to play a large role in the future. Though JAXA’s policy has seen very little 
change over time, the data policy of the Japan Meteorological Agency (JMA) is even 
less developed. JMA participates in WMO, exchanging data in accordance with 
Resolution 40, and also provides access to some imagery online via a data distributer. 
Perhaps because JMA has only operated satellites since 2005, there is very little 
evidence that satellite data sharing outside of WMO has been given much 
consideration. 
 
6.3.2 Japan Meteorological Agency (JMA) 
JAXA (NASDA) developed the first meteorological satellites for Japan, starting with 
the Geostationary Meteorological Satellite (GMS-1), also known as a Himawari 
satellite, in 1977. From early in the program’s development, the potential for 
operational meteorological use was clearly recognized by JMA. Efforts were made to 
coordinate development of Japan’s meteorological satellites with the standards of 
                                                





those developed in Europe and the United States to ensure interoperability.435 With a 
total of seven satellites launched since the beginning of the program, JMA maintains 
one operational geostationary satellite covering East Asia and the Western Pacific as 
well as one spare satellite in orbit.436 
 
JMA has been a member of WMO since its founding, and shares satellite data with 
other NMSs within this structure, following WMO data sharing principles.437 It also 
has a number of multilateral and bilateral agreements for data sharing.438 In 1994, the 
Japan Meteorological Business Support Center (JMBSC) was created “to support and 
enhance the activities of weather business and efforts towards prevention/ mitigation 
of natural hazards by authorities concerned.” One of the services it provides is 
distribution of meteorological data, products, and information in real time and non-
real time to user communities at a marginal cost approved by JMA.439 Archived GMS 
data can also be purchased through JMBSC.440 In 2008, JMA also made its satellite 
imagery freely available on the internet in jpeg format, stating that this was done to 
ensure access to MTSAT imagery for many users in the public.441 JMA also 
explained that more extensive online HRIT, JPEG, and other satellite data are 
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available only to NMSs due to limitations of JMA’s server capacity and network 
bandwidth.442 
 
JMA has one of the most restrictive policies of all, sharing data on an official level 
within the WMO, making a minimal set of images available online, and giving 
responsibility for all other data distribution to a commercial entity, where a fee is 
required for access. However, further action, whether to promote data use by 
researchers or others or to make greater efforts at cost recovery, does not seem 
imminent. 
 
6.4 Domestic Agency-Level Comparative Case Study Discussion 
Each of the seven organizations examined in this chapter followed a slightly different 
path in the development of their data policy, though there were a number of 
similarities in both actions and motivations. There was a common starting place, as 
each agency began without an official data sharing policy at the outset, generally 
engaging in informal data sharing in the early days of satellite Earth observation. 
From there, almost every agency made some attempt to benefit from the value of the 
data being collected. This led to efforts at cost recovery, commercialization, or even 
privatization that lasted for different periods of time for each agency. Following 
efforts, or at least consideration of, cost recovery, two U.S. agencies, NASA and 
USGS, moved gradually to completely free and open data policies. NOAA went 
through a similar transition, though it retains the ability to sell its data. ESA and 
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EUMETSAT also retain slightly tighter control, using licensing that restricts 
redistribution and retaining some capability for satellite data sales. JAXA and JMA 
have both retained cost recovery efforts to the greatest extent among the seven cases, 
with JAXA charging market prices to commercial users only, while JMA charges a 
fee to all users for all but the most basic data. 
Figure 6.2 Data Sharing Policies Over Time in Seven Agencies 
 
Figure 6.2 shows how the data sharing policies changed over time in the seven agencies for which 
case studies were carried out. 
 
As all of these policies developed over time, there were three arguments central to the 
discussions. Most important were economic arguments about whether it would be 
more efficient and beneficial to the country to treat data as a public good and make it 
freely available or treat it as a commodity and sell it. Normative arguments also 
played an important, though limited, role in weather data in particular. It was 
generally agreed that access to some weather information is required on moral 
grounds, and thus, distribution of this type of data was not subject to restriction based 
on economic arguments. With this exception, however, ethical arguments were 




belief that the public had the right to access the data for free, and commodity views 
supported by a belief that the government has a responsibility to protect the public’s 
investment and secure a return for general taxpayers whenever possible. Finally, the 
international aspect of satellite Earth observation and the global nature of some of the 
issues it can address also played an important role in policy development. In the 
meteorological agencies, NOAA, EUMETSAT, and JMA, in particular, international 
cooperation at some level was always seen as an imperative, with no consideration of 
stopping international data sharing altogether. For the science-focused agencies, this 
was less accepted, though the increasing importance of climate change as a global 
issue has raised its significance.  
 
Within each case study, there were two primary groups involved in data sharing 
policy development – agency officials and legislative or executive officials with 
responsibility for the agency budget, and the interests of these two groups determined 
the substantive issues that carry the most weight. Agencies are concerned with 
accomplishing their mission, which often requires sharing data to maximize research, 
inform the public, or understand what they recognize is an inherently global issue. As 
experts in these areas, they also have a better understanding of the difficult-to-
quantify benefits of data use. Non-agency officials concerned primarily with budget 
issues prioritize efficiency and cost reduction. They are often not experts in satellite 
or geospatial data, and are less likely to be aware of, or understand, the value of 
difficult-to-quantify benefits of data use. Economic arguments are driven largely by 




are of interest to both groups, but differences of opinion on their application are based 
on the character of the data, specifically whether the data is used for weather or 
climate purposes. 
 
Economic arguments were the most important determinant of policy development 
across all seven agencies. Both agency and budgeting officials are concerned with 
economic efficiency, and both have an incentive to accomplish as much as possible 
with the budget provided. Budgeting officials have a further interest in decreasing 
overall costs and reducing the budget, if possible. Because of its unique 
characteristics, satellite data can be viewed as either a public good or a commodity, 
and depending on the assumptions made or limitations faced in reality, either view 
could potentially be more efficient or more beneficial for a nation. The position taken 
on this theoretical question is aligned with the primary interests of each group of 
officials.  
 
Agency officials generally support the view of data as a public good and push for free 
provision of data. These agency officials hone in on the fact that the value of the data 
comes from its use, particularly in areas such as research and education. Providing 
data for free maximizes data use for a given mission cost, resulting in the greatest 
possible amount of research carried out and greatest overall social benefit. This is a 
logical position for agency officials, as it prioritizes their ability to best achieve their 
agency’s mission of supporting research and increasing understanding of climate 




importance of data use, but rather than focusing exclusively on these benefits, they 
prioritized the importance of overall efficiency and of cost reductions, reflecting their 
primary interest in government-wide budget issues.  
 
The positions and interests of these two decision-making groups drove the 
development of early data sharing policy. Across these case studies, data from early 
satellites was shared, often informally. This demonstrated the value and quality of the 
data collected by each agency’s space assets, including the potential for commercial 
applications using the data. Once this commercial value was clear, debates about 
whether and how data sharing policies should best capture the value of data took 
place. In general, agency officials supported a policy that would continue free data 
sharing, while budgeting officials supported efforts at data sales that would lead to 
cost recovery, commercialization, or privatization. 
 
Early in Earth observation satellite program development, in the 1980s and 1990s, 
there were a number of key uncertainties that favored the budgeting official position. 
First, it was known that there were potential commercial uses of data for mining, 
agriculture, fishing, and other areas, and it was not yet known whether there was 
sufficient interest to support a commercial remote sensing sector. If efforts to sell data 
could help to spur a vibrant commercial satellite remote sensing sector, these 
activities could be largely removed from the government budget, and satellite data 
collection would benefit from all of the inherent efficiencies of a competitive market 




cost recovery, alleviating pressure on government budgets. Second, the elasticity of 
demand for satellite data was unknown. If elasticity was low (demand was inelastic), 
then commercial or cost recovery models could operate without significantly reducing 
data use, because the same number of individuals (research, commercial, or 
otherwise) would purchase the data regardless of the price. Finally, the potential uses 
of data, including particular research findings, operational, and commercial uses were 
not fully known, and the benefits of these potential findings and products were 
difficult to quantify. For example, data use for research leads to a nebulous “better 
understanding” of climate, while the benefit of revenues generated from data sales is 
an easy-to-understand monetary amount. 
 
Given the structure of these arguments and these key uncertainties, it is not surprising 
that most agencies at least attempted to sell data. While a free data policy would only 
continue the status quo, data sales had the potential to reduce costs for the 
government through cost recovery or to spur the development of a private remote 
sensing sector. Further, these easy to understand cost reductions could potentially be 
captured without significantly decreasing data use, if demand proved to be inelastic. 
The high hopes for efforts at data sales were seen in the actions and statements of 
many agencies. In the United States, it was hoped that commercialization of the 
Landsat system would result in a new commercial remote sensing market, ensuring 
sustainable data collection over time and encouraging technical innovation, both of 
which would benefit all users. In ESA, it was further argued that if data could be sold 




development of the most valuable types of systems were continued. Both NOAA and 
EUMETSAT believed that sales of some weather data would provide revenues that 
could increase the sustainability of government meteorological agencies.  
 
In all three countries, data sales by the government were seen as initial steps in the 
development of a commercial sector, including both a commercial industry in raw 
data collection and sales as well as growth of a value added sector. Although policies 
were developed with these commercial goals in mind, they often included 
compromises that at least partially accommodated the position of agency officials, 
who were focused on maximizing data use, particularly for research. In combination 
with data sales, many programs provided special arrangements for the research 
community, sometimes providing free data in response to specific announcements of 
opportunity, or more broadly through implementation of a two-tiered data policy in 
which access for research use was free. NASA officials were most effective at 
making the agency case, arguing that research was central to their mission, and that 
the primary value of the data they collected lay in scientific use. Though they did 
implement a two-tiered policy for a short period, requiring authorization for 
commercial use, they never fully engaged in commercial data sales. 
 
Within approximately ten years of putting restrictive cost recovery and 
commercialization policies in place, most agencies had removed these policies. This 
occurred largely because the efforts had failed; ESA, NOAA, USGS, and 




system costs. Many of the key uncertainties that existed in the early Earth-observing 
satellite development period were now much better understood. Most importantly, 
experience had shown across many examples that there is not a viable commercial 
market for the sale of most satellite remote sensing data; the primary value of this 
data lies in its use for research and operational projects in the public interest. By 
continuing data collection programs, rather than canceling them, governments 
implicitly acknowledged that this data was valuable and its collection was the proper 
role of government. However, for data with the greatest commercial value and 
potential for sales, many nations continue to support commercialization and cost 
recovery. This is seen in the sale of high-resolution data in the U.S. private sector, 
licensed by the U.S. government, and ESA’s sales of synthetic aperture radar data. 
Both the United States and Europe refrain from developing government-owned high-
resolution satellites that could potentially compete with the private sector. JAXA’s 
expected policy change also reflects recognition of the limitations of the commercial 
market for certain types of data as they move from a policy that charges based on user 
to instead only charging for high-resolution data. 
 
As cost recovery and commercialization ventures failed, governments began to open 
data sharing policies. Experiences in cost recovery and the eventual adoption of free 
data policies made it increasingly evident that demand for remote sensing data was 
highly elastic. Landsat provides the most striking demonstration of this characteristic. 
When the initial decision to commercialize Landsat was made, data that had 




then raised in anticipation of transfer to the public sector, and raised again, 
dramatically, when control of satellite data sales was given to a private company. 
Each of these price increases was associated with a significant decrease in data use. 
When Landsat data was made completely free in 2008, use of the data skyrocketed. 
ESA and EUMETSAT also found that attempts to commercialize data resulted in 
relatively low data use, and the high elasticity of demand was not limited to research 
users. Studies showed that the value added sector for publicly collected geospatial 
information was much smaller in Europe than in the United States, a trend that was 
correlated with data pricing policies. 
 
Information learned about the remote sensing satellite data market through trial-and-
error weakened the argument of budget officials and gave strength to agency 
officials’ argument. In recent years, most agencies, particularly in the United States 
and to a lesser extent in Europe, have moved from a view of data as a commodity to 
treatment of satellite data as a public good. The emphasis at NASA, NOAA, USGS, 
ESA, and EUMETSAT is largely in reaching as many users as possible and progress 
is shown in increasing numbers of users, data downloads, and related publications, 
rather than in revenues.  
 
The second important determinant identified in the case studies was ethical 
arguments. Most often, ethical arguments are made in terms of the fairest way to 
distribute data and are closely related to economic arguments. When agencies argue 




public has the right to access data for free, because they have already paid for it once 
through taxation. This argument has been made on many occasions by NASA 
officials arguing for free data access policies. When data is viewed as a commodity, 
agencies argue that the satellite data is an important national asset that should be 
protected by the government; the government is viewed as a public trust for the data. 
It is also argued that those who use the data, particularly companies that process and 
re-sell it for a profit, benefit more from the system, and therefore should be 
responsible for contributing more to the system. These revenues then benefit 
taxpayers equally, by improving government capabilities or reducing reliance on 
general taxation. These arguments have been common in both Europe and Japan in 
support of their cost-recovery efforts. Though these arguments do not seem to be the 
primary determinants, they have an important role in justifying policies. Almost every 
agency makes a point of providing not only an economic argument, but also a moral 
rationale for its proposed actions. 
 
Though the most commonly mentioned ethical arguments seem to simply be used to 
support economic arguments, the most interesting cases are those few in which 
normative arguments about moral responsibilities outweigh economic arguments. 
This is particularly visible in efforts to sell weather data compared to other 
environmental satellite data. There is an accepted belief that the provision of weather 
information, particularly extreme weather forecasts and warnings, must be carried out 
by the government. While some raw weather data or weather products may be sold, it 




data and derived products must be provided freely to the public. For example, no 
government supports charging a price for hurricane warnings, and no government is 
willing to risk having data relevant to hurricane warnings be subject to the changes 
and developments in the commercial market. This was made most explicit in the 
United States when the Satellite Remote Sensing Commercialization Act of 1984 
called specifically for commercialization of government remote sensing systems, 
particularly Landsat, but also specifically forbade efforts to commercialize weather 
satellite systems. Though it was not codified in law, collection and distribution of 
weather data and information was similarly protected in Europe and Japan. 
EUMETSAT also demonstrates the importance of this argument by making special 
exceptions to its data sharing restrictions to ensure that data was shared “for official 
use” by other meteorological agencies. 
 
The effectiveness of these arguments with respect to weather data but not climate data 
is surprising, since the structure of the two phenomena have so many similarities. The 
moral obligation to provide weather data is based primarily on the fact that weather 
causes loss of life and significant damage to property, and that satellite data can be 
used to increase understanding of weather events and develop forecasts that save lives 
and property. However, climate change also has impacts with the potential to cause 
significant loss of life and significant damage to property, and satellite data can be 
used to better understand and forecast future climate change. The difference in moral 




phenomenon and damage as well as the link between increased understanding or 
improved forecasting for the phenomenon and prevention of damage. 
 
In the case of weather, the link between extreme weather and loss of life and property 
is very clear. A hurricane or flood occurs and individuals are killed and homes and 
businesses are destroyed. The link between forecasting and prevention of loss of life 
and property damage is also clear. If a hurricane’s path and intensity is accurately 
forecast a few days in advance, individuals can be evacuated, windows can be 
boarded up; fewer people die and less property damage occurs.  
 
These links are less clear for climate, in part because understanding of climate change 
and climate impacts is relatively new and rapidly evolving. (The Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change was formed only 25 years ago, compared to the 
International Meteorological Organization, which was formed more than 125 years 
ago.) Scientists argue that climate change leads to changes in temperature patterns 
that can affect timing of monsoons or other seasonal events, or likely incidence and 
severity of floods or droughts. When these events happen at unexpected times or in 
unexpected places they can lead to loss of life, damage to property, and decreases in 
agricultural production. However, these connections are not well understood by the 
public or by many decision-makers. Other climate impacts are even more difficult to 
connect directly and immediately to loss of life and property. Climate change leads to 
an increase in the likelihood of extreme weather events, but isn’t the cause of any 




cause erosion and other problems and eventually could lead to loss of property, mass 
migration, and conflict, but sea level rise happens gradually over long time periods 
and the precise effect on life and property is hard to determine. The link between 
increased understanding of climate or climate forecasting and the protection of life 
and property is also less clear than in the case of weather. Individuals, including 
policy-makers, often have a poor sense of what a climate forecasting system would 
entail and what its benefit would be. Existing operational forecasting systems that 
build on climate data, like NASA’s Famine Early Warning System and Drought 
Monitoring System are often not very visible to the public. The extent to which these 
systems actually lead to protection of life and property is even more opaque. 
 
This difference in the public understanding of links between climate change and 
damage as well as climate change forecasting and prevention of damage weakens the 
moral argument for sharing climate data. As scientific and public understanding of 
climate change improves, climate impacts become more visible, and use of climate 
forecasting systems increases, it is likely that this normative argument will become 
more important.   
 
Finally, arguments about the international structure of the problem are central to the 
development of data sharing policies. This has been most clearly visible in the 
weather community, where the need for international cooperation has been 
recognized since before satellites existed. In fact, the argument for international 




more stations were needed to get adequate coverage and countries could not access 
the territory of others to take measurements on the ground without permission. When 
meteorological satellites were developed, it was possible for one country to collect 
weather data over another country without permission, but practical limitations due to 
the high costs of satellite systems and ongoing need for in-situ data still prevented any 
one nation from collecting all relevant weather data on its own. Weather satellite data 
was incorporated into the well-established tradition of international meteorological 
data sharing.  
 
All three meteorological agencies, NOAA, EUMETSAT, and JMA, have been 
members of WMO since very early in their existence. As soon as they began satellite 
activities, these efforts were coordinated within WMO. Even during debates about the 
merits of cost recovery and commercialization, it was never suggested that 
international cooperation and data sharing should be discontinued. Efforts to sell data 
were always balanced with the need to share data internationally. This occurred 
through the identification of “essential” meteorological data, which would always be 
shared, an agreement that all three agencies signed on to as part of WMO Resolution 
40. Both EUMETSAT and JMA, while restricting some data, make special exceptions 
for providing data to national meteorological agencies for their official use. 
 
For other agencies, including NASA, USGS, ESA, and JAXA, international 
cooperation was traditionally less of an imperative. International data sharing did 




example, efforts were made to share data to meet high-level foreign policy goals, 
demonstrating the peaceful nature of the space program. Other countries shared data 
early on to encourage development of new uses and to help establish its value. Within 
many of the agencies, it was felt that international data sharing was beneficial for 
science, driving much of the informal data sharing that occurred in the 1970s and 80s. 
However, when these considerations had to be balanced against the potential benefits 
of cost recovery, the economic determinant largely won out, at least temporarily, and 
international cooperation decreased. An example of this was seen in ESA when 
efforts at cost recovery began with the Envisat program, including costs for foreign 
data users, reversing a decade-long tradition of free data sharing with other countries.  
 
Part of the explanation for the difference of treatment of weather and climate data is 
that climate change is a relatively new phenomenon compared to weather. Scientists 
and political officials from different countries are still not in full agreement on what 
data needs to be collected to understand climate and whether it is necessary to collect 
some or all of this data on an operational basis, i.e. consistent, ongoing collection. 
However, the complex international nature of climate change is gaining more 
recognition, and this is beginning to have an impact on data policies. All seven 
agencies mention climate change research as an important goal of their organization 
and note that efforts to address this problem require international cooperation. 
Climate monitoring and other climate services are starting to be incorporated into the 




need to be monitored on a consistent and ongoing basis, similar to weather data, is 
becoming more common.  
 
Further, international organizations have made important contributions to building 
consensus on the need for climate data. For example, many nations recognize the 
Essential Climate Variables developed by the Global Climate Observation System, 
providing a starting point in building international agreement on a clearly defined set 
of data required for understanding and addressing climate change. The large variety 
of variables that are considered “essential” has also given strength to the argument 
that international cooperation will be required to adequately monitor climate change, 
as it would be prohibitively expensive for one nation to collect all of the relevant data 
on its own. Almost all nations involved in climate monitoring using satellites are 
members of international organizations, particularly GEO and WMO, that call 
attention to the current state of international data sharing and promote mechanisms to 





Chapter 7:  International-Level Comparative Case Study 
 
The second set of case studies, presented here, examines two international 
organizations that specialize in activities that use data collected by Earth observing 
satellites and facilitate international data sharing: the Group on Earth Observations 
(GEO) and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO). Founded in 1950, the 
WMO coordinates international cooperation related to weather, and counts almost 
every country in the world as a member. One of its primary goals is encouraging and 
facilitating the international exchange of weather and climate data, including that 
collected by satellites. GEO, founded in 2005, has an even broader aim, with efforts 
to coordinate all international Earth observation efforts to support a number of 
applications, including climate, weather, natural disasters, health, and others. 
Encouraging free and open international data sharing is one of its primary goals. 
 
These organizations do not develop or operate satellites of their own. Instead, both 
have a coordinating role, bringing together representatives from countries or agencies 
with relevant space-assets and facilitating international cooperation. Both 
organizations have developed principles related to international satellite data sharing, 
and development of these principles involved lengthy international debates. These 
debates provide insight into the incentives and barriers of data sharing and the 
primary arguments or positions of various countries. The methods and level of 
success in achieving international data sharing among members also varies between 




how and to what extent the existence of these international organizations actually 
affects the development of satellite data sharing policies. 
 
As with the domestic case studies, this analysis is based on document analysis and 
semi-structured interviews with at least two individuals from each international 
organization. Documentation reveals each organization’s development process, and 
particularly the evolution of its data-sharing practices and principles. Interviews 
provide additional insight into this development process and the internal debates that 
took place within each organization. 
 
These case studies show that both organizations have played an important role in 
maintaining and encouraging international data sharing from climate-relevant 
satellites. The WMO, with its long history and relatively narrow focus on 
meteorology, has been more successful in ensuring international data sharing in this 
area. This stems largely from international agreement on the importance of sharing 
data that is needed to save lives and property as well as the inherently international 
nature of weather monitoring, which cannot be achieved by any nation on its own. 
The greatest level of success involves cooperation on an official level between 
national meteorological agencies. Broader data sharing has been less of a focus, and 
less has been achieved in this area. GEO, by contrast, is focused especially on 
encouraging the free and open exchange of data for all users. While they have not 
fully succeeded in getting members to adopt this principle, significant progress has 




Evidence suggests that discussions regarding the economic efficiency of data sharing 
and ethical responsibilities to share data have been effective. The visibility provided 
by the organization, both in highlighting the contributions of countries that share data 
as well as bringing to light restrictions that still exist, has provided greater incentive 
to increase data exchange. It has also facilitated the sharing of information about 
changes in member nations’ policies, as well as the impact these changes had. 
Arguments regarding the inherently global nature of climate monitoring and of many 
substantive issues in which data was needed were critical to encouraging countries to 
join the organization. 
 
7.1 World Meteorological Organization (WMO) 
The vision of WMO is to provide world leadership in expertise and international 
cooperation in weather, climate, hydrology and water resources and related 
environmental issues and thereby contribute to the safety and well-being of people 
throughout the world and to the economic benefit of all nations.443 
 
The WMO is a specialized agency of the United Nations, promoting international 
cooperation to enable operational weather, climate, and hydrology activities. As part 
of this effort, WMO facilitates the free and unrestricted exchange of data and 
information and contributes to policy development on this issue.444 As of January 
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2013, WMO had 191 members, including countries and territories. Representatives 
from each of these members come together every four years as part of the World 
Meteorological Congress to determine long-term policies and plans, to approve 
expenditures, and to elect the 37-member WMO Executive Council and other leaders. 
The Executive Council members are all directors of their respective national 
meteorological or hydrological services. They meet at least once a year to implement 
the programs approved by the congress. A permanent Secretariat is based in Geneva, 
Switzerland, and works to carry out regular WMO activities.445 The WMO carries out 
its work through about 20 scientific and technical programs, including the World 
Weather Watch, the WMO Space Program, and the World Climate Program (WCP), 
which includes the Global Climate Observing System (GCOS).446  
 
Early Sharing of Weather Satellite Data within WMO 
For hundreds of years, it has been clear that information about weather in one country 
could be used to anticipate weather soon to occur in another. International exchange 
of weather data on a useful timescale became possible with the invention of the 
telegraph in the mid-1800s.447 In 1873, meteorologists around the world formed the 
International Meteorological Organization (IMO) to coordinate and facilitate data 
sharing.448  
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The World Meteorological Organization was founded in 1950 with 31 member 
countries, replacing the non-governmental IMO with an official inter-governmental 
organization under the auspices of the United Nations.449 The WMO charter, written 
in 1947, listed one of the purposes of the organization, “To promote the establishment 
and maintenance of systems for the rapid exchange of meteorological and related 
information.”450 As capabilities in numerical modeling, forecasting, and monitoring 
improved in the early years of the program, and as the WMO’s production of 
information and products multiplied and improved accordingly, the international 
exchange of data only became more important.451 
  
The potential for satellites to contribute to international meteorology was recognized 
within WMO very early on, and in 1959, a resolution was passed to “encourage the 
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development of meteorological satellites as a means of providing data.”452 The first 
WMO report on meteorological satellites was jointly developed by representatives 
from the US and USSR, illustrating the extent of international consensus on the 
importance of sharing meteorological data, despite the fact that this data was and is 
important for military operations. As weather satellites were launched, the resulting 
data was shared freely with all nations, and special effort was put into designing 
communications systems that could disseminate data to all WMO Members on a 
timely basis.453  
 
These activities had a high level of political visibility and support; in 1961, the UN 
General Assembly passed a resolution noting the progress in meteorological satellites 
and “the world-wide benefits to be derived from international cooperation in weather 
research and analysis.” The resolution called for the WMO to draft a report on 
organizational and financial achievements to advance the state of atmospheric science 
and technology to provide better understanding of weather and climate and to further 
develop existing weather forecasting capabilities.454  
 
The resulting report laid out plans for the World Weather Watch (WWW) system - a 
coordinated worldwide system for collecting and sharing weather information and 
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products. The WWW included a Global Observing System made up of national 
observational networks, both in-situ and satellite, global centers for processing data, 
and telecommunications technologies to allow rapid exchange of information. The 
ultimate aim of the Global Observing System was to create “an integrated system 
which would provide all the observational data required for operational and research 
purposes by the most economical means.”455  
 
In 1962, the UN General Assembly referenced the report, calling on the WMO to 
further develop its plan to strengthen meteorological services and research. In 
response, the World Weather Watch system was officially established by the Fourth 
World Meteorological Congress in 1963.456 The General Assembly again recognized 
and encouraged these efforts in a resolution specifically calling on Member States to 
participate in the establishment of the World Weather Watch.457 This consistent high-
level interest and support was referenced as a critical component in the initial success 
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of the WWW and also reflects the extent to which leaders recognized the benefits of 
international cooperation in meteorology.458 
 
WMO had been engaged in observation and research related to climate since its 
creation, but increasing interest led it to hold the first World Climate Conference 
(WCC-1) in 1979, with participants from 53 countries and 24 international 
organizations.459  They concluded that understanding and forecasting of climate 
change needed to be improved and proposed improving the acquisition and 
availability of climatic data. The WMO created the World Climate Program to 
address these needs.460 In 1988, WMO and UNEP, partners in the World Climate 
Program, proposed the establishment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC), which would provide an assessment of scientific knowledge related 
to climate change.461  
 
Resolution 40: Formalizing Some Data Sharing and Allowing Restrictions 
For more than forty years, the practice of free and open international exchange of 
meteorological data had operated within WMO. However, in the late 1980s, facing 
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tightening budgets and high-level political pressure, a number of National 
Meteorological Agencies within Europe were considering undertaking commercial 
activities to help recover agency costs. It was clear these activities would conflict 
with existing norms of free data sharing. The issue of data exchange and commercial 
activities was raised at the Tenth World Meteorological Congress in 1987, and the 
Congress determined that the issue needed careful consideration. In the meantime, it 
released a resolution stating that “the principle of free and unrestricted exchange of 
meteorological data between National Meteorological Services should be 
maintained.”462 
 
This situation continued to evolve over the next four years. National Meteorological 
Services in Europe wanted to recover costs by selling value-added products, but 
argued that companies able to access data for free had an unfair competitive 
advantage over NMSs that bore the costs of developing and operating data collection 
systems. Some developing countries worried that commercial companies from 
developed countries with access to free data and advanced technology would 
undermine their official national meteorological systems. Some NMSs responded by 
considering restrictions on data distribution or charges for commercial users wishing 
to access data.463 In 1991, the Eleventh World Meteorological Congress recognized 
that “Commercial meteorological activities (have) the potential to undermine the free 
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exchange of meteorological data and products between National Meteorological 
Services.”464 
 
The WMO formed a working group to study the issue of commercialization and to 
examine how to reinforce the principle of free and unrestricted international sharing 
of data.465 Until the 1990s, meteorological data had been freely shared internationally 
for almost 100 years, even though no formal policy or legally binding commitment to 
do so existed. The United States and some other nations argued for continued free and 
open exchange of meteorological data. However, it was clear that tradition would no 
longer be sufficient to ensure that this practice continued. Europe was the primary 
proponent of restrictions on data sharing. Europe was not convinced by arguments 
about the efficiency of open data sharing and emphasized that not all data needed to 
be made freely available; some data was more applicable to particular regions or to 
some commercial purposes and could be restricted.466 WMO is a consensus 
organization, and therefore a compromise was developed that would address the 
desire to formalize the tradition of free and open data sharing while still establishing 
the right of nations to restrict data in order to engage in commercial activities. The 
                                                
464	  Exchanging	  Meteorological	  Data	  Guidelines	  on	  Relationships	  in	  Commercial	  Meteorological	  
Activities:	  WMO	  Policy	  and	  Practice.	  Rep.	  no.	  837.	  Geneva:	  n.p.,	  1996.	  Web.	  24	  May	  2013.	  
<http://library.wmo.int/pmb_ged/wmo_837_en.pdf>.	  
465	  Exchanging	  Meteorological	  Data	  Guidelines	  on	  Relationships	  in	  Commercial	  Meteorological	  
Activities:	  WMO	  Policy	  and	  Practice.	  Rep.	  no.	  837.	  Geneva:	  n.p.,	  1996.	  Web.	  24	  May	  2013.	  
<http://library.wmo.int/pmb_ged/wmo_837_en.pdf>.	  




result was Resolution 40, agreed to by the Twelfth World Meteorological Congress in 
1995.467 
 
The resolution protected free and open data sharing for a specified set of data, 
requiring that this “essential data” remain freely available. Agencies were 
encouraged, but not required, to share their “non-essential” datasets freely as well. It 
was expected that “non-essential” data, though restricted for commercial uses, would 
still be available for the official uses of national meteorological agencies within 
WMO. Essentially, WMO ensured continued free and open international exchange of 
data by formalizing the allowable exceptions to this practice. This explains the 
somewhat contradictory wording, in which WMO “urges members to strengthen their 
commitment to free and unrestricted exchange of meteorological and related data and 
products [and to] increase the volume of data and products exchanged,” but also notes 
that “WMO Members may be justified in placing conditions on their re-export for 
commercial purposes outside of the receiving country… for reasons such as national 
laws or cost of production.”468 In 1999, a similar policy was put in place for 
hydrological data.469 
 
It may seem that the resolution simply reflected the most conservative national 
perspectives with respect to data sharing, with Europe essentially just being granted 
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“permission” for what they already intended to do. However, the policy ensured that 
this one concession, this particular limitation on free and open data sharing, would be 
well defined and limited in scope. The resolution prevented individual nations from 
deciding on an ad hoc basis which data sets would be shared when. It ensured 
stability by getting agreement that the most important data would continue to be made 
freely available, regardless of future developments, and that other data would remain 
available for official use within the WMO. Resolution 40 even includes guidance to 
Members on appropriate actions in the case of non-compliance. For example, Annex 
2 notes that when restrictions on non-essential data are not honored, “the originating 
NMS may take appropriate actions including denial of access to these additional data 
and products to the receiving Member.”470 
 
In addition to formalizing the principle of free and unrestricted international sharing 
of essential meteorological data, there was some hope that the new policy would 
actually increase data sharing. If countries were able to generate commercial revenues 
from the sale of meteorological information and products, this could act as an 
incentive for the collection of a greater amount of “non-essential” data. Though the 
re-export of this data was restricted, its sharing within the WMO for official purposes 
as well as research and education use was still expected, and therefore, the WMO 
could still benefit from its collection.471 
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While discussion of international sharing of weather data was underway, the WMO 
also continued its research and efforts related to climate. The IPCC’s First 
Assessment Report was released in 1990 and discussed at the Second World Climate 
Conference (WCC-2) later that year. One of the key recommendations of WCC-2 was 
the establishment of the Global Climate Observing System, which occurred in 
1992.472 GCOS was based on the WMO Global Observing System, and was to be 
made up of climate relevant components of existing observing systems. The 
observations coordinated by GCOS would support the World Climate Program, the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), and the newly formed United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). In 2003, WMO 
participated in the newly formed ad hoc Group on Earth Observations (the pre-curser 
to the permanent GEO organization), eventually taking a lead or participating role in 
social benefit areas related to weather, water, climate, and disasters.473 
 
The WMO Global Framework for Climate Services (GFCS) program, created as a 
result of the third World Climate Conference (WCC-3) in 2011, noted the importance 
of improving sharing of global climate data. It argued that efforts were needed to 
overcome significant restrictions on sharing and barriers to accessing climate data, 
and it includes promoting free and open exchange of climate and observational data 
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as one of its eight principles. The GFCS proposes working through international 
deliberative mechanisms within WMO to reach agreement on essential climate data 
and products that should be shared in support of the protection of life and property, 
following the approach taken for meteorological data in Resolution 40.474 
 
Officially, the World Meteorological Organization does encourage nations to 
“strengthen their commitment to the free and unrestricted exchange of meteorological 
and related data and products [and to] increase the volume of data and products 
exchanged to meet the needs of WMO Programs.”475 But overall, the impact of the 
World Meteorological Organization is mixed. In one sense, the decisions of the 
WMO have a significant impact on the policies of its members, which include almost 
every nation in the world, because they are considered binding by members and even 
lay out some sanctions for non-compliance. Agencies do change their policies to 
comply with World Meteorological Organization resolutions. However, because of 
the consensus nature of the organization, this coercive ability is only used to a very 
limited extent with respect to data sharing. Furthermore, organizations like the 
national space agencies have not historically been active within the WMO, and 
generally were not considered in the creation of data-sharing policies. These 
organizations often collect research or experimental data, and generally do not collect 
data that falls within the “essential data” category, and thus the WMO data principles 
have little effect on these agencies’ data sharing policies. 
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7.2 Group on Earth Observations (GEO) 
The vision for GEOSS is to realize a future wherein decisions and actions for the 
benefit of humankind are informed by coordinated, comprehensive and sustained 
Earth observations and information.476 
 
The Group on Earth Observations is a voluntary intergovernmental organization that 
aims to build a Global Earth Observation System of Systems (GEOSS). GEOSS 
would connect existing and planned observing systems around the world, 
encouraging internationally coordinated efforts in terms of data collection and 
technical standards. A key element is enabling access to data collected from the 
thousands of instruments around the world. To do this, one of GEO’s aims is to 
coordinate data sharing policies and practices among members.477   
 
As of 2012, GEO had 88 government members, as well as the European Union, and 
67 other intergovernmental, international, and regional organizations involved in 
Earth observation issues. Members meet each year on the senior or ministerial level, 
and a standing executive committee consisting of 14 representatives from different 
regions remains in place throughout the year. Approximately every three years, GEO 
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holds a Ministerial Summit, which brings together ministerial-level representatives 
from Member states to reaffirm GEO efforts. 478 
 
The efforts to create GEOSS are centered on five crosscutting areas: architecture, data 
management, capacity building, science and technology, and user engagement, as 
well as nine societal benefit areas: disasters, health, energy, water, weather, 
ecosystems, agriculture, biodiversity, and climate. Within the climate group, GEO 
advocates for sustained and coordinated climate observing systems, with the goal of 
improving the ability of governments to understand and adapt to the impacts of 
climate change.479 Efforts in this area are coordinated through the Global Climate 
Observing System (GCOS). The Committee on Earth Observing Systems (CEOS) is 
the coordinator of the satellite component of GCOS, as well as the space-based 
component of other GEO efforts. Both GCOS and CEOS are active in coordinating 
system development and in promoting full and open data sharing.480  
 
International Recognition of the Need for Data Sharing and Precursors to GEO 
To fully understand the history of GEO, particularly its space and climate related 
components, it’s necessary to start almost two decades before GEO was even 
proposed, with the G7 Summit in 1982, which established a working group on remote 
sensing from space. In 1984, this working group became the Committee on Earth 
                                                
478	  "About	  GEO."	  GEO.	  Group	  on	  Earth	  Observations,	  n.d.	  Web.	  24	  May	  2013.	  
<http://www.earthobservations.org/about_geo.shtml>.	  
479	  "Climate."	  GEO.	  Group	  on	  Earth	  Observations,	  n.d.	  Web.	  24	  May	  2013.	  
<http://www.earthobservations.org/geoss_cl.shtml>.	  
480	  "CEOS	  Home."	  CEOS.	  Committee	  on	  Earth	  Observing	  Satellites,	  n.d.	  Web.	  24	  May	  2013.	  
<http://www.ceos.org/>.	  





Observing Satellites (CEOS), a permanent intergovernmental organization created to 
coordinate international civil Earth observing satellite missions, including planning, 
development, and interoperability of satellite missions and their related data.481 
 
Another important organization was spurred from the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) First Assessment Report, released in 1990. The IPCC report 
noted the need for systematic long-term observations of the Earth system, including 
increased accuracy and coverage, and enhancement of both satellite-based and 
surface-based climate measurements. At the World Climate Conference held in the 
same year, this point was discussed, and it was determined that monitoring and 
research of climate would need to be strengthened. In early 1992, the Global Climate 
Observing System (GCOS) was created to meet the observational need for the World 
Climate Research Program, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, and the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.482 Shortly after its 
creation, GCOS became an associate member of CEOS.483 
 
Also in 1992, the United Kingdom hosted a Conference on Space and the 
Environment in preparation for the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development (UNCED), also known as the Rio Earth Summit, which was to take 
place later that year. Based on this conference, CEOS put together a document for 
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presentation at the Rio Earth Summit on “The Relevance of Satellite Missions for 
Study of the Global Environment,” which listed existing and anticipated satellite 
missions and their contributions to a variety of research areas.484  
 
In 1992, as the benefits of Earth observation satellites were getting greater 
recognition at these international events, CEOS developed its Satellite Data 
Exchange Principles for Global Change Data. The document noted that many CEOS 
members were involved in global change research and that satellite systems required 
major investments. They also noted that these systems produced data with significant 
value, and called for maximizing use through an exchange mechanism among CEOS 
members, non-discriminatory access to data for non-CEOS members, and a goal of 
providing data at a price primarily reflecting the cost of filling the user request. It also 
stated that programs should have no period of exclusive data use, with data released 
no more than 3 months after the start of data acquisition.485 
 
Two years later, CEOS developed Data Principles for Operational Environmental 
Data. Again recognizing both the high costs of satellite systems as well as the 
benefits of wide data use, CEOS proposed developing compatible policies for data 
provision for the public benefit. The principles stated that real time and archived data 
for operational environmental use for the public benefit should be provided “on time 
scales compatible with user benefit.” They called for the provision of meta-data, the 
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use of common international standards, and establishment of “appropriate data 
provision mechanisms.” They also stated that there should be no period of exclusive 
use, except for that needed to provide data validation.486 
 
In 1995, GCOS developed its Climate Monitoring Principles, which also dealt with 
data provision.487 While acknowledging that GCOS member nations have their own 
policies regarding data exchange, as well as the fact that the principles were not 
legally binding, GCOS noted that GCOS contributors “have responsibilities in 
adopting” the principles. The principles called for “full and open sharing and 
exchange of GCOS-relevant data and products… at the lowest possible cost” as a 
fundamental objective. It called for information to be made widely available as soon 
as it became broadly useful for GCOS purposes, particularly for data and projects that 
have initial periods of exclusive use. The principles also dealt with more technical 
issues of data archiving, provision of algorithms and meta-data, and development and 
adherence to international data standards.488 
 
The importance of global Earth observations were recognized at the highest levels 
once again at the World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in 2002 and 
the G-8 conference in 2003. At the WSSD, NOAA Administrator Conrad 
Lautenbacher called for a global observing system for climate, a challenge that would 
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require close international cooperation.489 Jose Achache, the head of ESA Earth 
Observations as well as Chairman of CEOS at the time, also made a statement at the 
WSSD arguing, “there is no sustainable development without adequate information 
about the state of the Earth and its environment.” He also promoted the efforts of 
CEOS and encouraged cooperation with respect to satellites.490  
 
The WSSD Implementation Plan included numerous mentions of the need for 
international cooperation on Earth observations and specifically called out the need to 
develop systems to allow the active exchange of Earth observation data.491 Building 
on this, the G-8 meeting held in Evian, France, in 2003 developed three priorities 
involving science and technology, one of which was strengthening international 
cooperation on global observation, including minimizing data gaps and promoting 
data sharing.492 There was recognition that adequate monitoring of the Earth could 
not be accomplished by one nation, and that the benefits of these activities extended 
beyond national borders.493 
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Creation of GEO and Data Sharing Principles 
A large part of the impetus for creating GEO was the recognition that international 
cooperation was required for adequate global Earth observation; it was a challenge 
that no country could meet on its own. Following shortly after high-level recognition 
of the need for international cooperation on Earth observations at the World Summit 
on Sustainable Development (WSSD) and G8 Summit, the United States hosted the 
first Earth Observation Summit in Washington, DC in 2003. This one-day summit 
brought together ministerial-level representatives from 35 developing and developed 
countries as well as key international organizations, including CEOS and GCOS.  
 
The goal of the event was to raise awareness of the need for international cooperation 
on environmental monitoring among high-level decision makers and ensure a 
sustained level of cooperation and investment for the future.494 Participants in the 
summit developed a declaration that affirmed the need for global information about 
the Earth. They called for improved strategies for data collection and the 
minimization of data gaps, stating that a system was needed to ensure “Full and open 
exchange of observations with minimum time delay and minimum costs, recognizing 
relevant international instruments and national policies and legislation.”495 The 
declaration also created an ad hoc Group on Earth Observations (GEO) to develop a 
10-year Implementation Plan.496  
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The second Earth Observation Summit, held in Tokyo, Japan in 2004, adopted the 
Framework for the 10-year Implementation Plan, which specifically laid out plans for 
the Global Earth Observation System of Systems (GEOSS).497 The Framework 
document recognized the many ongoing efforts in terms of international cooperation 
on global monitoring, including the World Meteorological Organization, which it 
noted was the most advanced in its promotion of international collaboration.498 
However, the document noted that despite these efforts, progress was limited by lack 
of access to data, large spatial and temporal gaps in data sets, lack of interoperability, 
inadequate user involvement, and other challenges.  
 
To address these issues, they proposed the establishment of GEOSS, which would be 
a comprehensive, coordinated, and sustainable system of systems. GEOSS was to 
address observation, data processing, data exchange, and data dissemination. The 
term “system of systems” was chosen because it made clear the large scale of this 
global effort, and it reassured members that there would not be one “command 
center” with control over all Earth observations – there would be many national 
system contributions to a coordinated international system.499  
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Speaking at an event in Washington, DC in 2004, NOAA Administrator 
Lautenbacher noted data policy as one of the four big challenges for GEOSS 
implementation, along with integration, data management, and engaging developing 
countries. He asked, “How do we get free and openly traded data passed from one 
nation to another?” He acknowledged the challenges posed by the different business 
models in each country, including efforts at cost recovery and systems in which 
agencies purchase data from other agencies within the same government. However, 
he pointed to the example of the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), which 
is successful in sharing weather data on a free and open basis.500 
 
Just as WMO focuses on weather, GEO participants felt that it was important to focus 
on the specific benefits of a global observing system, rather than just the 
technologies. They identified nine societal benefit areas to which global observations 
would contribute. This also made it possible to emphasize areas of mutual interest and 
concern, such as natural and man-made disasters. Admiral Lautenbacher noted that 
“even enemies will help each other in these situations,” due to the ethical 
responsibility to share data when it can save lives. Lautenbacher also emphasized the 
considerable economic benefits associated with greater understanding of Earth 
systems and better prediction of weather, extreme events, and other societal benefit 
areas. 501 
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The third Earth Observation Summit was hosted by the European Union in 2005. By 
this time, participation in the summit had grown to nearly 60 nations. The resolution 
established GEO as a permanent body rather than an ad hoc group and endorsed the 
10-Year Implementation Plan for GEOSS.502 Among other things, this plan laid out 
the GEOSS data-sharing principles, which included “full and open exchange of data” 
within GEOSS, with recognition of relevant international instruments and national 
policies. It stated that all shared data would be made available “with minimum time 
delay and at minimum cost.” It also noted that GEOSS would encourage providing 
data free of charge or at the marginal cost of reproduction for research and education 
uses.503 Every country and organization that joined GEO endorsed the 10-Year Plan 
and these data sharing policies with it. However, the plan is not legally binding, and 
compliance with the principles is done under the “best effort” of member nations.  
 
In mid-2005, high-level backing continued, as the G8 heads of state once again 
announced their support for international cooperation on global Earth observations, 
specifically calling out the GEOSS 10-Year Implementation Plan in the Gleneagles 
Plan of Action. They noted that national implementation of GEOSS would move 
forward, and efforts to further develop the Global Climate Observing System 
(GCOS), especially for the benefit of developing nations, would be supported.504 At 
                                                
502	  Resolution	  of	  the	  Third	  Earth	  Observation	  Summit.	  Rep.	  N.p.,	  16	  Feb.	  2005.	  Web.	  24	  May	  
2013.	  
<http://www.earthobservations.org/documents/eos_iii/Third%20Summit%20Resolution.pdf>.	  
503	  The	  Global	  Earth	  Observation	  System	  of	  Systems	  (GEOSS)	  10-­‐Year	  Implementation	  Plan.	  Rep.	  
GEO,	  16	  Feb.	  2005.	  Web.	  24	  May	  2013.	  <http://www.earthobservations.org/documents/10-­‐
Year%20Implementation%20Plan.pdf>.	  






the 2007 G-8 meeting in Germany, the Summit Declaration stated, “We will continue 
to exercise leadership in the development of the Global Earth Observation System of 
Systems (GEOSS).”505 
 
Data Sharing Implementation in GEOSS 
It was recognized that further effort would be needed to implement and refine the data 
sharing policies that had been included in the GEOSS Implementation Plan. In 2006, 
the Group on Earth Observations established a task focused on “furthering the 
practical applications of the agreed GEOSS data sharing principles” and established a 
data principles task force. A special workshop was organized by the Committee on 
Data for Science and Technology (CODATA) of the International Council for 
Scientific Unions (ICSU) to exchange ideas related to this task.506 Workshop 
participants emphasized the need to develop incentives for compliance, rather than 
enforcement mechanisms, and to give credit to data providers. They felt that peer 
pressure could be effective in promoting sharing. They argued that in cases where 
restrictions are in place, the costs and benefits should be reviewed carefully and 
suggested that more work be done to demonstrate the value of open access data.507 
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The fourth Earth Observation Summit took place in Cape Town, South Africa in late 
2007, bringing together 72 GEO Members and 46 Participating Organizations. This 
summit recognized GEO’s first Report on Progress, which issued a “call to action” on 
four areas, including data sharing.508 Participants argued that to fully realize the 
benefits of GEOSS, it was imperative to support the GEO principle of free and open 
exchange of data.509 Many of the Members and Participating Organizations also 
emphasized the importance of climate change and stressed the global nature of that 
and other GEOSS challenges.510  
 
Differences in opinion on data sharing policies came to light when discussing the 
specifics of official GEO data sharing statements. In drafting the Cape Town 
Declaration for approval at the Ministerial Summit, France suggested deleting a 
paragraph that discussed advancing the implementation of data sharing principles, but 
a number of other countries, including Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, India, and 
Japan, opposed this change, and highlighted the importance of open data access.  
 
During the Ministerial Summit, many nations also mentioned the importance of data 
sharing and highlighted their own efforts in this area. The European Commission 
noted that data sharing was one of the greatest challenges for the future of GEOSS, 
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and highlighted its own efforts at increasing data sharing in Europe.511 Egypt noted 
that reducing costs for satellite images was one of the keys to ensuring developing 
nations benefit from GEOSS.512 Finland stated that it endorses the GEOSS Data 
Sharing Principles and had already decided to share environmental data owned by its 
national Environmental Administration free of charge.513 Germany noted that it 
provides TerraSAR radar satellite data free of charge for scientific use, and Japan 
stated that it was “pursuing an open data policy.”514 One of the efforts highlighted at 
this event, and mentioned by numerous members and participating organizations in 
speeches, was the decision to provide the China-Brazil Environmental Resource 
Satellite data to users in China, South America, and Africa on a free and open 
basis.515 
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G8 leaders continued to voice their support for GEOSS, specifically mentioning it in 
the 2008 Declaration on Environment with respect to climate and sustainable 
development, and the 2009 Declaration of Responsible Leadership for a Sustainable 
Future.516 The 2008 statement noted, “To respond to the growing demand for Earth 
observation data, we will accelerate efforts within the Global Earth Observation 
System of Systems (GEOSS), which builds on the work of UN specialized agencies 
and programs, in priority areas, inter alia, climate change and water resources 
management, by strengthening observation, prediction and data sharing.” 
 
At the 2008 Plenary, CODATA presented a white paper on the GEOSS Data Sharing 
Principles.  The White Paper outlined existing policies, laid out some of the rationales 
for widely sharing data, and identified some of the legal and policy exceptions to data 
sharing.517 GEO created a Data Sharing Task Force to look at these issues in depth 
and consider how they could be put into practice. The resulting Data Sharing 
Principles Implementation Guidelines were presented at the 2009 Plenary. The 
guidelines defined “full and open access” to mean data made available “with 
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minimum time delay and with as few restrictions as possible, on a nondiscriminatory 
basis, at minimum cost for no more than the cost of reproduction and distribution.”518  
 
The guidelines also argue that governments should remove restrictions on 
redistribution and reuse, an issue that is essential in order for data to achieve 
maximum results. The report states, “The cost of data needs to be free, or as low as 
possible for the widest possible range of users.” The guidelines argue for expanding 
provision of free data to not only research and educational users, but also to 
developing countries. They also note that research and educational categories should 
be based on use of the data, not the affiliation of the user. The guidelines strongly 
suggest that governments collect impact metrics regarding the use of their data.519  
 
In discussing these guidelines, a number of Participating Organizations, including 
CEOS and GCOS, emphasized that data is a global public good and also that the 
value of data for capacity building was a key element. The United States and ESA 
supported the document, but, others, such as France and Canada, asked for changes or 
clarifications, particularly for countries that did not adhere to the data sharing 
policies, but still wanted to contribute. Japan questioned wording that aimed to 
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encourage removal of restrictions on reuse or redistribution. Australia suggested that 
GEO should encourage charging for data to allow cost recovery.520 
 
The GEO Plenary met in 2008 and 2009. Once again, countries highlighted their 
activities in support of GEO, including with respect to data sharing. The United States 
announced that all Landsat data would be made freely available online to all users.521 
The EC noted that it was developing GMES data-sharing policies consistent with the 
GEO data-sharing principles of full and open access. ESA stated that its Earth 
explorer missions would adopt the same policy. Brazil reported on the widening of 
free data provision from CBERS, and China noted again that its weather satellite data 
would be universally available free of charge. EUMETSAT took the opportunity to 
announce its new data sharing policy, which made all archived data available freely 
online. Participants noted that promotion of the benefits of full and open access to 
GEOSS data would help to engage providers and users.522 
 
As these and earlier statements show, one of GEO’s largest contributions is as a 
forum for discussion of data sharing policies. This forum provides an opportunity to 
exchange information on concrete benefits of various data sharing policies, and it 
allows nations to make political arguments and exert peer pressure. For example, the 
United States announced at a GEO meeting that Landsat data would be made freely 
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available online to all users. After this policy was implemented, Landsat distributed 
as many scenes in one month as had previously been distributed over an entire year. 
GEO provided a forum in which this dramatic demonstration of user demand for 
freely available data could be presented to those developing data sharing policies in 
other nations, and it had a significant impact. The Landsat example is frequently 
referenced as a concrete argument in favor of moving to free and open data sharing 
policies. Nations share information on data use, growth of the value-added sector, and 
other economic benefits of open data policies. 
 
Data Sharing Innovations: Data Democracy and Data-CORE 
The 2010 GEO Plenary, GEO-VII, marked the halfway point in GEOSS 
implementation. The mid-term evaluation report noted that a large number of survey 
respondents identified the GEOSS data sharing principles as both the most important 
accomplishment of GEOSS to date and as one of the major challenges still facing 
GEOSS. It was felt that GEO had facilitated discussion and some consensus on a 
historically contentious issue, but also that the discussion needed to be transitioned to 
action.523  
 
The concept of the GOESS Data Collection of Open Resources for Everyone (the 
GEOSS Data-CORE) was introduced at the 2010 Plenary. While all data is welcome 
within GEOSS, the CORE includes only data that fully adhere to the GEOSS data 
sharing principles of full and open access. This makes freely available data easier for 
                                                






users to find and also provides special recognition for data providers that follow the 
GEO principles.524 The plenary also endorsed the idea of Data Democracy, originally 
developed within CEOS, which emphasized data sharing and capacity building 
specifically with respect to developing countries.525 The GEOSS Data Sharing Action 
Plan laid out specific actions to implement the data sharing principles.526 
 
The GEOSS Data-CORE is one example of an innovative idea developed within GEO 
that helps to clearly identify the state of data sharing and to make concrete arguments 
related to data sharing outcomes. With the Data-CORE, it is possible to clearly see 
which nations or agencies comply with the GEOSS Data Sharing Principles and 
which do not. This makes it easier to exert peer pressure, political, and economic 
arguments to effect non-compliant data sharing policies. The existence of the Data-
CORE also works as a demonstration project to show the benefits of easily accessible, 
freely available data. 
 
Responding to these new concepts, many countries continued to voice their support 
for data sharing, including the establishment of the Data-CORE and the concept of 
data democracy, with the United States and South Africa as particularly strong 
advocates. Other countries continued to be sensitive to wording that reflected poorly 
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on more restrictive national policies. For example, the European Space Agency 
(ESA) suggested that the word “conditions” should be used rather than “restrictions,” 
because it has a more positive connotation, and argued that it is reasonable to view 
prices as a condition rather than a restriction.527 This highlights the issues that even 
some very active GEO members, like Japan and India, did not made substantial 
changes in their data sharing policies that would increase access to data, instead 
attempting to broaden the data sharing principles or emphasizing the “best efforts” 
aspect of the agreements.  
 
Data democracy emphasizes normative arguments, attempting to get agreement on 
increased free data sharing in particular cases. Brazil and other developing nations 
have been particularly vocal about the concept of Data Democracy, which encourages 
data-sharing and capacity building specifically for developing nations. Groups within 
GEO have also chipped away at restrictive data sharing policies by arguing for, and 
getting, exceptions to data restrictions with respect to particular societal benefit areas, 
like disasters, or particular projects, like forest carbon monitoring. 
 
The GEOSS Data-CORE and Data Democracy concepts were endorsed at the 2010 
GEO Ministerial Summit that followed the GEO-VII Plenary. The importance of data 
sharing was again highlighted at the summit, with multiple countries calling out the 
issue in their statements. Estonia noted that full and open exchange of data was one of 
                                                






the biggest achievements of GEO and had caused a complete change in philosophy.528 
The European Commission called the adoption of the Data Sharing Action Plan “the 
beginning of a new era of international cooperation in Earth observation,” and 
reminded members of the policy of open access for GMES data.529 ESA noted that it 
had put in place a new policy of free and open access to its data, including past ERS, 
Envisat, and Earth Explorer missions.530 The United States emphasized the need for 
international cooperation on data collection and access and noted its continued 
support for the promotion of the GEOSS Data Sharing Principles.531 
 
Many participants in GEO noted a change in data sharing norms that has taken place 
over time. Whereas countries used to ask, “Why should I share my data?” countries 
now focus on “Why can’t this data be shared?” This change in focus – from an 
assumption of restrictions to an assumption of openness – is even written into the 
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Data Sharing Action Plan approved that year, which encouraged nations to examine 
restrictions on each dataset to clearly define the justifications for these restrictions.532 
 
The 2011 GEO Plenary, GEO-VIII, focused on implementing the GEOSS Data-
CORE concept. An official evaluation of the Architecture and Data Management 
activities found that the GEOSS architecture was still limited by restrictive data 
policies. They concluded that implementation of the Data Sharing Action Plan would 
be crucial for the group to meet its goals by 2015.533 The 2012-2015 work plan called 
for maximizing the number of data sets available within the GEOSS Data-CORE, 
developing metrics to show the impact of open data, and encouraging countries to 
identify specific institutional, legal, and technical barriers to full and open exchange 
of data.534  
 
The ultimate goal of GEO with respect to data sharing is to have all countries in full 
compliance with the GEOSS Data Sharing Principles. This would involve full and 
open access to all Earth observation data at no cost for all users. Data would be easily 
discoverable, accessible, and usable for all needs. Clearly, GEO has not yet fully 
achieved this goal – there is a significant amount of Earth observation data for which 
access is restricted or that is not available at all.  
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It is clear that countries do not change their policies just because “GEO said so.” 
GEO is an intergovernmental, consensus-based organization, based on voluntary 
“best efforts” of members. The vast majority of GEOSS costs are borne by members 
or participating organizations through their own actions, rather than through a central 
fund controlled by GEO. This voluntary structure means that GEO cannot and does 
not force members to change their data sharing policies. However, GEO did act as a 
forum in which economic arguments, normative arguments, and the inherently global 
nature of climate change and Earth observations were widely discussed. 
 
It is not clear that GEO will ever be able achieve free and open data sharing of all 
global Earth observation data. There may always be countries that do not see the 
benefits of contributing, and are not willing to make the necessary investments to do 
so. The desire to benefit from economically valuable data and the desire to control 
data access and distribution are unlikely to ever completely disappear, and could even 
see a resurgence, depending on larger economic and political trends. However, GEO 
has had a meaningful effect on national data sharing policies through wide and 
growing participation, promotion of high-level recognition of the importance of 
international cooperation on global Earth observations, and as a forum for both 
economic and normative arguments. Innovative ideas, such as the GEOSS Data-
CORE, provide concrete steps to further encourage data sharing. Continued efforts 
within GEO, building on these strengths, are likely to continue to have a meaningful 





7.3 International Case Study Discussion 
These two case studies show that international organizations have a major role to play 
in encouraging international data sharing. However, due to their different histories, 
focus, and organization, WMO and GEO affect data policies in different ways and 
have unique methods in which they could drive future climate data sharing. WMO 
has a long established history of international data sharing and an established sharing 
system. Its focus on operational monitoring and has the ability to make resolutions 
that are considered binding by members. These characteristics make it best able to 
institutionalize official data sharing among members for a minimal set of “essential 
data.” It has accomplished this goal for weather, and has great potential to apply 
similar methods to institutionalize official operational climate monitoring. GEO is a 
relatively new organization, with a smaller, but growing membership that includes 
operational and research organizations. Its strength lies in its ability to bring together 
individuals with the ability to affect national data sharing policies, and its 
commitment to maintaining pressure on members to adopt free and open data sharing 
policies for all environmental data. Though its policies and principles are not 
considered binding, it has had, and continues to have, an important effect on national 
data sharing policies. It has done this by developing systems, such as the GEO Data-
CORE that make compliance with its free and open data sharing principles easy to 
monitor, and providing a forum in which compliant countries can gain recognition 
and praise and non-compliant countries can be visibly called-out on their non-




sharing mechanisms and benefits can be shared and discussed, exerts meaningful peer 
pressure on members. Although compliance with its principles is not as universal as 
compliance with WMO resolutions, GEO has a greater ability to extend data sharing 
beyond “essential” data to all relevant environmental data. 
 
Both the World Meteorological Organization and the Group on Earth Observations 
were created due to recognition of the need for international cooperation on global 
issues, including meteorological and other environmental challenges. Both 
organizations have had consistently high levels of political visibility and support for 
their programs. This support has played a major role in encouraging progress on 
organizational goals and has ensured that decisions made in these organizations 
would be implemented by members. The focus of the organizations is on the benefits 
to society of international cooperation in weather, climate, disasters, or other areas, 
rather than on a particular technology or more abstract desires for international 
engagement. Both identified specific needs for data and information and emphasized 
that it would be impossible for any one country to address these issues on its own. 
These factors, which illustrate the importance and benefits of the organizations, have 
been effective in attracting members.  
 
International data sharing was and is a very prominent issue in both organizations, 
and is seen as fundamental to achieving each organization’s goals. However, the 
World Meteorological Organization and the Group on Earth Observations have taken 




existing tradition of free and open data sharing for weather, encouraging and building 
this capability as meteorological technology and techniques improved over time. 
However, the most important action of the WMO in this area was its successful 
attempt to formalize adherence to this tradition when it was endangered by growing 
interest in commercial activities. The WMO was able to do this by emphasizing the 
importance of international data sharing to the shared goal of accurate global weather 
forecasting and negotiations among member states about which data was essential to 
achieving this goal. The WMO had a major impact on national data sharing policies 
because members consider its resolutions binding. Before the resolution was passed, 
interest in cost recovery and commercialization had led to uncoordinated decisions by 
individual nations to restrict international sharing of some types of data. After the 
resolution, there was agreement by all nations on which data may or may not be 
restricted. Despite this important achievement, the effect on WMO data principles are 
limited, because they address only a minimal set of “essential” data, and they do not 
play an important role for agencies that were not traditionally involved in 
meteorological activities, such as space research agencies.  
 
Though each of its programs emphasize specific data needs or encourage further 
sharing, WMO has not yet taken major action, on the level of that undertaken for 
Resolution 40, to increase data sharing or address climate data in particular. However, 
the WMO has already begun to work more closely with space agencies that collect 
climate data, and the WMO Global Framework for Climate Services program has 




climate data. If the WMO moved forward to identify a set of “essential” climate data 
to be collected and shared on an operational basis, this could have a similar impact to 
WMO Resolution 40, institutionalizing at least some level of free and open 
international data sharing. Beyond identifying and getting consensus on which data 
must be shared, WMO would represent a mature international system in which 
climate data could be exchanged – WMO could provide not just the what, but the 
how. While there is great potential for WMO to make a meaningful impact on 
international climate data sharing policies, getting consensus on climate data sharing 
would not be easy, as there is less precedent for sharing this type of data, and the 
WMO would likely need to engage non-traditional members, such as space agencies, 
to fully take advantage of all available data sources. 
 
GEO, by contrast, has no coercive effect on national data sharing policies, and 
adherence to its data sharing principles is only expected on a “best effort” level by 
members. However, unlike the WMO, efforts to increase international data sharing 
have remained at the forefront of GEO activities, resulting in policy innovations, such 
as the GEO Data-CORE, that increase visibility of nations that do or do not comply 
with GEO’s data sharing policies. This visibility increases the prestige for nations that 
do comply. It also raises awareness of data availability, which likely increases data 
use and overall benefit. USGS’s decision to announce its open data sharing policy for 
Landsat at a GEO Summit was based on the fact that this forum was highly visible 
and filled with international representatives who would recognize the significance of 




its importance would likely have been much lower, the United States would have 
received less prestige benefit, use of Landsat data may have been lower, and the 
United States would have had less potential to affect other nations’ policies. GEOs 
efforts to increase visibility also increase the penalty, in terms of prestige, for nations 
that do not comply with its principles. Japan, for example, takes a leadership role in 
many GEO activities, but is repeatedly called out for not adopting a free and open 
data sharing policy. 
 
GEO acts as an important forum in which political arguments are made, peer pressure 
is exerted, and impacts of existing data sharing policies are demonstrated and 
discussed. These discussions and demonstrations have played an important role in 
convincing nations to open their data sharing policies. GEO is still a relatively new 
organization, and it is not yet clear the extent to which it will be able to fully achieve 
its goals. However, GEO is currently the most important international organization in 
terms of actively addressing global data sharing issues and driving change in national 
climate-relevant satellite data sharing policies. 
 
Overall, these case studies show that international organizations have a major role to 
play in encouraging global data sharing. Both organizations help to generate 
consensus that climate data that must be shared internationally. WMO’s strength lies 
in its ability to institutionalize data sharing for at least a sub-set of data it deems 
essential and to provide a technical and organizational framework for data exchange 
to take place. Through these mechanisms, it plays a very important role in 




policies comply with WMO resolutions. As climate monitoring becomes increasingly 
important to the National Weather Services that make up its core membership, and as 
it continues to engage space agencies that collect climate data, the WMO has the 
potential to have an important role in institutionalizing international data sharing of 
climate data, as well. GEO’s primary contribution is in keeping the issue of 
international environmental data sharing visible at high levels of government, 
providing prestige and benefits to those who share data freely, and consistently 
pressing nations that do not adopt free and open policies to do so. GEO also helps to 
distribute information about the benefits of data sharing and the effects of existing 







Chapter 8:  Conclusions and Policy Implications 
 
This dissertation began with an assertion that there was a need for climate data that 
could not be met by one nation on its own, but that some data is shared while other 
data isn’t; data sharing is not consistent. Current thinking on data sharing policy 
provided a large number of potential arguments for and against data sharing, but did 
not provide insight into which of these arguments are most important in developing 
data sharing policies, particularly in the case of climate satellites. This research 
examined the process of satellite data sharing policy development to add this 
important new dimension, identifying which issues were most important in 
determining data sharing policies within space and meteorological agencies, why 
these particular issues were important, and what implications this has for future 
policy-making. I used a comprehensive data set, quantitative analysis, and finally, a 
set of multi-level case studies to develop a model of policy making for Earth 
observation data. The model shows that data sharing policies are driven by debates 
among government agency and budget representatives regarding the most efficient, 
morally defensible, and effective data sharing practices. Policy-making has 
historically taken place despite a number of key uncertainties, which greatly 
influenced the development of early policies. Data-sharing policies have been 
informed by experience over time, reducing uncertainties and changing the strength 






Economic arguments, particularly whether the data is seen as a public good or a 
commodity, play the greatest role in Earth observation satellite data sharing policies. 
Agency officials support treatment of data as a public good and free and open data 
sharing. For a given level of expenditure, this policy maximizes data use, allowing 
agencies to achieve their mission of promoting research or operational activities to the 
greatest extent possible. Budgeting officials support data sales, emphasizing the 
importance of lowering costs and minimizing budget outlays. Once an agency has 
established that its satellite data is dependable, useful, and has potential commercial 
value, budgeting officials have an interest in promoting cost recovery or 
commercialization policies that could reduce costs to the government and increase 
overall efficiency. In cases where the size of the commercial market for data is large, 
commercialization will likely be successful and bring the efficiency benefits 
associated with a competitive market. If demand is highly inelastic, then these polices 
can be put in place without significantly decreasing data use and related benefits. 
With inelastic demand, cost recovery could lead to decreased costs without loss of 
benefits, even if a fully commercial venture was not viable.  
 
If the size of the commercial market and elasticity of demand for satellite data was 
unknown, as it was for early systems in the 1980s and 1990s, the budgeting officials’ 
argument is particularly strong – it has the potential for lowering costs without 
lowering benefits, while free data policies can only continue the status quo, with no 
potential for savings. This led to the adoption of cost recovery or commercialization 




However, these efforts failed in almost all cases, demonstrating both that a 
commercial market for satellite data is not viable for most climate relevant data and 
that elasticity of demand is actually quite high – even small increases in cost lead to 
significant reductions in data use. In cases where commercial data sales may still be 
possible, particularly for high resolution and synthetic aperture radar data, policies 
supporting data sales are often continued. Therefore, a rule of thumb for data sharing 
policies is that if the data can be sold, it will be sold – free data sharing policies are 
generally only put in place when data sales have proven impossible. 
 
Normative arguments about the fairness of data sharing policies are most often used 
to justify economic arguments. Agencies that see data as a commodity back up their 
policies with an argument that the government should act as a public trust. Agencies 
that argue for a public good view of data say that the public has already paid for the 
data and shouldn’t be forced to pay again. This normative argument is almost always 
given, so though it may not drive policy, it is seen as an important component in 
defending a policy. 
 
In very specific cases, normative arguments can trump economic arguments; this is 
primarily seen in the case of the weather, due to the clear connection between 
extreme weather events and loss of life and property as well as the ability for accurate 
monitoring and forecasts to reduce loss of life and property. These arguments are 
weaker with regard to climate data, largely because the links between climate change 




less well understood, particularly by decision-makers. However, understanding of 
climate impacts and benefits of climate knowledge and forecasting are increasing, and 
this trend will strengthen these arguments over time.   
 
Finally, the global nature of climate change and environmental monitoring plays an 
important role in encouraging data sharing. The need for international cooperation to 
effectively address global issues was the primary determinant for the creation of 
international organizations focused on data sharing – particularly the WMO and 
GEO. This argument is particularly strong within the weather community. Even when 
a restriction of data sharing was discussed, it was always mutually agreed within the 
WMO that some international sharing would continue. Countries argued about which 
data should be shared, not whether or not all data should be shared. This was less true 
with respect to climate data for a number of reasons. First, climate is a relatively new 
phenomenon, without the nearly 150-year history of sharing seen in the international 
weather community. Further, the needs for climate, in terms of both the types of data 
needed as well as requirements for consistent, ongoing monitoring are less well 










Table 8.1 Summaries of Determinants of Data Sharing Policy, Key 
Uncertainties, and Policy Implications 
 Economic Normative Institutional 
Agency Officials Free data maximizes use 
and therefore benefit 
(though hard to 
quantify) 
Best way to achieve 
mission 
Climate data 
sharing saves lives 
and property 
(argument strong 
with respect to 
weather data, 




to address the issue 
(argument strong 
with respect to 
weather data, weaker 
for climate data) 
Legislative and 
Budget Officials 
Cost recovery or 
commercial system 
could reduce costs, 
and/or create revenue 
(quantifiable benefit) 
May not have 
substantial effect on 
data use 
Key Uncertainties Is there a commercial 
market for satellite data? 
What is the elasticity of 
demand? 
What are the benefits of 
data use? 
Link between 
climate impacts and 
loss of life/ 
property 
Link between 
climate data and 
adaptation/ 
mitigation of 
impacts (e.g. lives 
saved) 
How much data is 
required?  
Which data must be 
shared?   
How can/ should it 





experience suggests that 
for almost all climate 
data, there is no 
commercial market, and 
elasticity is very high 
There are a multitude of 
valuable data uses 
Advances in 
climate science are 
making the link 
between climate 
change and its 
impacts more clear, 
operational uses of 
climate data need to 
be further 
developed 
Int. orgs have helped 
to show that it is not 
possible for one 
country to collect all 






It is most efficient for 
governments to treat 
data as a public good 
and make it freely 
available 
Climate data should 
be shared because 
of its ability to 
contribute to saving 
lives and property  
WMO should 
develop a resolution 
on climate data 
sharing 
GEO should 
continue efforts to 
increase data sharing 
Figure 8.1 summarizes the determinants of data sharing policies across agencies, the key uncertainties 





However, international organizations such as GCOS have helped to increase 
international agreement on climate data collection requirements. Also, NMSs, which 
make up WMO membership, have become increasingly interested in operational 
climate monitoring, and WMO has engaged with space agencies collecting climate 
data. WMO has the potential to be an important facilitator of climate data sharing in 
the future. GEO has contributed to increasing international data sharing primarily by 
putting consistent pressure on both meteorological and space agencies to increase 
data sharing. Though its policies and principles are not considered binding, GEO 
ensures that national data sharing policies remain visible, praising nations that 
provide data freely and calling attention to those that do not. 
 
Policy Implications 
This research identified the driving themes of data-sharing policy development – the 
three areas on which countries base their decision-making – as economic, normative, 
and institutional concerns. It is important to also tie this finding to the challenge that 
motivated this research – the prospects of improving the global ability to adequately 
monitor climate change. 
  
Economic considerations were determined to be one of the most important 
determinants of current data sharing policies, particularly as a barrier to free and open 
sharing. All experience and evidence up to this point has suggested that there is no 
viable commercial market for most climate-relevant satellite data, and elasticity of 
demand is very high. Therefore, the best information available suggests that 




adopting free and open data sharing policies, as this will maximize economic 
efficiency. 
 
Despite past experience, there is still some uncertainty about the costs and benefits of 
various data sharing policies, and nations have often continued efforts at cost 
recovery or commercialization in cases where data is at least partially commercially 
viable, for example for high resolution imagery and synthetic aperture radar data. 
Given widespread government preferences for supporting commercial efforts 
whenever possible, governments should aim to identify opportunities for maximizing 
data use, particularly for research and educational use, within the constraints of 
commercial or public-private regimes for data sales. Further, arguments about the 
economic efficiency of free and open data policies could be strengthened through 
analysis of the costs and benefits of particular policies. To do this, governments 
should seek to better track users, downloads, and resulting publications or products, 
and they should support research on economic impacts of various data sharing 
policies.  
  
Secondly, I found that normative arguments played a role in both the weather and 
climate communities, but were given higher priority in the weather community. 
Given the similarities in the structure of these two issues, normative and institutional 
arguments made in the weather community should be applied to climate data. The 
ability of climate data to contribute to the preservation of life and property should be 




this understanding, governments should increase international climate data sharing, at 
least for official use, due to the moral requirement to share data that has the potential 
to reduce loss of life and property. 
 
Finally, requirements and organizational systems for international exchange of 
weather data are much better developed than those for climate, as seen within the 
WMO system. However, the need for international cooperation to adequately monitor 
climate is similar to that for weather. Therefore, the WMO should specifically address 
the issue of climate data sharing by developing a resolution on the issue modeled after 
Resolution 40, as has been proposed by the WMO Global Framework for Climate 
Services. This would institutionalize international collection and sharing of at least a 
minimal set of essential climate data. Further, GEO should maintain its efforts to 
encourage data sharing by continuing to raise the visibility of both compliant and 
non-compliant national data sharing policies, and providing a forum for 
understanding the benefits of free and open data sharing policies. 
  
Future Research 
Carrying out this research has illuminated numerous questions and potential future 
research areas. One of the greatest needs in this area is for increased evidence of the 
economic effects of various data sharing policies. The U.S. Landsat Program is one of 
the best candidates for beginning this type of research. The Landsat Program has 
continuously operated medium-resolution land remote sensing satellites for forty 




Both these price changes and the number of users, as well as revenue, are well 
documented. This analysis would be most effective if combined with data on the 
actual use of the data in terms of publications or products derived from Landsat data. 
An analysis of the relationship between Landsat data sharing policies and data use or 
outputs could provide important insight into the effects of data sharing policies. This 
research could take into account other variables, such as increasing permeation of the 
Internet and computer processing power. This analysis would help to provide 
evidence of the economic impacts of changes in data sharing policies, tying back to 
my first policy implication. 
 
The analysis here showed that though economic arguments are important, there tends 
to be a rule of thumb that if it is possible to sell the data commercially, it will be sold. 
However, many of the existing commercial remote sensing entities are public-private 
partnerships that rely on public investment in satellite development or private 
companies that rely on the government as an anchor tenant. Research that looked at 
the various models currently in place for commercial remote sensing could help to 
illuminate the extent to which these activities are viable in the long-run, how they 
may evolve, and how data use that serves the public interest could best be achieved 
within these models. Case studies could focus on companies such as Digital Globe, 
Rapid-eye Canada, Astrium Services, and DMCii. Assuming that the rule of thumb 
will remain over time, a better understanding of commercial models for remote 
sensing sales could help to identify potential compromises or partnerships that would 




government open-license data buys, sharing of archived data, or sharing of degraded 
data could all offer potential improvements on the current situation amenable to both 
commercial entities and other users. 
 
Similarly, as identified by the second policy implication above, there is a need to look 
systematically at the structural similarities between weather and climate and the data 
needed for each of these areas. This would help to identify in more detail why 
meteorological data sharing is widely accepted and implemented as a normative and 
institutional imperative, while climate data sharing is not. Demonstrating similarities 
between the two may help to encourage increased commitments to climate data 
sharing, bringing this activity up to the level of meteorological data sharing. 
Differences in the two areas can help to illuminate the reasons for current differences 
in data sharing as well as special challenges that may need to be addressed in order to 
encourage climate data sharing in the future. 
 
While this research has focused on data sharing policies in countries with the largest 
Earth observation programs, expansion to other nations could be beneficial as well. 
For example, a case study on Chinese data sharing policy would be quite interesting, 
as this is an area where China is relatively open and transparent, sharing a significant 
amount of data. India, by contrast, operates important climate-relevant satellites, but 
is uncharacteristically opaque, significantly restricting access to their environmental 
satellite data. In India’s case, this seems to stem from security concerns, a 




satellites. A better understanding of this concern may illuminate whether this 
determinant is likely to remain important in India, gain strength elsewhere, or become 
less important over time. Though this analysis included Europe as a whole, analysis 
of individual European countries would improve overall understanding of the data 
sharing policy-making process. In particular, France engages in a number of unique 
public-private partnerships that involve satellite development and data sales that 
could provide insight into government views on commercialization.  
 
Another interesting set of cases would focus on the contribution of developing 
nations, which often own only one or two relatively simple Earth observation 
satellites. A number of developing countries, led by Brazil, are very vocal within 
GEO about the ethical responsibility of countries to share data for the benefit of 
developing nations. However, as a whole, developing nations are generally less likely 
to make their data freely available. These countries face different structural 
challenges than the countries examined in this research, particularly in their economic 
constraints or their ability to contribute to an international observing system. They 
may also be learning from the policies and actions of other countries. Case studies 
focused specifically on data sharing policies in these countries could provide insight 
into these diverse policy-making considerations. 
 
It was noted early on that international cooperation on climate monitoring would 
require international coordination in terms of data collection as well as cooperation in 




also of great importance. Because of the level of investment required, it is impractical 
for one country to collect all relevant climate data. Improved international 
cooperation in this area could not only lead to elimination of climate monitoring gaps, 
but could also provide budgetary savings as a more efficient global system eliminates 
unnecessary collection overlaps. Given budgetary concerns following the global 
financial crisis, particularly in the United States, this potential for savings may be an 
important factor driving future cooperation.  
 
Understanding how nations decide which and how many climate-relevant satellites to 
build, and particularly the extent to which they currently coordinate with other 
nations in doing so, would be essential to eventually developing a complete global 
climate monitoring system. There is evidence that some countries, for example 
Argentina, look specifically to develop satellites that collect data no other nation is 
collecting, ensuring that other nations will value their contribution to the international 
system, even if it only consists of a small number of satellites.535 Other nations seem 
to focus on collecting only the data that is of greatest importance to their own 
country. In addition to looking at motivations for these different policies, it would be 
useful to examine existing methods of cooperation in data collection, whether in joint 
satellite development, coordinated satellite constellations, or other cooperative 
models, to determine the most effective methods.  
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